tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2537406870454043122024-03-17T23:03:53.431-04:00New York Criminal DefenseA practical source for New York criminal law updates and commentary.Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.comBlogger846125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-4725284539058891492023-05-18T21:11:00.004-04:002023-05-18T21:11:53.365-04:00Challenging Traffic Stops as Violative of Equal Protectionby Jill Paperno
Author of "<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defens</a>e"
As every criminal defense lawyer knows, pretext stops are the bane of our (and more importantly, our clients’) existence. We have all long suffered under the burden of U.S. v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and People v. Robinson 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001), cases in which first the Supreme Court and then the New York Court of Appeals concluded that even if the officer’s primary reason in stopping someone was racist, courts would not examine an officer’s motivation in engaging in these stops, and such stops are not illegal. Study after study demonstrates what was predicted by defendants’ counsel in both cases and considered and rejected by both courts. Pretext stops are rife with racial disparities, and searches resulting from such stops suffer from the same biases. For more information about the history of pretext stops, the studies, the harms caused by these stops, and what is going on around the country, check out this report issued by Empire Justice Center in January of this year: https://empirejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Stop-the-Stops-Empire-Justices-Preliminary-Report-on-Racial-Disparities-in-Pretext-Stops.pdf
But there are some glimmers of hope in case law, statutes and policies developing across the country. Many of these developments are described in the Empire Justice report. But we want to focus on some recent cases and practice suggestions based on these cases.
First, a little refresher. Pretext stops are stops by police officers of motorists, cyclists and even pedestrians, generally for low-level, non-safety Vehicle and Traffic Law violations. The reason they are referred to as “pretext stops” is that the stopping officer actually wants to detain someone for another reason, like an investigation in which there is insufficient legal basis, or a completely unlawful reason like racial profiling.
As noted above, in Whren the Supreme Court permitted officers to engage in these stops. While the New York State Constitution sometimes provides greater protection of rights, in Robinson, the New York Court of Appeals refused to do so when it came to pretext stops. While each case said that arrests based on membership in a protected class would violate the Equal Protection Clause, both cases pointed defendants in the direction of civil lawsuits, presumably while they were serving time in prison for the criminal charges based on evidence seized as a result of these biased stops. Interestingly, prior to Whren and Robinson, there were New York Appellate Division cases that barred use of evidence obtained in pretext stops.
Last fall, the Third Department issued a decision in People v. Jones 219 AD3d 150. The Court returned the case to the trial court for consideration of whether arresting officers engaged in racial profiling, and if so, whether the evidence seized should be suppressed.
In Jones, the Court stated,
(W)e conclude that the Robinson standard does not preclude a challenge to a traffic stop predicated on racial profiling, at least under our state constitution. Correspondingly, the remedy for such an unconstitutional stop would be suppression of the evidence seized. In that regard, we are mindful that the First Department reached a contrary conclusion in (cases listed in the decision). Such a limitation would effectively render a defendant's constitutional rights meaningless in the criminal context – an outcome we do not accept. For a defendant's constitutional rights to be meaningful, the exclusionary rule must apply (see generally People v. Jones, 2 N.Y.3d 235, 241–242, [2004]).
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that both the majority and dissent in Robinson rejected as unworkable the “primary motivation” subjective test for a traffic stop (see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 353). We abide by that conclusion. Whether a traffic stop was premised on racial profiling must be assessed objectively with reference to the facts and circumstances of the encounter. Such considerations may include, for example, whether the arresting officers were involved in a plausible investigation prior to executing the vehicle stop. Also important — and certainly most relevant here — is consideration of the officers’ actions and comments during the encounter.
