Thursday, September 25, 2008

CPL 190.50(5)(a) requires that upon a request from a defendant to appear
before the grand jury, the district attorney must notify the defendant or
his attorney of the prospective or pending grand jury proceeding and must "
accord the defendant a reasonable time to exercise his right to appear as a
witness therein." In People v Shemesh ( __ NY3d __ [9/16/08]) the Court of Appeals affirmed a dismissal of an indictment, with leave to represent, because there was record support for the lower courts findings that the district attorney had failed to accord the defendant reasonable time to exercise his right to appear as a witness before the grand jury. The facts in Shemesh, which are set forth in the 3-2 decision of the Appellate Division, First Department at 2008 NY Slip Op 00208,51 AD3d 239, reveal that the district attorney had provided the defendant with 4 possible dates to testify, but that the defendant could not testify on any of those dates due to either a change in counsel (not for the purpose of being deliberately dilatory) or because it would conflict with his observance of a religious holiday. The trial court and the majority of the Appellate Division held that merely providing a defendant with four possible dates to testify was unreasonable where the defendant had timely communicated good reasons that he was unable to testify on those dates and that he was able to testify on a different date during the term of the grand jury. The Court of Appeals had previously held in People v Sawyer (96 NY2d 815, 816 [2001]) that the "concept of reasonableness is flexible and must be applied to the particular facts of a case known at the time." Applying Sawyer, the Appellate Division held that "[a] flexible application of the concept of reasonableness to the particular facts...cuts in favor of defendant..."

The affirmance of this holding by the Court of Appeals should provide
valuable support for attorneys seeking to challenge the limited times
offered by a district attorney to their clients to testify at the grand
jury as being unreasonable.
CPL 190.50(5)(a) requires that upon a request from a defendant to appear
before the grand jury, the district attorney must notify the defendant or
his attorney of the prospective or pending grand jury proceeding and must "
accord the defendant a reasonable time to exercise his right to appear as a
witness therein." In People v Shemesh ( __ NY3d __ [9/16/08]) the Court of Appeals affirmed a dismissal of an indictment, with leave to represent, because there was record support for the lower courts findings that the district attorney had failed to accord the defendant reasonable time to exercise his right to appear as a witness before the grand jury. The facts in Shemesh, which are set forth in the 3-2 decision of the Appellate Division, First Department at 2008 NY Slip Op 00208,51 AD3d 239, reveal that the district attorney had provided the defendant with 4 possible dates to testify, but that the defendant could not testify on any of those dates due to either a change in counsel (not for the purpose of being deliberately dilatory) or because it would conflict with his observance of a religious holiday. The trial court and the majority of the Appellate Division held that merely providing a defendant with four possible dates to testify was unreasonable where the defendant had timely communicated good reasons that he was unable to testify on those dates and that he was able to testify on a different date during the term of the grand jury. The Court of Appeals had previously held in People v Sawyer (96 NY2d 815, 816 [2001]) that the "concept of reasonableness is flexible and must be applied to the particular facts of a case known at the time." Applying Sawyer, the Appellate Division held that "[a] flexible application of the concept of reasonableness to the particular facts...cuts in favor of defendant..."

The affirmance of this holding by the Court of Appeals should provide
valuable support for attorneys seeking to challenge the limited times
offered by a district attorney to their clients to testify at the grand
jury as being unreasonable.

Error to Permit Defendant to Be Cross-Examined Regarding Prior YO Adjudication

In People v Towsley, 2008 NY Slip Op 06054 [4th Dept 7/3/08] [here], the Fourth Department held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to issue a Sandoval ruling permitting the defendant to be cross examined regarding a prior Youthful Offender adjudication. This error was deemed harmless; but this seems like a ruling to remember when you have a client who previously received YO status.

Error to Permit Defendant to Be Cross-Examined Regarding Prior YO Adjudication

In People v Towsley, 2008 NY Slip Op 06054 [4th Dept 7/3/08] [here], the Fourth Department held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to issue a Sandoval ruling permitting the defendant to be cross examined regarding a prior Youthful Offender adjudication. This error was deemed harmless; but this seems like a ruling to remember when you have a client who previously received YO status.

Horseshoes, Hand Grenades, and Predicate Sentencing:

Besides the classic examples of horseshoes and hand grenades, compliance with the requirements for predicate sentencing is apparently another instance in which getting close is credited.

In People v Mateo, 2008 NY Slip Op 06087 [4th Dept 7/3/08](here] the Fourth Department considered the consequence of the failure of the People to file a
second felony offender statement as required by CPL 400.21 (2) following his retrial. The Court noted that
[t]he People filed a second felony offender statement at the first trial and defendant admitted his status as a second felony offender at that time and at sentencing following the retrial. We thus conclude that there was substantial compliance with the statute.
Thus, the People are required to have only substantial compliance with CPL 400.21 (2).

Horseshoes, Hand Grenades, and Predicate Sentencing:

Besides the classic examples of horseshoes and hand grenades, compliance with the requirements for predicate sentencing is apparently another instance in which getting close is credited.

In People v Mateo, 2008 NY Slip Op 06087 [4th Dept 7/3/08](here] the Fourth Department considered the consequence of the failure of the People to file a
second felony offender statement as required by CPL 400.21 (2) following his retrial. The Court noted that
[t]he People filed a second felony offender statement at the first trial and defendant admitted his status as a second felony offender at that time and at sentencing following the retrial. We thus conclude that there was substantial compliance with the statute.
Thus, the People are required to have only substantial compliance with CPL 400.21 (2).

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

In People v Fredrick, 2008 NY Slip Op 06056 [4th Dept 7/3/08] [here] the Fourth Department not only reversed a conviction due to unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct, but in doing so the Court expressly refused to consider whether the misconduct contributed to the verdict. In reversing in the interest of justices, the Court wrote

as defendant correctly contends, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the People's witnesses during both his opening and closing statements (see People v LaDolce, 196 AD2d 49, 57; see generally People v Bailey, 58 NY2d 272, 277-278). He also improperly elicited testimony from a police officer who vouched for the credibility of the confidential informant by testifying that the confidential informant had provided reliable information to the police in the past (see People v Slaughter, 189 AD2d 157, 160, lv denied 81 NY2d 1080). In addition, the prosecutor repeatedly elicited irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony from several police officers concerning the percentages of convictions obtained by those officers in prior unrelated cases, referred to by the prosecutor as their "batting average[s]." That misconduct was compounded during summation when the prosecutor highlighted the "exemplary record" of the police officers and the confidential informant who testified for the prosecution by stating that they were "batting 100 percent[,] 85 percent, 90 percent" (see generally People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110). Further, the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony establishing that defendant had been incarcerated since his arrest (see People v Paul, 229 AD2d 932, 933), as well as testimony on direct examination of the confidential informant that defendant had not made certain exculpatory statements to him while they were in jail following defendant's arrest (see generally People v Collins, 12 AD3d 33, 38-39).

It cannot be said that County Court "took appropriate action to dilute the effect of [the prosecutorial misconduct]" (People v Mott, 94 AD2d 415, 419), and we conclude that the misconduct "operated to deny . . . defendant his fundamental right to a fair trial" (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238). We therefore "must reverse the conviction and grant a new trial, . . . without regard to any evaluation as to whether the errors contributed to the defendant's conviction. The right to a fair trial is self-standing and proof of guilt, however overwhelming, can never be permitted to negate this right" (id.).
In People v Fredrick, 2008 NY Slip Op 06056 [4th Dept 7/3/08] [here] the Fourth Department not only reversed a conviction due to unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct, but in doing so the Court expressly refused to consider whether the misconduct contributed to the verdict. In reversing in the interest of justices, the Court wrote

as defendant correctly contends, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the People's witnesses during both his opening and closing statements (see People v LaDolce, 196 AD2d 49, 57; see generally People v Bailey, 58 NY2d 272, 277-278). He also improperly elicited testimony from a police officer who vouched for the credibility of the confidential informant by testifying that the confidential informant had provided reliable information to the police in the past (see People v Slaughter, 189 AD2d 157, 160, lv denied 81 NY2d 1080). In addition, the prosecutor repeatedly elicited irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony from several police officers concerning the percentages of convictions obtained by those officers in prior unrelated cases, referred to by the prosecutor as their "batting average[s]." That misconduct was compounded during summation when the prosecutor highlighted the "exemplary record" of the police officers and the confidential informant who testified for the prosecution by stating that they were "batting 100 percent[,] 85 percent, 90 percent" (see generally People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110). Further, the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony establishing that defendant had been incarcerated since his arrest (see People v Paul, 229 AD2d 932, 933), as well as testimony on direct examination of the confidential informant that defendant had not made certain exculpatory statements to him while they were in jail following defendant's arrest (see generally People v Collins, 12 AD3d 33, 38-39).

