Wednesday, August 24, 2011
As detailed in a post last Fall (see) in People v Colville (79 AD3d 189 [2nd Dept 2010]) the Second Department, without reaching a decision on the issue, engaged in detailed review of the arguments as to whether the decision to submit a lesser included offense is a fundamental one that must be made by the defendant or is a strategic one that can be made by counsel. The Colville court noted that courts have split on this issue, which has not yet been addressed by the New York Court of Appeals. That might be changing as Judge Read has granted the appellant in Colville leave to appeal to the Court if Appeals. Hopefully, this means that New York attorneys might soon obtain an answer to this important and recurring question.
As detailed in a post last Fall (see) in People v Colville (79 AD3d 189 [2nd Dept 2010]) the Second Department, without reaching a decision on the issue, engaged in detailed review of the arguments as to whether the decision to submit a lesser included offense is a fundamental one that must be made by the defendant or is a strategic one that can be made by counsel. The Colville court noted that courts have split on this issue, which has not yet been addressed by the New York Court of Appeals. That might be changing as Judge Read has granted the appellant in Colville leave to appeal to the Court if Appeals. Hopefully, this means that New York attorneys might soon obtain an answer to this important and recurring question.
Sunday, August 21, 2011
A Few Thoughts on Sentencing
by
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
A Few Thoughts on Sentencing
by
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
by
Mark D. Hosken, Supervisory Assistant Federal Public Defender.
Western District of New York
What should happen when the government knowingly introduces a witness’ false testimony in a trial. That question was recently before the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, No. 09-4043, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. June 17, 2011). There, the panel affirmed the District Court’s order granting the defendant a new trial. While taking place in the Seventh Circuit, the panel’s holding serves as a reminder as to what defense counsel should do if you are faced with the government introducing testimony known to be false.
In Freeman, an individual charged in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy decides to cooperate, and testifies before the grand jury. He told the grand jury that he participated in the drug conspiracy by mixing and bagging up the drugs for one of the other defendants, and explains how the other defendants fit into the operation. He chronicles his meetings with the defendants and the occasions when he witnessed them together. He testifies to a specific time frame (2003) when he saw all of the defendants at a specific location known as the “penthouse.” That testimony was not true. It was undisputed that one of the defendants, Brian Wilbourn, was incarcerated during a three and a half year period (between 2002 and 2005) when the witness claimed he was present while the defendants were bagging drugs at a specific location.
Defense counsel reviews the witness’ grand jury testimony while preparing for trial. He notifies the government that his client could not have been seen with the other defendants as the witness claimed because his client was incarcerated. As the Seventh Circuit panel noted, “the government plowed ahead and still had [its witness] testify. It solicited testimony about Wilbourn’s presence at the penthouse; it even encouraged [its witness]to specifically detail Wilbourn’s participation in [the] operation there. . . . What’s more, when Wilbourn’s attorney began cross-examining [the witness] about the impossibility of Wilbourn being at the penthouse, the prosecutor objected, stating in the presence of the jury, ‘Objection. That’s not true.’” Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, at *2-3.
Near the end of the trial the government stipulated that that Wilbourn was in prison from April 2002 until September 2005. Twelve days after the government’s witness testified, the stipulation was read to the jury. Notwithstanding the stipulation, the government relied on its witness’ testimony during its closing argument. According to the government, its witness did not lie during his testimony. Rather, the government argued that he was just imprecise or mildly mistaken about the dates on which some events occurred.
The District Court sustained several defense objections, and informed the government that its argument was both inaccurate and an attempt to bolster its witness’ testimony. The District Court later determined that this constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The defendants were ultimately found guilty of the conspiracy charge. However, the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the false testimony of the government’s witness violated their due process rights. The District Court agreed.
In Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, a 7th Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1984), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the panel upheld the district court’s determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment and that if not for the improprieties, the defendants would have been acquitted.
More importantly, the panel extended the government’s duty beyond merely determining the accuracy of its claims. Now, the government must not forgo its duty to investigate its witnesses.