People v. Jones, 210 A.D.3d 150, 177 N.Y.S.3d 174, 178–79 (2022)
For a further analysis of the Jones case, see Hon. Barry Kamins’s columns in December in Law.com at https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2022/12/05/exclusionary-rule-applied-for-the-first-time-to-racial-profiling/ and Law.com in April at https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2023/04/04/race-and-the-fourth-amendment-defendants-raise-issue-in-suppression-motions/
This week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the highest in the state, decided Commonwealth vs. Michael Robinson-Van Rader. While this Mr. Robinson (Van Rader) also lost his case, the court concluded both that selective enforcement based on race may be a basis for suppression of evidence, and that to ensure that the Equal Protection clause is truly given the consideration it must receive, a more relaxed standard must be applied in cases where racial discrimination in the stop is properly raised. This decision is full of gems, from the recognition of the difficulty in proving a negative when trying to establish a record on demographic statistics, to the recognition of the subjectivity of the stops. The Court stated (in its 41 page decision):
The remedy for a selective enforcement violation is suppression of the evidence that was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to equal protection… In Long, 485 Mass. at 723-725, we revised the standard by which a defendant can establish a claim of selective enforcement, in the context of the traffic laws. In deciding that such a change was necessary, we explained, "it is clear that Lora has placed too great an evidentiary burden on defendants. The right of drivers to be free from racial profiling will remain illusory unless and until it is supported by a workable remedy." Id. at 721…The issue having been squarely raised here, we conclude that the equal protection standard established in Long for traffic stops applies equally to pedestrian stops and threshold inquiries, as well as other selective enforcement claims challenging police investigatory practices. In Long, 485 Mass. at 722, we determined that the first two parts of the three-part Franklin standard are not necessary in the context of motor vehicle stops. We explained that, "because of the ubiquity of traffic violations, only a tiny percentage of these violations ultimately result in motor vehicle stops, warnings, or citations. Thus, it is virtually always the case that a broader class of persons violated the law than those against whom the law was enforced. Similarly, in stopping one vehicle but not another, an officer necessarily has made a deliberate choice." (Quotation and citation omitted.) Id. Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry is restricted to whether the traffic stop was motivated by the driver's race or membership in another protected class. Id. at 723. …"Asking a defendant claiming selective enforcement to prove who could have been targeted by an informant, but was not, or who the [investigating agency] could have investigated, but did not, is asking [the defendant] to prove a negative; there is simply no statistical record for a defendant to point to." United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2018). The inaccessibility or unavailability of relevant data in such situations stands in contrast to cases of selective prosecution, which occur "when, from among the pool of people referred by police, a prosecutor pursues similar cases differently based on race" or another protected class…We note that the decision to conduct a pedestrian stop, or to investigate a suspect, is a "deliberate choice," thus satisfying the requirement under the second part of the three part Franklin test, see Franklin, 376 Mass. at 894, that a defendant show that the failure to prosecute was deliberate. 33 Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2431, 2432 (2018).
So what is a defense lawyer to do?
Start obtaining and examining the records and statistics relating to stops conducted by particular offices or the department, as the defense attorneys did in the Robinson-Van Rader case above. Compare them to population statistics. Break down the language and claims of officers when you hear of a defendant “blading their body” or engaging in “furtive gestures.” Attach the Empire Justice Center report to your motion and raise those Equal Protection claims under the United States and New York State constitutions, citing People v. Jones. And don’t run away from a court’s claim you are “playing the race card.” This is not a game, and systemic racism is not a card.Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-32343423422598976792022-04-26T15:48:00.001-04:002022-04-26T15:48:29.891-04:00Challenges for cause - cops and prosecutorsby
Jill Paperno
<div style="font-family: "times new roman"; margin: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span></div>
There are times that a police officer or prosecutor may wind up in the jury panel, or even seated in the box. As you know, when selecting a jury, if you question a witness who seems to have a bias, the witness may make an expurgatory statement that, “Of course, I can be fair,” and you may wind up having to use a peremptory. But there are some kinds of challenges for cause for which that “expurgatory oath” does not work. Often, judges will let these potential jurors go on challenges for cause, but sometimes they don’t.
There are several subdivisions to CPL 270.20(1), the statute that addresses challenges for cause. The one we know best is 270.20(1)(b), which states,
1. A challenge for cause is an objection to a prospective juror and may be made only on the ground that:
(b) He has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial;
CPL 270.20(1)(c) is the subdivision that lists categories of individuals who are presumptively biased. The statute states:
1. A challenge for cause is an objection to a prospective juror and may be made only on the ground that:
(c) He is related within the sixth degree by consanguinity or affinity to the defendant, or to the person allegedly injured by the crime charged, or to a prospective witness at the trial, or to counsel for the people or for the defendant; or that he is or was a party adverse to any such person in a civil action; or that he has complained against or been accused by any such person in a criminal action; or that he bears some other relationship to any such person of such nature that it is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict; or
Here is the interesting part. With respect to 270.20(1)(a), the state of mind subdivision, a potential juror can overcome the challenge for cause by assuring the trial court that they do not have the state of mind likely to preclude them from rendering an impartial verdict. (But there are ways of getting around this claim by continuing to question the juror.)
When a person falls within the category of 270.20(1)(c), which has to do with relationships, they cannot simply assure the court the relationship will not cause them to be biased. This category of challenges for cause is described as “implied bias.”