It cannot be said that County Court "took appropriate action to dilute the effect of [the prosecutorial misconduct]" (People v Mott, 94 AD2d 415, 419), and we conclude that the misconduct "operated to deny . . . defendant his fundamental right to a fair trial" (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238). We therefore "must reverse the conviction and grant a new trial, . . . without regard to any evaluation as to whether the errors contributed to the defendant's conviction. The right to a fair trial is self-standing and proof of guilt, however overwhelming, can never be permitted to negate this right" (id.).

Horseshoes, Hand Grenades, and Predicate Sentencing:

Besides the classic examples of horseshoes and hand grenades, compliance with the requirements for predicate sentencing is apparently another instance in which getting close is credited.

In People v Mateo, 2008 NY Slip Op 06087 [4th Dept 7/3/08](here] the Fourth Department considered the consequence of the failure of the People to file a
second felony offender statement as required by CPL 400.21 (2) following his retrial. The Court noted that
[t]he People filed a second felony offender statement at the first trial and defendant admitted his status as a second felony offender at that time and at sentencing following the retrial. We thus conclude that there was substantial compliance with the statute.
Thus, the People are required to have only substantial compliance with CPL 400.21 (2).

Horseshoes, Hand Grenades, and Predicate Sentencing:

Besides the classic examples of horseshoes and hand grenades, compliance with the requirements for predicate sentencing is apparently another instance in which getting close is credited.

In People v Mateo, 2008 NY Slip Op 06087 [4th Dept 7/3/08](here] the Fourth Department considered the consequence of the failure of the People to file a
second felony offender statement as required by CPL 400.21 (2) following his retrial. The Court noted that
[t]he People filed a second felony offender statement at the first trial and defendant admitted his status as a second felony offender at that time and at sentencing following the retrial. We thus conclude that there was substantial compliance with the statute.
Thus, the People are required to have only substantial compliance with CPL 400.21 (2).

When Does a "Conviction" Occur?

by James Eckert

Many statutes impose harsher penalties on a defendant who commits a crime
after he has been "convicted" of another crime. For example, a UUMV
conviction after a prior is more serious, the second DWI is a felony and so
on. Today, in People v Montilla, the Court of Appeals held that a
defendant is convicted, at least for some purposes, the day he pleads
guilty.

A judgment of conviction is based on the date sentence has been
imposed. However, in order to sustain a conviction under PL 265.02(1) - CPW3, instead of CPW4, the Court of Appeals ruled that "conviction" meant only that the defendant had pled guilty, not that there was a judgment of conviction.
Therefore, after the defendant pled guilty, but before he was sentenced, he
stood "convicted" of the crime he pled to and was therefore subject to
harsher penalties for possession of a weapon.

The Court did point out that recidivist statutes require the imposition of
sentence to constitute a prior conviction, so Montilla does not support a
felony DWI charge the day after the defendant pleads to, but is not
sentenced for, a DWI. However, expect that the statute will be applied to
any other use of the term "convicted" where it is not absolutely clear that
the statute is for recidivists.

When Does a "Conviction" Occur?

by James Eckert

Many statutes impose harsher penalties on a defendant who commits a crime
after he has been "convicted" of another crime. For example, a UUMV
conviction after a prior is more serious, the second DWI is a felony and so
on. Today, in People v Montilla, the Court of Appeals held that a
defendant is convicted, at least for some purposes, the day he pleads
guilty.

A judgment of conviction is based on the date sentence has been
imposed. However, in order to sustain a conviction under PL 265.02(1) - CPW3, instead of CPW4, the Court of Appeals ruled that "conviction" meant only that the defendant had pled guilty, not that there was a judgment of conviction.
Therefore, after the defendant pled guilty, but before he was sentenced, he
stood "convicted" of the crime he pled to and was therefore subject to
harsher penalties for possession of a weapon.

The Court did point out that recidivist statutes require the imposition of
sentence to constitute a prior conviction, so Montilla does not support a
felony DWI charge the day after the defendant pleads to, but is not
sentenced for, a DWI. However, expect that the statute will be applied to
any other use of the term "convicted" where it is not absolutely clear that
the statute is for recidivists.
In People v Buchanan [4th Dept 6/6/08] (here) the Fourth Department unanimously held that the use of a stun belt that is not visible to the jury is subject to the same judicial scrutiny as other forms of physical restraint that are visible. Spefically, the Court held that the use of a stun belt that is not visible to the jury requires the court to make the same individualized security determination required for the use of physical restraints that are visible (see Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 632).

The Court,however, divided 3-2 as to what constitutes an individualized determination. The majority held that the requirement was satisfied where
the court stated that it had a policy to use restraints in "serious" cases and that it would comply with the recommendation of the Sheriff's deputy to use the restraint.

The dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Fahey, strongly disagreed that the trial judge's reasoning constituted an individualized determination:
In this case, the court set forth on the record three reasons for the use of the stun belt. First, the court stated that it was its policy to place all defendants accused of a crime of a serious nature in either leg shackles or a stun belt during trial. Second, the court stated that the Sheriff's Department wanted defendant to wear the stun belt. Third, the court stated its belief that "an innocent man on trial for murder is more dangerous than a guilty one."
In point of fact, the court noted that defendant had "done [nothing] to warrant" the use of the stun belt, and the only reference to defendant's background was the court's acknowledgment that defendant had never caused any problems in the courtroom in his previous appearances before the court....
The court's blanket policy of placing all defendants in either leg shackles or a stun belt based on the nature of the crime charged is directly contrary to the requirement that there be a case by case determination by the court concerning the necessity for the use of restraints along with the requisite "close judicial scrutiny." The court's blanket policy directly violates the due process requirements for the use of visible restraints... The court should not relegate its duty to apply judicial scrutiny to the Sheriff's Department but, rather, it may consider the recommendation of the Sheriff's Department in making its determination (see generally People v Thomas, 125 AD2d 873, 874)...
Finally, the court's statement "that an innocent man on trial for murder is more dangerous than a guilty one" goes to the very heart of our concern with respect to the procedure used in determining whether the defendant in this case was required to wear a stun belt. The presumption of innocence must be maintained against all attempts to erode it, and courts must ensure that it is not undermined by a desire for convenience or the demands of bureaucratic policies. The presumption of innocence requires that a trial not only be fair, but that it also appears to be fair. The appearance of fairness requires that physical restraints, whether visible or not, be used only where there is an essential state interest. Nothing in the record before us indicates that there was any essential state interest considered in the context of this defendant.
In People v Buchanan [4th Dept 6/6/08] (here) the Fourth Department unanimously held that the use of a stun belt that is not visible to the jury is subject to the same judicial scrutiny as other forms of physical restraint that are visible. Spefically, the Court held that the use of a stun belt that is not visible to the jury requires the court to make the same individualized security determination required for the use of physical restraints that are visible (see Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 632).

The Court,however, divided 3-2 as to what constitutes an individualized determination. The majority held that the requirement was satisfied where
the court stated that it had a policy to use restraints in "serious" cases and that it would comply with the recommendation of the Sheriff's deputy to use the restraint.

The dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Fahey, strongly disagreed that the trial judge's reasoning constituted an individualized determination:
In this case, the court set forth on the record three reasons for the use of the stun belt. First, the court stated that it was its policy to place all defendants accused of a crime of a serious nature in either leg shackles or a stun belt during trial. Second, the court stated that the Sheriff's Department wanted defendant to wear the stun belt. Third, the court stated its belief that "an innocent man on trial for murder is more dangerous than a guilty one."
In point of fact, the court noted that defendant had "done [nothing] to warrant" the use of the stun belt, and the only reference to defendant's background was the court's acknowledgment that defendant had never caused any problems in the courtroom in his previous appearances before the court....
The court's blanket policy of placing all defendants in either leg shackles or a stun belt based on the nature of the crime charged is directly contrary to the requirement that there be a case by case determination by the court concerning the necessity for the use of restraints along with the requisite "close judicial scrutiny." The court's blanket policy directly violates the due process requirements for the use of visible restraints... The court should not relegate its duty to apply judicial scrutiny to the Sheriff's Department but, rather, it may consider the recommendation of the Sheriff's Department in making its determination (see generally People v Thomas, 125 AD2d 873, 874)...
Finally, the court's statement "that an innocent man on trial for murder is more dangerous than a guilty one" goes to the very heart of our concern with respect to the procedure used in determining whether the defendant in this case was required to wear a stun belt. The presumption of innocence must be maintained against all attempts to erode it, and courts must ensure that it is not undermined by a desire for convenience or the demands of bureaucratic policies. The presumption of innocence requires that a trial not only be fair, but that it also appears to be fair. The appearance of fairness requires that physical restraints, whether visible or not, be used only where there is an essential state interest. Nothing in the record before us indicates that there was any essential state interest considered in the context of this defendant.

Reversal for Brady Violation Absent Specific Request for Information

n People v Hunter (6/12/08) a unanimous Court of Appeals held that in a sex case, where the defense was consent, it was a Brady violation requiring reversal for the prosecutor to withhold from the defense information that in another pending case the same complainant has accused a man of rape and his claim was that the sex had been consensual. The Court rejected the argument that the subsequent guilty plea by the defendant in the other case obviated the Brady violation. The Court held that the post-trial plea was irrelevant as to the People's duties pursuant to Brady at the time of trial and before. If the information known to the People when this case was tried was "favorable to the accused" and "material" within the meaning of Brady, defendant had a due process right to obtain it, and that right could not be nullified by post-trial events.

Further, the Court ruled that this information that, complainant had accused a second man of rape, as she had defendant; that her encounter with this other man, like her encounter with defendant, took place in the accused man's home; and that, according to that man, the complainant willingly had sex with him and then lied about it, would have been admissible at the defendant's trial during the cross-examination of the complainant.

Finally, and most unusually, despite there not being the specific request for such information (that is almost always required to find Brady violations), the Court concluded that under the facts of the case (in which the jury acquitted on some of the counts) that it was a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different if the information had been disclosed, and that the information, therefore, was material.

Reversal for Brady Violation Absent Specific Request for Information

n People v Hunter (6/12/08) a unanimous Court of Appeals held that in a sex case, where the defense was consent, it was a Brady violation requiring reversal for the prosecutor to withhold from the defense information that in another pending case the same complainant has accused a man of rape and his claim was that the sex had been consensual. The Court rejected the argument that the subsequent guilty plea by the defendant in the other case obviated the Brady violation. The Court held that the post-trial plea was irrelevant as to the People's duties pursuant to Brady at the time of trial and before. If the information known to the People when this case was tried was "favorable to the accused" and "material" within the meaning of Brady, defendant had a due process right to obtain it, and that right could not be nullified by post-trial events.

Further, the Court ruled that this information that, complainant had accused a second man of rape, as she had defendant; that her encounter with this other man, like her encounter with defendant, took place in the accused man's home; and that, according to that man, the complainant willingly had sex with him and then lied about it, would have been admissible at the defendant's trial during the cross-examination of the complainant.

Finally, and most unusually, despite there not being the specific request for such information (that is almost always required to find Brady violations), the Court concluded that under the facts of the case (in which the jury acquitted on some of the counts) that it was a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different if the information had been disclosed, and that the information, therefore, was material.
What is rarer, reversal due to the admission of hearsay or reversal due to prosecutorial misconduct? How about reversal for unpreserved hearsay violations? Or reversal for unpreserved prosecutorial misconduct?

In People v Ballerstein 2008 NY Slip Op 05127 [4th Dept 6/6/08], a decision sure to be cited often, the Fourth Department held that, despite not being preserved for review, the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial and required reversal. The Court explained "we are mindful of our overriding responsibility' to ensure that the cardinal right of a defendant to a fair trial' is respected in every instance" (People v Wlasiuk, 32 AD3d 674, 675, lv dismissed 7 NY3d 871, quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238).

Addressing first the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors, we agree with defendant that County Court erred in admitting hearsay, including excerpts from the victim's diary, testimony relating to the victim's menstruation, testimony from the ex-boyfriend of the victim's mother concerning a videotape that he never viewed, and testimony from various witnesses concerning the victim's allegations of sexual abuse. We note in particular that the court admitted in evidence the double hearsay testimony of the medical director of the Child Advocacy Center with respect to statements made by the victim to a nurse at the center when the medical director was not present, despite the fact that the court had granted defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude that testimony. Moreover, all of the victim's statements made at the Child Advocacy Center were inadmissible because they were made during the course of a forensic examination and were not "relevant to diagnosis and treatment" [citations omitted]. The error in the admission of the victim's statements made at the Child Advocacy Center was compounded by the improper admission of the medical director's opinion testimony concerning the credibility of the victim's statements. The opinion testimony of the medical director improperly intruded upon the function of the jury to determine whether to credit the victim's statements (see People v Eberle, 265 AD2d 881, 882)...
With respect to the contention of defendant that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct, we agree with defendant that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathies in his opening statement (see People v Brown, 26 AD3d 392, 393). In addition, he improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim (see id.; People v George, 249 AD2d 488, lv denied 92 NY2d 879), and he engaged in misconduct by commenting on the credibility of an individual whom he did not intend to call as a witness. Further, throughout the trial, the prosecutor asked leading questions that circumvented unfavorable rulings of the court and introduced evidence that the court had precluded him from presenting. Finally, in his closing statement, the prosecutor made several "irrelevant comments which [had] no bearing on any legitimate issue in the case" (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109) and, in stating that "[p]rosecutors seek justice and juries deliver it in cases such as these," he "exceed[ed] the bounds of legitimate advocacy" (People v Melendez, 11 AD3d 983, 984, lv denied 4 NY3d 888; see People v Benedetto, 294 AD2d 958, 959). Furthermore, the prosecutor impermissibly warned the jury not to "fall into the same trap the Department of Social Services has fallen into," whereby the victim "got lost in the system." "Such appeals to emotion tend to deflect the jurors' attention from issues of fact on the question of guilt or innocence" (People v Bowie, 200 AD2d 511, 513, lv denied 83 NY2d 869), and cause them instead to focus on protecting the victim and correcting an alleged error in the child protective system (see generally People v Ivey, 83 AD2d 788, 789). We can only conclude herein that the prosecutor's "inflammatory [comments had] a decided tendency to prejudice the jury against the defendant" (Ashwal, 39 NY2d at 110; see People v Carter, 31 AD3d 1167, 1169; People v Almethoky, 9 AD3d 882).


Another big win for Mary Davison.
What is rarer, reversal due to the admission of hearsay or reversal due to prosecutorial misconduct? How about reversal for unpreserved hearsay violations? Or reversal for unpreserved prosecutorial misconduct?

In People v Ballerstein 2008 NY Slip Op 05127 [4th Dept 6/6/08], a decision sure to be cited often, the Fourth Department held that, despite not being preserved for review, the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial and required reversal. The Court explained "we are mindful of our overriding responsibility' to ensure that the cardinal right of a defendant to a fair trial' is respected in every instance" (People v Wlasiuk, 32 AD3d 674, 675, lv dismissed 7 NY3d 871, quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238).