2011 WL 2417091 *5. (internal cites omitted).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applied in different situations. The first being those instances when the prosecution knew or should have known about perjured testimony. These situations are fundamentally unfair. Convictions obtained therein must be set aside. This requires a finding that there existed a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
The Second Circuit has applied the Agurs analysis to set aside convictions when the government’s witnesses have presented perjured testimony. See, United States v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972) (the government’s deceit including untruthful testimony, deliberate excisions from reports, preparation of false reports and repeated misrepresentations required a new trial); Perkins v. LeFevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982) (the prosecution’s failure to provide the witness’ rap sheet to the defense after the witness denied any convictions which were recorded on his criminal history resulted in the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991) (the perjury of the government’s witness required a reversal of the convictions when the government in redirect and in closing argument made much of the witness’ motive for telling the truth.); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1997) (the government’s use of business record evidence that it knew contained fictitious entries, and according to its author were false in their entirety, required reversal when the government conducted no further inquiry into the veracity of the records.); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002) (the prosecutor’s failure to correct the record in spite of the witness’ false testimony and her argument in summation relying on that false testimony was sufficient basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus); and Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (the prosecutor knowingly elicited false statements from a witness and did not correct the record when the witness testified falsely about conversations he had with the prosecutor - this was sufficient to grant a writ of habeas corpus.).
The importance of the Freeman decision is the imposition of a duty on the prosecutor to investigate his/her witnesses. The government’s counsel may no longer contend “I didn’t know,” or “the witness was simply mistaken,” or “the defense attorney had a sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witness.” Defense counsel should put the government on notice of a witness’ perjury, record proper objections, and challenge the government’s failure to correct the record. Building on the Supreme Court decisions and adding the direction in Freeman, counsel should argue the government’s failure to fully investigate its witnesses is a sufficient basis to set aside a conviction, obtain a new trial or otherwise secure a dismissal in the appropriate criminal prosecution.
Mark D. Hosken, Supervisory Assistant Federal Public Defender.
Western District of New York
What should happen when the government knowingly introduces a witness’ false testimony in a trial. That question was recently before the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, No. 09-4043, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. June 17, 2011). There, the panel affirmed the District Court’s order granting the defendant a new trial. While taking place in the Seventh Circuit, the panel’s holding serves as a reminder as to what defense counsel should do if you are faced with the government introducing testimony known to be false.
In Freeman, an individual charged in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy decides to cooperate, and testifies before the grand jury. He told the grand jury that he participated in the drug conspiracy by mixing and bagging up the drugs for one of the other defendants, and explains how the other defendants fit into the operation. He chronicles his meetings with the defendants and the occasions when he witnessed them together. He testifies to a specific time frame (2003) when he saw all of the defendants at a specific location known as the “penthouse.” That testimony was not true. It was undisputed that one of the defendants, Brian Wilbourn, was incarcerated during a three and a half year period (between 2002 and 2005) when the witness claimed he was present while the defendants were bagging drugs at a specific location.
Defense counsel reviews the witness’ grand jury testimony while preparing for trial. He notifies the government that his client could not have been seen with the other defendants as the witness claimed because his client was incarcerated. As the Seventh Circuit panel noted, “the government plowed ahead and still had [its witness] testify. It solicited testimony about Wilbourn’s presence at the penthouse; it even encouraged [its witness]to specifically detail Wilbourn’s participation in [the] operation there. . . . What’s more, when Wilbourn’s attorney began cross-examining [the witness] about the impossibility of Wilbourn being at the penthouse, the prosecutor objected, stating in the presence of the jury, ‘Objection. That’s not true.’” Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, at *2-3.
Near the end of the trial the government stipulated that that Wilbourn was in prison from April 2002 until September 2005. Twelve days after the government’s witness testified, the stipulation was read to the jury. Notwithstanding the stipulation, the government relied on its witness’ testimony during its closing argument. According to the government, its witness did not lie during his testimony. Rather, the government argued that he was just imprecise or mildly mistaken about the dates on which some events occurred.
The District Court sustained several defense objections, and informed the government that its argument was both inaccurate and an attempt to bolster its witness’ testimony. The District Court later determined that this constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The defendants were ultimately found guilty of the conspiracy charge. However, the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the false testimony of the government’s witness violated their due process rights. The District Court agreed.
In Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, a 7th Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1984), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the panel upheld the district court’s determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment and that if not for the improprieties, the defendants would have been acquitted.
More importantly, the panel extended the government’s duty beyond merely determining the accuracy of its claims. Now, the government must not forgo its duty to investigate its witnesses.
The government’s duty to assure the accuracy of its representations has been well stated many times before. . . . This means that when the government learns that part of its case may be inaccurate, it must investigate. . . . It cannot simply ignore evidence that its witness is lying. . . . Here, the government abdicated its responsibility by failing to investigate and determine whether (the defendant) could have been (where the witness) claimed he was.
