the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711).
Sunday, November 20, 2011
In People v Hackett (2011 NY Slip Op 08061 [4th Dept 11/10/11]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, vacated defendant's risk level determination, and remitted the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, where the assessment was based, in part, on factors that had neither been selected on the risk assessment instrument nor raised by the People at the hearing. The Court held that
In People v Hackett (2011 NY Slip Op 08061 [4th Dept 11/10/11]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, vacated defendant's risk level determination, and remitted the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, where the assessment was based, in part, on factors that had neither been selected on the risk assessment instrument nor raised by the People at the hearing. The Court held that
the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711).
Parents and teachers know you're more likely to achieve desired behaviors if there are consequences for disobedience. Appellate courts, when dealing with improper conduct by prosecutors, seem unaware of this simple rule. So they repeatedly criticize prosecutorial misconduct in appellate decisions which affirm the conviction. Then they wonder why trial attorneys persist in the behavior which resulted in the conviction and then the affirmance. For example, in People v Washington (2011 NY Slip Op 08404 [4th Dept [11/18/11]), the Court wrote that
Perhaps if the Court, confronted by persistent misconduct, exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction and reversed, trial prosecutors would get the message and finally stop asking these improper questions. And if that seems too much, maybe the Court could deter the misconduct by simply naming in its decision the trial prosecutor who engaged in misconduct. The current practice of affirming while noting that the unnamed prosecutor acted improperly is a demonstrated failure at impacting behavior.
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial based on the prosecutor's improper questions on cross-examination concerning whether the prosecution witnesses were lying or were liars. That contention is not preserved for our review inasmuch as defendant failed to object to those questions (see CPL 470.05 [2]), and we decline to exercise our power to review defendant's contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We note, however, that such questions were improper (see People v Paul, 229 AD2d 932; People v Paul, 212 AD2d 1020, 1021, lv denied 85 NY2d 912; People v Edwards, 167 AD2d 864, lv denied 77 NY2d 877). As this Court stated over 20 years ago, "[o]n numerous occasions, we have forcefully condemned prosecutorial cross-examination which compels a defendant to state that witnesses lied in their testimony" (People v Eldridge, 151 AD2d 966, 966, lv denied 74 NY2d 808). Unfortunately, we find it necessary once again to forcefully condemn such improper conduct by the prosecutor.
Perhaps if the Court, confronted by persistent misconduct, exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction and reversed, trial prosecutors would get the message and finally stop asking these improper questions. And if that seems too much, maybe the Court could deter the misconduct by simply naming in its decision the trial prosecutor who engaged in misconduct. The current practice of affirming while noting that the unnamed prosecutor acted improperly is a demonstrated failure at impacting behavior.
Parents and teachers know you're more likely to achieve desired behaviors if there are consequences for disobedience. Appellate courts, when dealing with improper conduct by prosecutors, seem unaware of this simple rule. So they repeatedly criticize prosecutorial misconduct in appellate decisions which affirm the conviction. Then they wonder why trial attorneys persist in the behavior which resulted in the conviction and then the affirmance. For example, in People v Washington (2011 NY Slip Op 08404 [4th Dept [11/18/11]), the Court wrote that
Perhaps if the Court, confronted by persistent misconduct, exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction and reversed, trial prosecutors would get the message and finally stop asking these improper questions. And if that seems too much, maybe the Court could deter the misconduct by simply naming in its decision the trial prosecutor who engaged in misconduct. The current practice of affirming while noting that the unnamed prosecutor acted improperly is a demonstrated failure at impacting behavior.
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial based on the prosecutor's improper questions on cross-examination concerning whether the prosecution witnesses were lying or were liars. That contention is not preserved for our review inasmuch as defendant failed to object to those questions (see CPL 470.05 [2]), and we decline to exercise our power to review defendant's contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We note, however, that such questions were improper (see People v Paul, 229 AD2d 932; People v Paul, 212 AD2d 1020, 1021, lv denied 85 NY2d 912; People v Edwards, 167 AD2d 864, lv denied 77 NY2d 877). As this Court stated over 20 years ago, "[o]n numerous occasions, we have forcefully condemned prosecutorial cross-examination which compels a defendant to state that witnesses lied in their testimony" (People v Eldridge, 151 AD2d 966, 966, lv denied 74 NY2d 808). Unfortunately, we find it necessary once again to forcefully condemn such improper conduct by the prosecutor.
Perhaps if the Court, confronted by persistent misconduct, exercised its interest of justice jurisdiction and reversed, trial prosecutors would get the message and finally stop asking these improper questions. And if that seems too much, maybe the Court could deter the misconduct by simply naming in its decision the trial prosecutor who engaged in misconduct. The current practice of affirming while noting that the unnamed prosecutor acted improperly is a demonstrated failure at impacting behavior.
In Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts (129 S.Ct. 2527 [2009]), the Supreme Court held that it violate the right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of a person who performed the test subject to confrontation. Thus, the admission at trial of three sworn “certificates of analysis” or affidavits showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on samples of the seized white powder was reversible error where the analyst did not testify. The Court rejected the ideas that the right to confrontation only applied when the evidence accused someone of a crime or didn’t apply to scientific tests, noting that crime labs have provided unreliable evidence in the past, and said that confrontation would help find the truth.
This year, in Bullcoming v New Mexico (564 U.S. __,131 S.Ct. 2705 [2011]), the Court held that under the confrontation clause “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”
In People v Pealer (2011 NY Slip Op 08397 [4th Dept 11/18/11]) considered whether these holding apply to the calibration and simulator solution certificates used in verifying the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. The problems with the reliability and accuracy of such certificates was revealed in a 1987 Pennsylvania audit report (http://www.ridl.us/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=294). The Fourth Department rejected the contention that these documents were testimonial subject to the right to confrontation, holding that
It should be noted that some local courts have held otherwise (People v Carreira, 27 Misc3d [Watertown City Ct 2010]; People v. Heyanka, 25 Misc3d 978 [Dist Ct Suffolk Co 2009]).
This year, in Bullcoming v New Mexico (564 U.S. __,131 S.Ct. 2705 [2011]), the Court held that under the confrontation clause “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”
In People v Pealer (2011 NY Slip Op 08397 [4th Dept 11/18/11]) considered whether these holding apply to the calibration and simulator solution certificates used in verifying the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. The problems with the reliability and accuracy of such certificates was revealed in a 1987 Pennsylvania audit report (http://www.ridl.us/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=294). The Fourth Department rejected the contention that these documents were testimonial subject to the right to confrontation, holding that
the statements contained in the breath test documents are not accusatory in the sense that they do not establish an element of the crimes. Indeed, standing alone, the documents shed no light on defendant's guilt or innocence. The only relevant fact established by the documents is that the breath test instrument was functioning properly. The functionality of the machine, however, neither directly establishes an element of the crimes charged nor inculpates any particular individual. Thus, the government employees who prepared the records were “not defendant's accuser[s]' in any but the most attenuated sense”, and the breath test documents were properly admitted in evidence over defendant's objection based on the Confrontation Clause (internal citations omitted).
It should be noted that some local courts have held otherwise (People v Carreira, 27 Misc3d [Watertown City Ct 2010]; People v. Heyanka, 25 Misc3d 978 [Dist Ct Suffolk Co 2009]).
In Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts (129 S.Ct. 2527 [2009]), the Supreme Court held that it violate the right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of a person who performed the test subject to confrontation. Thus, the admission at trial of three sworn “certificates of analysis” or affidavits showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on samples of the seized white powder was reversible error where the analyst did not testify. The Court rejected the ideas that the right to confrontation only applied when the evidence accused someone of a crime or didn’t apply to scientific tests, noting that crime labs have provided unreliable evidence in the past, and said that confrontation would help find the truth.
This year, in Bullcoming v New Mexico (564 U.S. __,131 S.Ct. 2705 [2011]), the Court held that under the confrontation clause “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”
In People v Pealer (2011 NY Slip Op 08397 [4th Dept 11/18/11]) considered whether these holding apply to the calibration and simulator solution certificates used in verifying the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. The problems with the reliability and accuracy of such certificates was revealed in a 1987 Pennsylvania audit report (http://www.ridl.us/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=294). The Fourth Department rejected the contention that these documents were testimonial subject to the right to confrontation, holding that
It should be noted that some local courts have held otherwise (People v Carreira, 27 Misc3d [Watertown City Ct 2010]; People v. Heyanka, 25 Misc3d 978 [Dist Ct Suffolk Co 2009]).
This year, in Bullcoming v New Mexico (564 U.S. __,131 S.Ct. 2705 [2011]), the Court held that under the confrontation clause “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”
In People v Pealer (2011 NY Slip Op 08397 [4th Dept 11/18/11]) considered whether these holding apply to the calibration and simulator solution certificates used in verifying the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. The problems with the reliability and accuracy of such certificates was revealed in a 1987 Pennsylvania audit report (http://www.ridl.us/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=294). The Fourth Department rejected the contention that these documents were testimonial subject to the right to confrontation, holding that
the statements contained in the breath test documents are not accusatory in the sense that they do not establish an element of the crimes. Indeed, standing alone, the documents shed no light on defendant's guilt or innocence. The only relevant fact established by the documents is that the breath test instrument was functioning properly. The functionality of the machine, however, neither directly establishes an element of the crimes charged nor inculpates any particular individual. Thus, the government employees who prepared the records were “not defendant's accuser[s]' in any but the most attenuated sense”, and the breath test documents were properly admitted in evidence over defendant's objection based on the Confrontation Clause (internal citations omitted).