With respect to a prosecutor, the Second Department just addressed this issue in People v. Cortes. The Court stated,
A prospective juror may be challenged for cause on several grounds, including that he or she has a “relationship” with counsel for the People “of such a nature that it is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict” (CPL 270.20[1][c]; see People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 284, 287, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668). Such “implied bias” requires “automatic exclusion from jury service regardless of whether the prospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect [his or] her ability to be fair and impartial” (People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d at 287, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985, 389 N.E.2d 467).
Here, during jury selection, the subject prospective juror informed the Supreme Court that she was presently working as an assistant district attorney, within the Queens County District Attorney's Office, the same agency that was prosecuting the defendant, and that she was familiar with the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the Justice. As the People correctly concede, the juror's contemporaneous working relationship with the agency prosecuting the defendant required that juror's dismissal for cause (see People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d at 288, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668; People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d at 650–651, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985, 389 N.E.2d 467; People v. Greenfield, 112 A.D.3d 1226, 1229–1230, 977 N.Y.S.2d 486). Because the defendant challenged this juror for cause and thereafter exhausted all of his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection, the court's error in denying the for-cause challenge requires reversal of the judgment of conviction and remittitur for a new trial (see CPL 270.20[2]; People v. Wilson, 200 A.D.3d 1005, 158 N.Y.S.3d 255; People v. Rojas, 184 A.D.3d 761, 762, 124 N.Y.S.3d 246).
People v. Cortes, No. 2014/16, 2022 WL 1160957, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 20, 2022)
One of the cases cited in Cortes is People v. Branch, a 1979 Court of Appeals decision, which dealt with a police officer who was a potential juror. Like the prosecutor in Cortes, the police officer was subject to a different analysis, and the expurgatory oath is not available.
As stated, under the old law an expurgatory oath was not available where “implied bias” was shown. The reason for this rule was that the risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship between the prospective juror and one of the key participants in the trial was so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint. In enacting CPL 270.20 (subd. 1, par. (c)) the Legislature broadened the list of suspect relationships to exclude from jury service those persons who bear “some other relationship * * * likely to preclude (them) from rendering an impartial verdict”. To be sure such individuals are equally unfit to sit as jurors as are those who fall within the other prohibited categories. The expurgatory oath was never applied where any of the other suspect relationships were involved, and there is no indication whatsoever that the Legislature intended to diverge from this principle here (see People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 104, n. 2, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381, 394, 305 N.E.2d 469, 478).
People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (1979)
The “implied bias” analysis is still good. In addition to being cited this week in Cortes, the First Department noted its applicability in a 2019 case, People v. McGregor.
“Implied bias” exists where a juror “bears some ... relationship to any such person [defendant, witness, prosecution] of such nature that it is likely to preclude [the juror] from rendering an impartial verdict” (CPL 270.20[1][c]; People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d at 649–650, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985, 389 N.E.2d 467). “[T]he frequency of contact and nature of the parties' relationship are to be considered in determining whether disqualification is necessary” (People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 284, 287, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668 [2011]).
Implied bias “requires automatic exclusion from jury service regardless of whether the prospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect [his or] her ability to be fair and impartial” (People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d at 287, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668; People v. Rentz, 67 N.Y.2d 829, 501 N.Y.S.2d 643, 492 N.E.2d 771 [1986] [juror's statement at posttrial hearing that relationship did not affect his impartiality is ineffective] ).