2011 WL 2417091 *5. (internal cites omitted).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applied in different situations. The first being those instances when the prosecution knew or should have known about perjured testimony. These situations are fundamentally unfair. Convictions obtained therein must be set aside. This requires a finding that there existed a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
The Second Circuit has applied the Agurs analysis to set aside convictions when the government’s witnesses have presented perjured testimony. See, United States v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972) (the government’s deceit including untruthful testimony, deliberate excisions from reports, preparation of false reports and repeated misrepresentations required a new trial); Perkins v. LeFevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982) (the prosecution’s failure to provide the witness’ rap sheet to the defense after the witness denied any convictions which were recorded on his criminal history resulted in the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991) (the perjury of the government’s witness required a reversal of the convictions when the government in redirect and in closing argument made much of the witness’ motive for telling the truth.); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1997) (the government’s use of business record evidence that it knew contained fictitious entries, and according to its author were false in their entirety, required reversal when the government conducted no further inquiry into the veracity of the records.); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002) (the prosecutor’s failure to correct the record in spite of the witness’ false testimony and her argument in summation relying on that false testimony was sufficient basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus); and Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (the prosecutor knowingly elicited false statements from a witness and did not correct the record when the witness testified falsely about conversations he had with the prosecutor - this was sufficient to grant a writ of habeas corpus.).
The importance of the Freeman decision is the imposition of a duty on the prosecutor to investigate his/her witnesses. The government’s counsel may no longer contend “I didn’t know,” or “the witness was simply mistaken,” or “the defense attorney had a sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witness.” Defense counsel should put the government on notice of a witness’ perjury, record proper objections, and challenge the government’s failure to correct the record. Building on the Supreme Court decisions and adding the direction in Freeman, counsel should argue the government’s failure to fully investigate its witnesses is a sufficient basis to set aside a conviction, obtain a new trial or otherwise secure a dismissal in the appropriate criminal prosecution.
by
Mark D. Hosken, Supervisory Assistant Federal Public Defender.
Western District of New York
What should happen when the government knowingly introduces a witness’ false testimony in a trial. That question was recently before the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, No. 09-4043, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. June 17, 2011). There, the panel affirmed the District Court’s order granting the defendant a new trial. While taking place in the Seventh Circuit, the panel’s holding serves as a reminder as to what defense counsel should do if you are faced with the government introducing testimony known to be false.
In Freeman, an individual charged in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy decides to cooperate, and testifies before the grand jury. He told the grand jury that he participated in the drug conspiracy by mixing and bagging up the drugs for one of the other defendants, and explains how the other defendants fit into the operation. He chronicles his meetings with the defendants and the occasions when he witnessed them together. He testifies to a specific time frame (2003) when he saw all of the defendants at a specific location known as the “penthouse.” That testimony was not true. It was undisputed that one of the defendants, Brian Wilbourn, was incarcerated during a three and a half year period (between 2002 and 2005) when the witness claimed he was present while the defendants were bagging drugs at a specific location.
Defense counsel reviews the witness’ grand jury testimony while preparing for trial. He notifies the government that his client could not have been seen with the other defendants as the witness claimed because his client was incarcerated. As the Seventh Circuit panel noted, “the government plowed ahead and still had [its witness] testify. It solicited testimony about Wilbourn’s presence at the penthouse; it even encouraged [its witness]to specifically detail Wilbourn’s participation in [the] operation there. . . . What’s more, when Wilbourn’s attorney began cross-examining [the witness] about the impossibility of Wilbourn being at the penthouse, the prosecutor objected, stating in the presence of the jury, ‘Objection. That’s not true.’” Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, at *2-3.
Near the end of the trial the government stipulated that that Wilbourn was in prison from April 2002 until September 2005. Twelve days after the government’s witness testified, the stipulation was read to the jury. Notwithstanding the stipulation, the government relied on its witness’ testimony during its closing argument. According to the government, its witness did not lie during his testimony. Rather, the government argued that he was just imprecise or mildly mistaken about the dates on which some events occurred.
The District Court sustained several defense objections, and informed the government that its argument was both inaccurate and an attempt to bolster its witness’ testimony. The District Court later determined that this constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The defendants were ultimately found guilty of the conspiracy charge. However, the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the false testimony of the government’s witness violated their due process rights. The District Court agreed.
In Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, a 7th Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1984), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the panel upheld the district court’s determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment and that if not for the improprieties, the defendants would have been acquitted.
More importantly, the panel extended the government’s duty beyond merely determining the accuracy of its claims. Now, the government must not forgo its duty to investigate its witnesses.
2011 WL 2417091 *5. (internal cites omitted).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applied in different situations. The first being those instances when the prosecution knew or should have known about perjured testimony. These situations are fundamentally unfair. Convictions obtained therein must be set aside. This requires a finding that there existed a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
The Second Circuit has applied the Agurs analysis to set aside convictions when the government’s witnesses have presented perjured testimony. See, United States v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972) (the government’s deceit including untruthful testimony, deliberate excisions from reports, preparation of false reports and repeated misrepresentations required a new trial); Perkins v. LeFevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982) (the prosecution’s failure to provide the witness’ rap sheet to the defense after the witness denied any convictions which were recorded on his criminal history resulted in the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991) (the perjury of the government’s witness required a reversal of the convictions when the government in redirect and in closing argument made much of the witness’ motive for telling the truth.); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1997) (the government’s use of business record evidence that it knew contained fictitious entries, and according to its author were false in their entirety, required reversal when the government conducted no further inquiry into the veracity of the records.); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002) (the prosecutor’s failure to correct the record in spite of the witness’ false testimony and her argument in summation relying on that false testimony was sufficient basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus); and Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (the prosecutor knowingly elicited false statements from a witness and did not correct the record when the witness testified falsely about conversations he had with the prosecutor - this was sufficient to grant a writ of habeas corpus.).
The importance of the Freeman decision is the imposition of a duty on the prosecutor to investigate his/her witnesses. The government’s counsel may no longer contend “I didn’t know,” or “the witness was simply mistaken,” or “the defense attorney had a sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witness.” Defense counsel should put the government on notice of a witness’ perjury, record proper objections, and challenge the government’s failure to correct the record. Building on the Supreme Court decisions and adding the direction in Freeman, counsel should argue the government’s failure to fully investigate its witnesses is a sufficient basis to set aside a conviction, obtain a new trial or otherwise secure a dismissal in the appropriate criminal prosecution.
Mark D. Hosken, Supervisory Assistant Federal Public Defender.
Western District of New York
What should happen when the government knowingly introduces a witness’ false testimony in a trial. That question was recently before the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Freeman, No. 09-4043, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. June 17, 2011). There, the panel affirmed the District Court’s order granting the defendant a new trial. While taking place in the Seventh Circuit, the panel’s holding serves as a reminder as to what defense counsel should do if you are faced with the government introducing testimony known to be false.
In Freeman, an individual charged in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy decides to cooperate, and testifies before the grand jury. He told the grand jury that he participated in the drug conspiracy by mixing and bagging up the drugs for one of the other defendants, and explains how the other defendants fit into the operation. He chronicles his meetings with the defendants and the occasions when he witnessed them together. He testifies to a specific time frame (2003) when he saw all of the defendants at a specific location known as the “penthouse.” That testimony was not true. It was undisputed that one of the defendants, Brian Wilbourn, was incarcerated during a three and a half year period (between 2002 and 2005) when the witness claimed he was present while the defendants were bagging drugs at a specific location.
Defense counsel reviews the witness’ grand jury testimony while preparing for trial. He notifies the government that his client could not have been seen with the other defendants as the witness claimed because his client was incarcerated. As the Seventh Circuit panel noted, “the government plowed ahead and still had [its witness] testify. It solicited testimony about Wilbourn’s presence at the penthouse; it even encouraged [its witness]to specifically detail Wilbourn’s participation in [the] operation there. . . . What’s more, when Wilbourn’s attorney began cross-examining [the witness] about the impossibility of Wilbourn being at the penthouse, the prosecutor objected, stating in the presence of the jury, ‘Objection. That’s not true.’” Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, at *2-3.
Near the end of the trial the government stipulated that that Wilbourn was in prison from April 2002 until September 2005. Twelve days after the government’s witness testified, the stipulation was read to the jury. Notwithstanding the stipulation, the government relied on its witness’ testimony during its closing argument. According to the government, its witness did not lie during his testimony. Rather, the government argued that he was just imprecise or mildly mistaken about the dates on which some events occurred.