Addressing first the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors, we agree with defendant that County Court erred in admitting hearsay, including excerpts from the victim's diary, testimony relating to the victim's menstruation, testimony from the ex-boyfriend of the victim's mother concerning a videotape that he never viewed, and testimony from various witnesses concerning the victim's allegations of sexual abuse. We note in particular that the court admitted in evidence the double hearsay testimony of the medical director of the Child Advocacy Center with respect to statements made by the victim to a nurse at the center when the medical director was not present, despite the fact that the court had granted defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude that testimony. Moreover, all of the victim's statements made at the Child Advocacy Center were inadmissible because they were made during the course of a forensic examination and were not "relevant to diagnosis and treatment" [citations omitted]. The error in the admission of the victim's statements made at the Child Advocacy Center was compounded by the improper admission of the medical director's opinion testimony concerning the credibility of the victim's statements. The opinion testimony of the medical director improperly intruded upon the function of the jury to determine whether to credit the victim's statements (see People v Eberle, 265 AD2d 881, 882)...
With respect to the contention of defendant that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct, we agree with defendant that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathies in his opening statement (see People v Brown, 26 AD3d 392, 393). In addition, he improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim (see id.; People v George, 249 AD2d 488, lv denied 92 NY2d 879), and he engaged in misconduct by commenting on the credibility of an individual whom he did not intend to call as a witness. Further, throughout the trial, the prosecutor asked leading questions that circumvented unfavorable rulings of the court and introduced evidence that the court had precluded him from presenting. Finally, in his closing statement, the prosecutor made several "irrelevant comments which [had] no bearing on any legitimate issue in the case" (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109) and, in stating that "[p]rosecutors seek justice and juries deliver it in cases such as these," he "exceed[ed] the bounds of legitimate advocacy" (People v Melendez, 11 AD3d 983, 984, lv denied 4 NY3d 888; see People v Benedetto, 294 AD2d 958, 959). Furthermore, the prosecutor impermissibly warned the jury not to "fall into the same trap the Department of Social Services has fallen into," whereby the victim "got lost in the system." "Such appeals to emotion tend to deflect the jurors' attention from issues of fact on the question of guilt or innocence" (People v Bowie, 200 AD2d 511, 513, lv denied 83 NY2d 869), and cause them instead to focus on protecting the victim and correcting an alleged error in the child protective system (see generally People v Ivey, 83 AD2d 788, 789). We can only conclude herein that the prosecutor's "inflammatory [comments had] a decided tendency to prejudice the jury against the defendant" (Ashwal, 39 NY2d at 110; see People v Carter, 31 AD3d 1167, 1169; People v Almethoky, 9 AD3d 882).


Another big win for Mary Davison.
The Court of Appeals, in People v Luciano, 2008 NY Slip Op 04898 [6/3/08] has held that forfeiture or permeptory challenges is a permissible remedy for attorneys who exercise peremtory challenges in violation of the constitiuion under Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986] and its progeny. However, the Court noted

that the free exercise of peremptory challenges is a venerable trial tool that should be denied only in rare circumstances. In fashioning the proper remedy, a trial judge may consider, among other factors, whether the challenged juror is available to be reseated, whether the litigant appears to be engaging in a pattern of discrimination, and the number of peremptory challenges that remain to be exercised. While even a single instance of discriminatory conduct may warrant forfeiture, where the finding of discrimination is close, forfeiture may not be an appropriate remedy (citations omitted).


In Luciano the trial court's ruling that cousnel has forfeited permentory challenges was error and the defendat was entitled to a new trial

because the trial judge was under a misapprehension that the law required forfeiture and failed to exercise the requisite discretion. As the court stated, "The law is that if you exercise the strikes and you determine them to [have been made] on a[] discriminatory basis, you forfeit those rights." As a result, defense counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection. This is reversible error, entitling defendant to a new trial. In so holding, we reach no conclusion as to whether there was indeed a Batson violation or whether forfeiture would have been a proper remedy had discretion been exercised.
The Court of Appeals, in People v Luciano, 2008 NY Slip Op 04898 [6/3/08] has held that forfeiture or permeptory challenges is a permissible remedy for attorneys who exercise peremtory challenges in violation of the constitiuion under Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986] and its progeny. However, the Court noted

that the free exercise of peremptory challenges is a venerable trial tool that should be denied only in rare circumstances. In fashioning the proper remedy, a trial judge may consider, among other factors, whether the challenged juror is available to be reseated, whether the litigant appears to be engaging in a pattern of discrimination, and the number of peremptory challenges that remain to be exercised. While even a single instance of discriminatory conduct may warrant forfeiture, where the finding of discrimination is close, forfeiture may not be an appropriate remedy (citations omitted).


In Luciano the trial court's ruling that cousnel has forfeited permentory challenges was error and the defendat was entitled to a new trial

because the trial judge was under a misapprehension that the law required forfeiture and failed to exercise the requisite discretion. As the court stated, "The law is that if you exercise the strikes and you determine them to [have been made] on a[] discriminatory basis, you forfeit those rights." As a result, defense counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection. This is reversible error, entitling defendant to a new trial. In so holding, we reach no conclusion as to whether there was indeed a Batson violation or whether forfeiture would have been a proper remedy had discretion been exercised.
In People v Colligan, 2008 NY Slip Op 05133 [4th Dept 6/6/2008] the Court held that it was error to deny a suppression motion where, prior to the issuance of a warrant to search a car, the police took the keys to the car from the defendant and sat out with the automobile. Since the hearing record did not show that probable cause existed as such time, this was unlawful in that

[a]lthough they did not search the automobile until the search warrant had been obtained, "there is no lesser invasion in the detention or holding of an automobile while a warrant [is] obtained than in an immediate entry of an automobile to search for contraband or evidence" (People v Singleteary, 35 NY2d 528, 533; see People v Brosnan, 32 NY2d 254, 259-260).
In People v Colligan, 2008 NY Slip Op 05133 [4th Dept 6/6/2008] the Court held that it was error to deny a suppression motion where, prior to the issuance of a warrant to search a car, the police took the keys to the car from the defendant and sat out with the automobile. Since the hearing record did not show that probable cause existed as such time, this was unlawful in that

[a]lthough they did not search the automobile until the search warrant had been obtained, "there is no lesser invasion in the detention or holding of an automobile while a warrant [is] obtained than in an immediate entry of an automobile to search for contraband or evidence" (People v Singleteary, 35 NY2d 528, 533; see People v Brosnan, 32 NY2d 254, 259-260).
I previously reported that the Appellate Division, Fourt Department, in People of State of New York ex rel. Lucas Foote v Piscotti, held that persons charged with violating the terms of post release supervision not imposed by judges are entitled to immediate release. In fact, the other three Appellate Divisions have all issued similar decisions (People ex rel Lewis Ward, __ AD3d __, 2008 WL 2051102 [1st Dept 5/1/08]; People ex rel Gerard v Kralik, 2008 NY Slip Op 04895 [2nd Dept 5/27/08]; Prendergast v NYS Dept of Corrections, __ AD3d __, 2008 WL 1902192 [3d Dept 5/1/08]).

Seems pretty clear. So what has our State done with the hundreds of persons currently being incarcerated in New York state based on violations of PRS not imposed by judges? They have sent memos to the judges about how they can get them re-sentenced, and have written to the inmates telling them they will be subject to re-sentencing, but have taken no steps to release these people being held without any valid commitment order or to inform them that they are being illegally detained and are entitled to release forthwith. The Attorney General has taken the position that even when the commitment do not show any judicially imposed sentence of PRS and when the only PRS was illegally imposed by DOCS the person should be held in custody because the commitment order may be incorrect.