It should be noted that some local courts have held otherwise (People v Carreira, 27 Misc3d [Watertown City Ct 2010]; People v. Heyanka, 25 Misc3d 978 [Dist Ct Suffolk Co 2009]).
Thursday, November 10, 2011
While the remedy was merely remand for a new hearing, this decision could prove important if it stops a court from assessing points at the SORA hearing. It's also an important reminder that SORA is a contested process where the People bear the burden.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
1236 KA 11-00285
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
V
PATRICK HACKETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (NORMAN P. EFFMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LORI PETTIT RIEMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY (KELLY M. BALCOM OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M. Himelein, J.), dated January 25, 2010. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On appeal from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.), defendant contends that County Court miscalculated his total risk factor score in the risk assessment instrument (RAI), and thus mistakenly determined that he was presumptively a level three risk based on that score. We agree with defendant. In fact, pursuant to the correct total risk factor score in the RAI, defendant is presumptively classified as a level two risk. We note, however, that the court also sua sponte assessed additional points under risk factor 3 (Number of Victims) and risk factor 4 (Duration of Offense Conduct with Victim) in the RAI, which then rendered defendant a presumptive level three risk. We further agree with defendant that the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711). We therefore reverse the order, vacate defendant’s risk level determination, and remit the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, and a new hearing if necessary, in compliance with Correction Law §168-n (3) and defendant’s due process rights.
Decided November 10, 2011
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
1236 KA 11-00285
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
V
PATRICK HACKETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (NORMAN P. EFFMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LORI PETTIT RIEMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY (KELLY M. BALCOM OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M. Himelein, J.), dated January 25, 2010. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On appeal from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.), defendant contends that County Court miscalculated his total risk factor score in the risk assessment instrument (RAI), and thus mistakenly determined that he was presumptively a level three risk based on that score. We agree with defendant. In fact, pursuant to the correct total risk factor score in the RAI, defendant is presumptively classified as a level two risk. We note, however, that the court also sua sponte assessed additional points under risk factor 3 (Number of Victims) and risk factor 4 (Duration of Offense Conduct with Victim) in the RAI, which then rendered defendant a presumptive level three risk. We further agree with defendant that the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711). We therefore reverse the order, vacate defendant’s risk level determination, and remit the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, and a new hearing if necessary, in compliance with Correction Law §168-n (3) and defendant’s due process rights.
Decided November 10, 2011
While the remedy was merely remand for a new hearing, this decision could prove important if it stops a court from assessing points at the SORA hearing. It's also an important reminder that SORA is a contested process where the People bear the burden.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
1236 KA 11-00285
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
V
PATRICK HACKETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (NORMAN P. EFFMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LORI PETTIT RIEMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY (KELLY M. BALCOM OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M. Himelein, J.), dated January 25, 2010. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On appeal from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.), defendant contends that County Court miscalculated his total risk factor score in the risk assessment instrument (RAI), and thus mistakenly determined that he was presumptively a level three risk based on that score. We agree with defendant. In fact, pursuant to the correct total risk factor score in the RAI, defendant is presumptively classified as a level two risk. We note, however, that the court also sua sponte assessed additional points under risk factor 3 (Number of Victims) and risk factor 4 (Duration of Offense Conduct with Victim) in the RAI, which then rendered defendant a presumptive level three risk. We further agree with defendant that the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711). We therefore reverse the order, vacate defendant’s risk level determination, and remit the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, and a new hearing if necessary, in compliance with Correction Law §168-n (3) and defendant’s due process rights.
Decided November 10, 2011
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
1236 KA 11-00285
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
V
PATRICK HACKETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (NORMAN P. EFFMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
LORI PETTIT RIEMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY (KELLY M. BALCOM OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M. Himelein, J.), dated January 25, 2010. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On appeal from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.), defendant contends that County Court miscalculated his total risk factor score in the risk assessment instrument (RAI), and thus mistakenly determined that he was presumptively a level three risk based on that score. We agree with defendant. In fact, pursuant to the correct total risk factor score in the RAI, defendant is presumptively classified as a level two risk. We note, however, that the court also sua sponte assessed additional points under risk factor 3 (Number of Victims) and risk factor 4 (Duration of Offense Conduct with Victim) in the RAI, which then rendered defendant a presumptive level three risk. We further agree with defendant that the court violated his due process rights by sua sponte assessing those additional points. The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment (see § 168-n [3]; People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 136-140). Here, neither risk factor was originally selected on the RAI or raised by the People at the SORA hearing, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points for the first time when the court issued its decision (cf. People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, lv denied 12 NY3d 711). We therefore reverse the order, vacate defendant’s risk level determination, and remit the matter to County Court for a new risk level determination, and a new hearing if necessary, in compliance with Correction Law §168-n (3) and defendant’s due process rights.
Decided November 10, 2011
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