The District Court sustained several defense objections, and informed the government that its argument was both inaccurate and an attempt to bolster its witness’ testimony. The District Court later determined that this constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The defendants were ultimately found guilty of the conspiracy charge. However, the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that the false testimony of the government’s witness violated their due process rights. The District Court agreed.
In Freeman, 2011 WL 2417091, a 7th Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1984), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the panel upheld the district court’s determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment and that if not for the improprieties, the defendants would have been acquitted.
More importantly, the panel extended the government’s duty beyond merely determining the accuracy of its claims. Now, the government must not forgo its duty to investigate its witnesses.
The government’s duty to assure the accuracy of its representations has been well stated many times before. . . . This means that when the government learns that part of its case may be inaccurate, it must investigate. . . . It cannot simply ignore evidence that its witness is lying. . . . Here, the government abdicated its responsibility by failing to investigate and determine whether (the defendant) could have been (where the witness) claimed he was.
2011 WL 2417091 *5. (internal cites omitted).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court explained that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applied in different situations. The first being those instances when the prosecution knew or should have known about perjured testimony. These situations are fundamentally unfair. Convictions obtained therein must be set aside. This requires a finding that there existed a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
The Second Circuit has applied the Agurs analysis to set aside convictions when the government’s witnesses have presented perjured testimony. See, United States v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972) (the government’s deceit including untruthful testimony, deliberate excisions from reports, preparation of false reports and repeated misrepresentations required a new trial); Perkins v. LeFevre, 691 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1982) (the prosecution’s failure to provide the witness’ rap sheet to the defense after the witness denied any convictions which were recorded on his criminal history resulted in the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991) (the perjury of the government’s witness required a reversal of the convictions when the government in redirect and in closing argument made much of the witness’ motive for telling the truth.); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1997) (the government’s use of business record evidence that it knew contained fictitious entries, and according to its author were false in their entirety, required reversal when the government conducted no further inquiry into the veracity of the records.); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002) (the prosecutor’s failure to correct the record in spite of the witness’ false testimony and her argument in summation relying on that false testimony was sufficient basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus); and Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (the prosecutor knowingly elicited false statements from a witness and did not correct the record when the witness testified falsely about conversations he had with the prosecutor - this was sufficient to grant a writ of habeas corpus.).
The importance of the Freeman decision is the imposition of a duty on the prosecutor to investigate his/her witnesses. The government’s counsel may no longer contend “I didn’t know,” or “the witness was simply mistaken,” or “the defense attorney had a sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witness.” Defense counsel should put the government on notice of a witness’ perjury, record proper objections, and challenge the government’s failure to correct the record. Building on the Supreme Court decisions and adding the direction in Freeman, counsel should argue the government’s failure to fully investigate its witnesses is a sufficient basis to set aside a conviction, obtain a new trial or otherwise secure a dismissal in the appropriate criminal prosecution.
Thursday, August 11, 2011
Some Thoughts on Felony Sentencing in New York
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court (the cert. petition in People v Battles is pending) The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court (the cert. petition in People v Battles is pending) The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Some Thoughts on Felony Sentencing in New York
Jill Paperno
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court (the cert. petition in People v Battles is pending) The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender
Plea and sentence negotiations are a part of our practice that requires social skills, strategy, and yes, a knowledge of the sentencing laws. If a client is facing a much higher sentence, maybe the deal on the table is a good one. But if they're not, it may not be. Very often DAs and judges are not familiar with the details of the sentencing laws and might, out of lack of familiarity, misstate the sentence exposure your client faces. We have to know what the possible sentences are in a case before we walk into the conference. But unfortunately, the sentencing statutes are dense and poorly written. But we still have to know them. There are some common errors defense attorneys make that I'd like to address broadly. Remember - it's always important to read the applicable statutes - after all these years all the experienced attorneys I know review them time and time again. And for some of these statutes, the practice commentaries and cases interpreting the statutes are a must-read as well.
Persistent offender statutes
Prosecutors often enjoy raising the specter of persistent felony sentencing if a defendant does not accept a lousy offer.
There are two kinds of persistent felony sentencing statutes - the persistent felony offender statute and the persistent violent felony offender statute. Each one elevates the minimum sentence a defendant may receive, and makes the maximum sentence life. But there are important distinctions between the two.