Phrased differently, the Attorney General, without citing any authority, argues that, rather than being bound by the terms of commitment orders, DOCS is free to ignore them since they may be incorrect (sort of a presumption of irregularity). And the argument is that, based on this possibility, the person can be detained despite the absence of any commitment order justifying continued custody. In a different context, the Fourth Department held in People v Williams, 191 AD2d 989 [4th Dept 1993] “The police are not at liberty to arrest and hold a suspect while they search for evidence sufficient to justify their action [citations omitted].”
I previously reported that the Appellate Division, Fourt Department, in People of State of New York ex rel. Lucas Foote v Piscotti, held that persons charged with violating the terms of post release supervision not imposed by judges are entitled to immediate release. In fact, the other three Appellate Divisions have all issued similar decisions (People ex rel Lewis Ward, __ AD3d __, 2008 WL 2051102 [1st Dept 5/1/08]; People ex rel Gerard v Kralik, 2008 NY Slip Op 04895 [2nd Dept 5/27/08]; Prendergast v NYS Dept of Corrections, __ AD3d __, 2008 WL 1902192 [3d Dept 5/1/08]).

Seems pretty clear. So what has our State done with the hundreds of persons currently being incarcerated in New York state based on violations of PRS not imposed by judges? They have sent memos to the judges about how they can get them re-sentenced, and have written to the inmates telling them they will be subject to re-sentencing, but have taken no steps to release these people being held without any valid commitment order or to inform them that they are being illegally detained and are entitled to release forthwith. The Attorney General has taken the position that even when the commitment do not show any judicially imposed sentence of PRS and when the only PRS was illegally imposed by DOCS the person should be held in custody because the commitment order may be incorrect.

Phrased differently, the Attorney General, without citing any authority, argues that, rather than being bound by the terms of commitment orders, DOCS is free to ignore them since they may be incorrect (sort of a presumption of irregularity). And the argument is that, based on this possibility, the person can be detained despite the absence of any commitment order justifying continued custody. In a different context, the Fourth Department held in People v Williams, 191 AD2d 989 [4th Dept 1993] “The police are not at liberty to arrest and hold a suspect while they search for evidence sufficient to justify their action [citations omitted].”

Our Government is Incarcerating Many People Without Any Lawful Authority

The Executive branch of our government is knowingly incarcerating many people whom it knows it has no legal authority to incarcerate. It appears to be our government's policy that, although it is unlawful to incarcerate these individuals, the government will continue to keep them in custody unless and until each affected individual wins a habeas corpus proceeding resulting in a court order for his release. Nor has our government even notified the affected individuals that they are being held unlawfully. Such illegal incarcerations predicated on a wholesale disregard for the law by our government undermines the very authority of our government to expect people to follow its laws. It ought to be offensive to those who expect our government to be one of law. It also risks civil damages for illegal imprisonment based on this unlawful incarceration.

No, I am not referring to the Bush administration and Guantanamo. Rather, I am addressing the fact that a month after the New York Court of Appeals has expressly held that sentence of post release supervision [PRS]not imposed by judges are void and a week after the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that consequently a person in custody for violating the terms of PRS not imposed by a judge is entitle to be discharged "from custody forthwith" neither the New York State Division of Parole nor the New York State Department of Corrections has taken steps to discharge from custody the many people currently incarcerated for violating the terms of PRS not imposed by a judge. Rather, all that New York is doing with respect to these unlawfully incarcerated individuals is taking steps to have them lawfully sentenced to PRS by judges. But, of course, even after these people are lawfully sentenced to PRS they cannot be lawfully incarcerated for conduct which predates the imposition by a judge of a sentence of PRS. So, these people are all entitled to immediate release. Yet, absent any lawful sentence or authority, New York continues to keep these people locked up.

If you are offended by our government's wholesale disregard of its laws, you might want to write to Brian Fischer, Commissioner, NYS Department of Correctional Services, Building 2,1220 Washington Ave, Albany, New York 12226-2050 and to George P. Alexander, Commissioner of the NYS Division of Parole,97 Central Avenue, Albany, NY 12206 urging that they follow the law and work to insure the immediate release of persons held in New York prisons for violating the terms of PRS which were not imposed by a judge.

Our Government is Incarcerating Many People Without Any Lawful Authority

The Executive branch of our government is knowingly incarcerating many people whom it knows it has no legal authority to incarcerate. It appears to be our government's policy that, although it is unlawful to incarcerate these individuals, the government will continue to keep them in custody unless and until each affected individual wins a habeas corpus proceeding resulting in a court order for his release. Nor has our government even notified the affected individuals that they are being held unlawfully. Such illegal incarcerations predicated on a wholesale disregard for the law by our government undermines the very authority of our government to expect people to follow its laws. It ought to be offensive to those who expect our government to be one of law. It also risks civil damages for illegal imprisonment based on this unlawful incarceration.

No, I am not referring to the Bush administration and Guantanamo. Rather, I am addressing the fact that a month after the New York Court of Appeals has expressly held that sentence of post release supervision [PRS]not imposed by judges are void and a week after the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that consequently a person in custody for violating the terms of PRS not imposed by a judge is entitle to be discharged "from custody forthwith" neither the New York State Division of Parole nor the New York State Department of Corrections has taken steps to discharge from custody the many people currently incarcerated for violating the terms of PRS not imposed by a judge. Rather, all that New York is doing with respect to these unlawfully incarcerated individuals is taking steps to have them lawfully sentenced to PRS by judges. But, of course, even after these people are lawfully sentenced to PRS they cannot be lawfully incarcerated for conduct which predates the imposition by a judge of a sentence of PRS. So, these people are all entitled to immediate release. Yet, absent any lawful sentence or authority, New York continues to keep these people locked up.

If you are offended by our government's wholesale disregard of its laws, you might want to write to Brian Fischer, Commissioner, NYS Department of Correctional Services, Building 2,1220 Washington Ave, Albany, New York 12226-2050 and to George P. Alexander, Commissioner of the NYS Division of Parole,97 Central Avenue, Albany, NY 12206 urging that they follow the law and work to insure the immediate release of persons held in New York prisons for violating the terms of PRS which were not imposed by a judge.

One Cannot Be Incarcerated For Violating The Terms Of Post Release Supervision Not Imposed By A Judge

After the Court of Appeals held that post release supervision sentences added by the Department of Corrections or by court personnel, other than judges are not validly imposed, but that resentencing was available in such cases for a court to lawfully impose such a sentence (People v Sparber)the questioned remained whether persons charged with violating the terms of post release supervision not imposed by judges are entitled to immediate release. Today, in People of State of New York ex rel. Lucas Foote v Piscotti the
Fourth Department answered this question with a clear "yes."
Petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding contending that the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) lacked the authority to include a period of postrelease supervision in petitioner's sentence calculation because the sentencing court had not imposed a period of postrelease supervision. County Court erred in refusing to sustain the writ of habeas corpus based upon its conclusion that postrelease supervision was mandated by law and that nullification of postrelease supervision would render petitioner's sentence invalid. As the Court of Appeals has written, "[b]ecause CPL 380.20 and 380.40 collectively provide that only a judge may impose a [postrelease supervision] sentence, we conclude that DOCS may not do so" (Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., ___ NY3d ___, ___ [Apr. 29, 2008]).

Thus, the Court ordered that Sheriff discharge petitioner from custody forthwith.

One Cannot Be Incarcerated For Violating The Terms Of Post Release Supervision Not Imposed By A Judge

After the Court of Appeals held that post release supervision sentences added by the Department of Corrections or by court personnel, other than judges are not validly imposed, but that resentencing was available in such cases for a court to lawfully impose such a sentence (People v Sparber)the questioned remained whether persons charged with violating the terms of post release supervision not imposed by judges are entitled to immediate release. Today, in People of State of New York ex rel. Lucas Foote v Piscotti the
Fourth Department answered this question with a clear "yes."
Petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding contending that the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) lacked the authority to include a period of postrelease supervision in petitioner's sentence calculation because the sentencing court had not imposed a period of postrelease supervision. County Court erred in refusing to sustain the writ of habeas corpus based upon its conclusion that postrelease supervision was mandated by law and that nullification of postrelease supervision would render petitioner's sentence invalid. As the Court of Appeals has written, "[b]ecause CPL 380.20 and 380.40 collectively provide that only a judge may impose a [postrelease supervision] sentence, we conclude that DOCS may not do so" (Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., ___ NY3d ___, ___ [Apr. 29, 2008]).

Thus, the Court ordered that Sheriff discharge petitioner from custody forthwith.
by Tim Davis, Esq.


People v Hackett, 47 AD3d 1122 (January 24, 2008)

Late one night, a State Trooper observed the defendant drive his vehicle over the fog line. The Trooper activated his emergency lights. After pulling over to the side of the road, the defendant leaned toward the passenger seat of his vehicle before the Trooper approached. The Trooper requested both license and registration, but defendant produced only the registration. Upon questioning defendant concerning his movement within the vehicle, defendant explained he was reaching for his cell phone, which he then showed to the Trooper.

The Trooper ordered defendant out, and decided to detain him for a traffic violation. The Trooper handcuffed defendant for safety reasons, and placed him in his patrol car while he ran a warrant check. He made no effort to determine whether defendant possessed a valid driver's license. Once a second Trooper arrived, the first went to defendant's vehicle, opened the passenger door and looked at the floor board. Seeing nothing, he bent down and shone his flashlight underneath the passenger seat, discovering a loaded handgun. A later search revealed a quantity of cocaine as well.

Indicted for two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and three counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, defendant moved to suppress the handgun and cocaine. The lower court relied on the minutes of the preliminary hearing - at which just the Trooper testified - and denied the request.

The Third Department, relying on People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224 [1989], held that the Trooper had no probable cause to return and search under the front passenger seat of defendant’s vehicle, when the defendant was secured and there was no imminent threat the Trooper’s safety. Although the defendant was driving erratically and disappeared from sight when he leaned toward the passenger seat, he explained this movement and produced his cell phone. Further, although the Trooper thought the defendant seemed nervous and repeatedly looked at his vehicle, this conduct was insufficient to justify a search. The search was unlawful because 1) there was no basis for the Trooper to believe a weapon was within the vehicle, and 2) no actual or specific danger threatened the safety of the officers.



People v Hasenflue, 48 AD3d 888 (February 21, 2008)

In March 2003, the defendant represented himself at trial, and was convicted of Attempted Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer, Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree and Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree. He appealed, and argued that the court erred in proceeding to trial without completing a 730 exam, which was ordered by another judge at arraignment. Before trial, two psychologists attempted to examine the defendant, but made no determination as he refused to cooperate. In People v Hasenflue, 24 AD3d 1017, the Third Department held that the defendant was “deprived of his right to a full and fair determination of his mental capacity to stand trial,” and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing.

Both counsel and the two psychologists who tried to interview defendant testified at the reconstruction hearing. The psychologists reviewed all the defendant’s psychiatric records and the court proceedings, leading them to opine that he was competent. Based upon this testimony, the court determined that the People established defendant’s competency to stand trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The Third Department reversed, concluding it was not possible to determine defendant's competency given the lack of any contemporaneous psychiatric examinations/evaluations at the time of trial. While relevant to the ultimate issue, neither his observed demeanor at trial nor his self representation was sufficient to establish his competence.


People v Revette, 48 AD3d 886 (February 21, 2008)

Defendant was charged with setting two fires to the home of her ex-boyfriend, with whom she was involved in a custody dispute. She was convicted after trial of Arson in the Third Degree (two counts) and Burglary in the Third Degree (two counts).

Before trial, defendant sought dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL § 210.35(5), arguing that a grand juror was married to one of the three deputy sheriffs who investigated the fire and testified before the grand jury.

As a close relationship between a grand juror and a witness raises the risk of prejudice, the Third Department held that the prosecutor should have enquired whether the juror could fairly evaluate the evidence. Although the prosecutor asked the juror if she could remain impartial, he received an ambiguous response which he never asked her to clarify. This was significant as the number of jurors voting to indict was not recorded, and the testimony of the juror’s husband was important to the case.

People v Ramos, 48 AD3d 984 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was convicted after trial of Burglary in the Second Degree and Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree. The court sentenced him to twelve years determinate on the burglary and four years determinate on the criminal mischief.

On appeal, defendant argued he should have been sentenced to an indeterminate term on the criminal mischief as it is a non-violent felony. The People conceded this was error. The Third Department vacated the sentence and remitted the case to the trial court.


People v Westerling, 48 AD3d 965 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was charged with abducting and then raping his estranged girlfriend. He was convicted after trial of Rape in the First Degree, Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree (two counts), Kidnaping in the Second Degree, Coercion in the First Degree, Criminal Use of a Firearm in the First Degree, Criminal Contempt in the First Degree (two counts) and Resisting Arrest.

The main issue on appeal was the trial court’s Molineux ruling permitting the People to introduce evidence of numerous domestic violence incidents between defendant and the complainant. In addition to a number of specific instances of violence, the trial court permitted the complainant to testify that defendant hit, bit or threw her approximately 100 times during their three-year relationship. The Third Department ruled it was improper for the court to allow her to testify to unparticularized acts occurring over such a lengthy period.

The potential prejudice of this testimony was exacerbated by the court’s failure to provide the jury with cautionary instructions regarding the limited purpose of this evidence. The court's final instructions were insufficient to cure this deficiency after the jury heard such evidence without any guidance as to its purpose.


People v Haddock
, 48 AD3d 969 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was convicted after trial of failing to comply with SORA - failing to register on an annual basis, and failing to register within ten days of a change of address.
On appeal, defendant raised the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury that the People were required to prove he knowingly failed to comply with SORA's registration requirements.

Although Correction Law § 168-t contains no requirement of a culpable mental state, the Third Department held that the legislature did not intend to create a strict liability crime. The Court found support for this position in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which set forth knowledge as an element. Although the People's proof included ample evidence of defendant's knowledge, the Third Department held that the failure to provide such a charge could not be regarded as harmless error.


People v Karika, 48 AD3d 980 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was charged with Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree.

During his preliminary instructions, the trial judge correctly advised the jury not to consider the sentence the defendant might receive if convicted, as that was a matter solely for the court to determine. However, immediately before making this statement, the court inexplicably related a recent out-of-court conversation in which someone asked what the court might do when a person commits the charged crime without really meaning to, or knowing the proscribed conduct is unlawful. The court replied: “[I]f a jury decides they are guilty, I give them an unconditional discharge or conditional discharge. It reflects itself in the sentence.”

Defense counsel did not immediately object to this statement, but during the charge conference asked for a curative instruction as the jury might believe the defendant in this case - if found guilty - could receive a conditional or unconditional discharge.
The Third Department first ruled that counsel preserved this challenge even though he waited until the charge conference to request a curative instruction. The issue was raised in time for the court to act.

The Court then reversed, finding that the trial judge basically told the jury the defendant could receive a conditional or unconditional discharge if he were convicted of Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree. This may have led the jury “to a scrutiny of the evidence less close than that to which defendant was entitled”
by Tim Davis, Esq.


People v Hackett, 47 AD3d 1122 (January 24, 2008)

Late one night, a State Trooper observed the defendant drive his vehicle over the fog line. The Trooper activated his emergency lights. After pulling over to the side of the road, the defendant leaned toward the passenger seat of his vehicle before the Trooper approached. The Trooper requested both license and registration, but defendant produced only the registration. Upon questioning defendant concerning his movement within the vehicle, defendant explained he was reaching for his cell phone, which he then showed to the Trooper.

The Trooper ordered defendant out, and decided to detain him for a traffic violation. The Trooper handcuffed defendant for safety reasons, and placed him in his patrol car while he ran a warrant check. He made no effort to determine whether defendant possessed a valid driver's license. Once a second Trooper arrived, the first went to defendant's vehicle, opened the passenger door and looked at the floor board. Seeing nothing, he bent down and shone his flashlight underneath the passenger seat, discovering a loaded handgun. A later search revealed a quantity of cocaine as well.