Persistent violent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.08 addresses persistent violent felony offender sentencing. The procedure a court must use in determining whether a defendant should be subjected to such sentencing is contained in CPL 400.16. Generally speaking, a person who has been convicted of a violent felony offense or predatory sex offense and has two prior violent felonies for two separate convictions within a ten year period (not counting time spent incarcerated) is a persistent violent felony offender. If a court makes the determination a person is a PVFO then persistent violent felony offender sentencing is mandatory. The second predicate offense must be committed after the first felony offense for a person to be found to be a PVFO. It is NOT required that a person serve two prior state sentences. Each prior violent felony must be within ten years of the current felony, but the ten years is tolled during periods of incarceration. (See, e.g. People v. Ogarra, 757 NYS2d 683.)
So some of the important things to know about PVFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is mandatory if applicable, and there is a ten year period within which the two prior violent felonies must have occurred.
Persistent felony offender
Penal Law Section 70.10 addresses persistent felony offender sentencing. Notably, that statute does not require that the two prior felonies occur within a specified period. It does, however, require that the felonies be sequential and that the defendant served a state prison bid on at least two prior felony convictions (by requiring the sentence for each conviction be in excess of one year or death under Penal Law 70.10(1)(b)(i)) (Death? Then isn't persistent a bit of overkill, if you'll pardon the pun?) Persistent felony offender sentencing is within the discretion of the judge, and may be based on factors other than simply prior sentences. Therefore, it has been challenged as unconstitutional (but found constitutional by the NYCA and Second Circuit) and may yet be reviewed by the Supreme Court (the cert. petition in People v Battles is pending) The procedure used to determine whether a defendant is a persistent felony offender is contained in CPL Section 400.20.
With any kind of predicate sentence, out of state charges may be considered to be felonies, but you actually have to analyze whether they constitute felonies under New York law, first by looking at the face of the statute, and sometimes by looking at the accusatory. (For example, in some states, breaking into a car may be considered a burglary. Not a felony in New York even if a person did state time in the other state, and even if it was your car. Thus, not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes.) See 70.04(1)(b)(i) and 70.06(1)(b)(i) for the requirements for out of state felonies, as well as cases interpreting that statute.
So some of the most important things to know about PFO sentencing are that the crimes must be sequential, the sentence is NOT mandatory if applicable, there is no statutory period in which the two felonies must have occurred, but each must have resulted in a sentence of state prison (70.10[1][b][i]).
So if the judge or prosecutor is threatening persistent sentencing, make sure you have reviewed your client's record and determined whether it supports that sentence.
Mandatory consecutive
Penal Law Section 70.25 governs when sentences must be concurrent or consecutive. Importantly, although a defendant may be a second felony offender, that does not automatically mean that s/he is required to serve consecutive time. The specific circumstances that require consecutive time are contained within the statute. They include when a person is sentenced as a predicate or persistent felony offender (but do not apply to all predicates/persistents - read the statute) and are on parole (which is described as an "undischarged sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed"), defendants charged with escape, bail jumping, VFOs while released on pending felonies, etc.
Prior violent felonies
Keep in mind that certain E felonies charged as attempts to commit D felonies may not be prior violent felonies. See Penal Law Section 70.02(d).
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
Strategies for Defending Sex Crimes
Frequent contributor to this blog, Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender Jill Paperno, is a very knowledgeable and successful trial attorney. Her posts usually consist of practical advice to trial counsel in which she shares her expertise. Now, in a longer and more formal setting, Jill is sharing her expertise in a book. Jill is one of the co-authors of a the newly published "Strategies for Defending Sex Crimes: Leading Lawyers on Understanding the Current Sex Crimes Environment and Building a Thorough Defense (Inside the Minds)" in which experienced attorneys provide detailed advice on the defense of sex crimes from the initial client interview and investigation, through preparation for psychosexual evaluations, examination of scientific evidence, trial, and, if necessary, sentencing.
Strategies for Defending Sex Crimes
Frequent contributor to this blog, Second Assistant Monroe County Public Defender Jill Paperno, is a very knowledgeable and successful trial attorney. Her posts usually consist of practical advice to trial counsel in which she shares her expertise. Now, in a longer and more formal setting, Jill is sharing her expertise in a book. Jill is one of the co-authors of a the newly published "Strategies for Defending Sex Crimes: Leading Lawyers on Understanding the Current Sex Crimes Environment and Building a Thorough Defense (Inside the Minds)" in which experienced attorneys provide detailed advice on the defense of sex crimes from the initial client interview and investigation, through preparation for psychosexual evaluations, examination of scientific evidence, trial, and, if necessary, sentencing.
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