Indicted for two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and three counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, defendant moved to suppress the handgun and cocaine. The lower court relied on the minutes of the preliminary hearing - at which just the Trooper testified - and denied the request.

The Third Department, relying on People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224 [1989], held that the Trooper had no probable cause to return and search under the front passenger seat of defendant’s vehicle, when the defendant was secured and there was no imminent threat the Trooper’s safety. Although the defendant was driving erratically and disappeared from sight when he leaned toward the passenger seat, he explained this movement and produced his cell phone. Further, although the Trooper thought the defendant seemed nervous and repeatedly looked at his vehicle, this conduct was insufficient to justify a search. The search was unlawful because 1) there was no basis for the Trooper to believe a weapon was within the vehicle, and 2) no actual or specific danger threatened the safety of the officers.



People v Hasenflue, 48 AD3d 888 (February 21, 2008)

In March 2003, the defendant represented himself at trial, and was convicted of Attempted Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer, Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree and Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree. He appealed, and argued that the court erred in proceeding to trial without completing a 730 exam, which was ordered by another judge at arraignment. Before trial, two psychologists attempted to examine the defendant, but made no determination as he refused to cooperate. In People v Hasenflue, 24 AD3d 1017, the Third Department held that the defendant was “deprived of his right to a full and fair determination of his mental capacity to stand trial,” and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing.

Both counsel and the two psychologists who tried to interview defendant testified at the reconstruction hearing. The psychologists reviewed all the defendant’s psychiatric records and the court proceedings, leading them to opine that he was competent. Based upon this testimony, the court determined that the People established defendant’s competency to stand trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The Third Department reversed, concluding it was not possible to determine defendant's competency given the lack of any contemporaneous psychiatric examinations/evaluations at the time of trial. While relevant to the ultimate issue, neither his observed demeanor at trial nor his self representation was sufficient to establish his competence.


People v Revette, 48 AD3d 886 (February 21, 2008)

Defendant was charged with setting two fires to the home of her ex-boyfriend, with whom she was involved in a custody dispute. She was convicted after trial of Arson in the Third Degree (two counts) and Burglary in the Third Degree (two counts).

Before trial, defendant sought dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL § 210.35(5), arguing that a grand juror was married to one of the three deputy sheriffs who investigated the fire and testified before the grand jury.

As a close relationship between a grand juror and a witness raises the risk of prejudice, the Third Department held that the prosecutor should have enquired whether the juror could fairly evaluate the evidence. Although the prosecutor asked the juror if she could remain impartial, he received an ambiguous response which he never asked her to clarify. This was significant as the number of jurors voting to indict was not recorded, and the testimony of the juror’s husband was important to the case.

People v Ramos, 48 AD3d 984 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was convicted after trial of Burglary in the Second Degree and Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree. The court sentenced him to twelve years determinate on the burglary and four years determinate on the criminal mischief.

On appeal, defendant argued he should have been sentenced to an indeterminate term on the criminal mischief as it is a non-violent felony. The People conceded this was error. The Third Department vacated the sentence and remitted the case to the trial court.


People v Westerling, 48 AD3d 965 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was charged with abducting and then raping his estranged girlfriend. He was convicted after trial of Rape in the First Degree, Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree (two counts), Kidnaping in the Second Degree, Coercion in the First Degree, Criminal Use of a Firearm in the First Degree, Criminal Contempt in the First Degree (two counts) and Resisting Arrest.

The main issue on appeal was the trial court’s Molineux ruling permitting the People to introduce evidence of numerous domestic violence incidents between defendant and the complainant. In addition to a number of specific instances of violence, the trial court permitted the complainant to testify that defendant hit, bit or threw her approximately 100 times during their three-year relationship. The Third Department ruled it was improper for the court to allow her to testify to unparticularized acts occurring over such a lengthy period.

The potential prejudice of this testimony was exacerbated by the court’s failure to provide the jury with cautionary instructions regarding the limited purpose of this evidence. The court's final instructions were insufficient to cure this deficiency after the jury heard such evidence without any guidance as to its purpose.


People v Haddock
, 48 AD3d 969 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was convicted after trial of failing to comply with SORA - failing to register on an annual basis, and failing to register within ten days of a change of address.
On appeal, defendant raised the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury that the People were required to prove he knowingly failed to comply with SORA's registration requirements.

Although Correction Law § 168-t contains no requirement of a culpable mental state, the Third Department held that the legislature did not intend to create a strict liability crime. The Court found support for this position in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which set forth knowledge as an element. Although the People's proof included ample evidence of defendant's knowledge, the Third Department held that the failure to provide such a charge could not be regarded as harmless error.


People v Karika, 48 AD3d 980 (February 28, 2008)

Defendant was charged with Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree.

During his preliminary instructions, the trial judge correctly advised the jury not to consider the sentence the defendant might receive if convicted, as that was a matter solely for the court to determine. However, immediately before making this statement, the court inexplicably related a recent out-of-court conversation in which someone asked what the court might do when a person commits the charged crime without really meaning to, or knowing the proscribed conduct is unlawful. The court replied: “[I]f a jury decides they are guilty, I give them an unconditional discharge or conditional discharge. It reflects itself in the sentence.”

Defense counsel did not immediately object to this statement, but during the charge conference asked for a curative instruction as the jury might believe the defendant in this case - if found guilty - could receive a conditional or unconditional discharge.
The Third Department first ruled that counsel preserved this challenge even though he waited until the charge conference to request a curative instruction. The issue was raised in time for the court to act.

The Court then reversed, finding that the trial judge basically told the jury the defendant could receive a conditional or unconditional discharge if he were convicted of Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree. This may have led the jury “to a scrutiny of the evidence less close than that to which defendant was entitled”
In People v Sparber, 2008 NY Slip Op 03946 [NY 4/29/2008], the Court of Appeals finally considered the remedy when sentencing courts fail to pronounce their Post Release Supervision [PRS] terms in accordance with Criminal Procedure Law sections 380.20 and 380.40 and more than a year has past.

The Second Circuit, in considering this issue, held in Earley v Murray (451 F3d 71 [2d Cir 2006]), which held that DOCS's administrative addition of a PRS term not pronounced by Supreme Court violated federal "due process guarantees" (id. at 76 n 1) and should therefore be excised from the petitioner's sentence on a motion for a writ of habeas corpus. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the Second Circuit that only a judge, and not prison or court clerks can impose PRS. However, the Court disagreed as to the remedy and as to the effect of the one year limit on th eabilty of prosecutors to seek resentencing set forth in CPL 440.40 [1]. The Court explained

It is indisputable that the relief that defendants request — expungement of their PRS terms — would permit them to serve a sentence not in compliance with the statute. But defendants say that this result is required because the People failed to seek proper resentencing within one year from the date of their convictions and did not properly preserve their objection to defendant's expungement remedy before the trial court (see CPL 440.40 [1])[FN6]. Defendants are incorrect. The sole remedy for a procedural error such as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required pronouncement (see People v Sturgis, 69 NY2d 816, 817-818 [1987] ["[A] sentence [that] violates the mandate of CPL 380.20 . . . must be vacated and the case remitted to the trial court for resentencing"]; see also People v Stroman, 36 NY2d 939, 940-941 [1975] [violation of CPL 380.40 requires reversal and remitter for resentencing]).[FN7]


In all five of these cases, there exists no procedural bar to allowing the sentencing [*9]court to correct its PRS error [FN8]. It is obvious that at the time of each defendant's sentencing, Supreme Court intended to impose a sentence in compliance with the provisions of Penal Law §§ 70.00 (6) and 70.45 (1) — one that consisted of a determinate sentence and a period of PRS. No record evidence rebuts that presumption. Thus, the failure to pronounce the required sentence amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court could easily remedy (see People v DeValle, 94 NY2d 870, 871 [2000]; People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 614 [1982]; People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 364-365 [1981]).

Two footnotes to ponder. First note 6:
Defendants could, of course, move "[a]t any time" for resentencing (CPL 440.20 [1]). Their failure to exercise that right does not entitle them to the remedy requested here. Further, a court's authority to correct its own errors at resentencing is not subject to the one-year time limit imposed on the People by CPL 440.40 (1) (see People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 615 [1982] ["(I)t is clear that CPL 440.40 is intended only as a limitation on the People with reference to an 'invalid [sentence] as a matter of law' not imposed by mistake"]).

This note raises at least three questions. First, how could a defense attorney ethically move to have his client's sentence increased? Second, why would she do so? Third, in the divide between invalid sentences and mistaken sentence, how can the failure to be impose a mandatory PRS not be classified as an invalid sentence subject to the one year limitation?

Then comes note 7:
Defendants assert that CPL 450.90 precludes us from remitting for resentencing because the People, having prevailed below, are not entitled to that affirmative relief from this Court. Defendants are mistaken. Rather than affirmative relief to the People, this Court is merely giving a more limited form of relief to defendants than they seek.


So when the defendant argues that the PRS sentence was unlawfully imposed by prison or court officials other than a judges and that he is not and cannot be now subject to PRS, ithe imposition of PRS is just a limited form of the relief that defendant wanted. Which defendant ever asked for or wanted PRS?
In People v Sparber, 2008 NY Slip Op 03946 [NY 4/29/2008], the Court of Appeals finally considered the remedy when sentencing courts fail to pronounce their Post Release Supervision [PRS] terms in accordance with Criminal Procedure Law sections 380.20 and 380.40 and more than a year has past.

The Second Circuit, in considering this issue, held in Earley v Murray (451 F3d 71 [2d Cir 2006]), which held that DOCS's administrative addition of a PRS term not pronounced by Supreme Court violated federal "due process guarantees" (id. at 76 n 1) and should therefore be excised from the petitioner's sentence on a motion for a writ of habeas corpus. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the Second Circuit that only a judge, and not prison or court clerks can impose PRS. However, the Court disagreed as to the remedy and as to the effect of the one year limit on th eabilty of prosecutors to seek resentencing set forth in CPL 440.40 [1]. The Court explained

It is indisputable that the relief that defendants request — expungement of their PRS terms — would permit them to serve a sentence not in compliance with the statute. But defendants say that this result is required because the People failed to seek proper resentencing within one year from the date of their convictions and did not properly preserve their objection to defendant's expungement remedy before the trial court (see CPL 440.40 [1])[FN6]. Defendants are incorrect. The sole remedy for a procedural error such as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required pronouncement (see People v Sturgis, 69 NY2d 816, 817-818 [1987] ["[A] sentence [that] violates the mandate of CPL 380.20 . . . must be vacated and the case remitted to the trial court for resentencing"]; see also People v Stroman, 36 NY2d 939, 940-941 [1975] [violation of CPL 380.40 requires reversal and remitter for resentencing]).[FN7]


In all five of these cases, there exists no procedural bar to allowing the sentencing [*9]court to correct its PRS error [FN8]. It is obvious that at the time of each defendant's sentencing, Supreme Court intended to impose a sentence in compliance with the provisions of Penal Law §§ 70.00 (6) and 70.45 (1) — one that consisted of a determinate sentence and a period of PRS. No record evidence rebuts that presumption. Thus, the failure to pronounce the required sentence amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court could easily remedy (see People v DeValle, 94 NY2d 870, 871 [2000]; People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 614 [1982]; People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 364-365 [1981]).

Two footnotes to ponder. First note 6:
Defendants could, of course, move "[a]t any time" for resentencing (CPL 440.20 [1]). Their failure to exercise that right does not entitle them to the remedy requested here. Further, a court's authority to correct its own errors at resentencing is not subject to the one-year time limit imposed on the People by CPL 440.40 (1) (see People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 615 [1982] ["(I)t is clear that CPL 440.40 is intended only as a limitation on the People with reference to an 'invalid [sentence] as a matter of law' not imposed by mistake"]).

This note raises at least three questions. First, how could a defense attorney ethically move to have his client's sentence increased? Second, why would she do so? Third, in the divide between invalid sentences and mistaken sentence, how can the failure to be impose a mandatory PRS not be classified as an invalid sentence subject to the one year limitation?

Then comes note 7:
Defendants assert that CPL 450.90 precludes us from remitting for resentencing because the People, having prevailed below, are not entitled to that affirmative relief from this Court. Defendants are mistaken. Rather than affirmative relief to the People, this Court is merely giving a more limited form of relief to defendants than they seek.


So when the defendant argues that the PRS sentence was unlawfully imposed by prison or court officials other than a judges and that he is not and cannot be now subject to PRS, ithe imposition of PRS is just a limited form of the relief that defendant wanted. Which defendant ever asked for or wanted PRS?
In People v Torres, 2008 NY Slip Op 03888 [4th Dept 4/25/2008], the Court agreed
with defendant...that County Court erred in directing that the sentence imposed on the count of criminal possession of a weapon shall run consecutively to the sentence imposed on each count of attempted assault and attempted aggravated assault. There is no evidence that defendant "possessed the pistol with a purpose unrelated to his intent to shoot [the officers]" (People v Hamilton, 4 NY3d 654, 658), and thus the sentence imposed on the count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree must run concurrently with the sentences imposed on those counts (see People v Manor, 38 AD3d 1257, 1259, lv denied 9 NY3d 847; People v Boyer, 31 AD3d 1136, 1139, lv denied 7 NY3d 865).
In People v Torres, 2008 NY Slip Op 03888 [4th Dept 4/25/2008], the Court agreed
with defendant...that County Court erred in directing that the sentence imposed on the count of criminal possession of a weapon shall run consecutively to the sentence imposed on each count of attempted assault and attempted aggravated assault. There is no evidence that defendant "possessed the pistol with a purpose unrelated to his intent to shoot [the officers]" (People v Hamilton, 4 NY3d 654, 658), and thus the sentence imposed on the count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree must run concurrently with the sentences imposed on those counts (see People v Manor, 38 AD3d 1257, 1259, lv denied 9 NY3d 847; People v Boyer, 31 AD3d 1136, 1139, lv denied 7 NY3d 865).
In <People v Newkirk, 2008 NY Slip Op 03879 [4th Dept 4/25/2008], the Court agreed
with defendant that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Although the weight of the evidence establishes that defendant and two accomplices went to the wholesale club with the intent to commit a larceny, it does not establish that defendant forcibly stole property (see generally id.).

The evidence presented at trial establishes that, upon entering the wholesale club, defendant and one of his accomplices saw a loss prevention employee, who was seated in a wheelchair at the entrance/exit. After entering the wholesale club, defendant and that accomplice each picked up two boxed computer monitors, intending to steal them. As they approached the exit, the accomplice ran out first, whereupon the employee attempted to grab one of the boxes, causing the wheelchair to spin. The employee then left his wheelchair and followed the accomplice on foot. Defendant remained in the wholesale club and, immediately after the contact between the accomplice and the employee, defendant discontinued his participation in the larceny by dropping the two boxed computer monitors that he was carrying. The accomplice, followed by the employee, continued out of the wholesale club to a vehicle where the second accomplice was waiting. When the two accomplices attempted to drive away in the vehicle, the accomplice who had been with defendant in the wholesale club punched the employee in the face, causing the employee physical injury. Defendant walked out of the store as the two accomplices drove away in the vehicle, and he offered aid to the employee before walking away. [*2]

The evidence weighs heavily in favor of a finding that defendant neither "forcibly [stole] property" (Penal Law § 160.10), nor "solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided [the accomplice in the wholesale club] in the commission of the crime" (People v Carr-El, 287 AD2d 731, 733, affd 99 NY2d 546; see § 20.00; cf. People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830, 832; People v Harris, 19 AD3d 871, 873-874, lv denied 5 NY3d 806; People v Mejia, 297 AD2d 755, lv denied 99 NY2d 561). We thus conclude that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded on the issue whether defendant shared "the mental culpability necessary to commit the crime charged," i.e., the intent to commit a forcible theft (Carr-El, 287 AD2d at 733; see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).