People v. McGregor, 179 A.D.3d 26, 30, 113 N.Y.S.3d 675, 678 (2019)
So make sure you develop the relationships in your voir dire, including frequency of contact, connection with the department and individuals within it, and more. Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-37364958240259028582020-08-31T14:57:00.001-04:002020-08-31T15:00:12.185-04:00<p> <span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Attempted Assault in the Second Degree for Assault of a Police Officer is Not a Crime</span></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><div style="border-bottom: none; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: 1pt solid rgb(225, 225, 225); padding: 3pt 0in 0in;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0px;"><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><u></u>by </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;">Jill Paperno
Author of "Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense"
<u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><br></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><br></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;">PL 120.05(3) is the statute that makes assault on a police officer a felony. That charge is not based on an intent to cause injury to an officer. For the reasons described in People v. Campbell, a 1988 decision excerpted below, an attempt to engage in an act with unintended consequences may not be a cognizable crime. That is sometimes referred to as “impossibility” – that it is impossible to commit the offense. Attempted Assault in the Second Degree <b>under that particular subdivision</b> is not a crime. And yet, our clients still get charged with it. It is up to us to remain vigilant and ensure that these charges do not form the basis for detention or incarceration. Sometimes police don’t know this aspect of the law (which relates specifically to them, so maybe they know, and think we don’t.) And yes, I was prompted to send this by a case that came in today and the client is being held on the charge. <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;">Under the Penal Law, a person “is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime” (Penal Law § 110.00). An attempt exists as an integral offense having an identity separate from the crime which is being attempted. The rationale of treating an attempt as criminal conduct is “that although the defendant may have failed in his purpose, his conduct is nevertheless culpable and if carried far enough causes a sufficient risk of harm to be treated as a crime in itself (see, e.g., Hall, Criminal Attempt—A Study of the Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 Yale LJ 789, 816)” (<i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Bracey,</span></i> 41 N.Y.2d 296, 299, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bracey-19?ref=Atmwbv!CRvdtv" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094</a>). Essentially, an attempt to commit a crime consists of an intent to bring about the result which the particular law proscribes and, in addition, an act in furtherance of that intent (2 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2, at 24; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 75[1] ). To prove an attempt, the People must establish that the defendant acted for a particular criminal purpose, i.e.—with intent to “commit a specific crime (see, e.g., <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-kane-11?ref=Atmwbv!qoUMGm" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Kane,</span></i> 161 N.Y. 380, 55 N.E. 946</a>). ‘It is not enough to show that the defendant intended to do some unspecified criminal act’ (LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 59, p. 429)” (<i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Bracey, supra,</span></i> at 300, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bracey-19?ref=Atmwbv!CRvdtv" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094</a>). Because the very essence of a criminal attempt is the defendant's intention to cause the proscribed result, it follows that there can be no attempt to commit a crime which makes the causing of a certain result criminal even though wholly unintended.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;">Thus, there can be no attempt to commit assault, second degree (Penal Law § 120.05[3] ), since one cannot have a specific intent to cause an unintended injury (<i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">see, People v. Bracey, supra,</span></i> at 300, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bracey-19?ref=Atmwbv!CRvdtv" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094</a>; <span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;"><img alt="https://i1.next.westlaw.com/StaticContent_49.5.2003/images/v1/flag_red_small.png?ignoreDeliveryNewLine" class="CToWUd" data-image-whitelisted="" height="16" id="m_-2493622698984026638Picture_x0020_1" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ui=2&ik=47e7b8e8b4&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-f:1676550455003141328&th=17444dc18e7b54d0&view=fimg&sz=s0-l75-ft&attbid=ANGjdJ_PK8Ppfgg2UeUppxciljmDzpCz_KaZZojrbDXcrWb2iF2Ed685jub4KOqAkU2JD6rdMlXKCMArAbWqovZ3cPWpNV06FHWX5aI3pQcbQlxi5RhBBPBiLuXeCsk&disp=emb" style="height: 0.1666in; width: 0.1666in;" width="16"></span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-zimmerman-62?ref=Atmwbv!EARnBl" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Zimmerman,</span></i> 46 A.D.2d 725, 360 N.Y.S.2d 127</a>; <span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;"><img alt="https://i1.next.westlaw.com/StaticContent_49.5.2003/images/v1/flag_red_small.png?ignoreDeliveryNewLine" class="CToWUd" data-image-whitelisted="" height="16" id="m_-2493622698984026638Picture_x0020_2" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ui=2&ik=47e7b8e8b4&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-f:1676550455003141328&th=17444dc18e7b54d0&view=fimg&sz=s0-l75-ft&attbid=ANGjdJ-J14WQlxBhGwL1OWWpDTO9Ey19VcZPDcJDG_PvLMLkWv0ddIpJH_m-dfeoQQCbRa2bpGe-0XEkIC9bnVXGPI8fslH2mSTRc9-M2xMn_nBPQOlFQf5hrsE8C04&disp=emb" style="height: 0.1666in; width: 0.1666in;" width="16"></span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-brown-460?ref=Atmwbv!iK4b1O" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Brown,</span></i> 21 A.D.2d 738, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922</a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/state-v-almeda-2?ref=Atmwbv!NSUfm-" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">State v. Almeda,</span></i> 189 Conn. 303, 455 A.2d 1326</a>; <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">cf., <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-foster-106?ref=Atmwbv!i_weGg" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v. Foster,</a></span></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-foster-106?ref=Atmwbv!i_weGg" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"> <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-foster-106?ref=Atmwbv!i_weGg" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">19 N.Y.2d 150, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 225 N.E.2d 200</a>). It makes no difference that the statute calls for a different element of intent—i.e., that the injury must be caused while the defendant intends to prevent the officer from performing a lawful duty. That element of intent relates not to the result proscribed by the statute—causing the injury—but to the circumstances which make that result one for which defendant is strictly liable (<i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">see, </span></i><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;"><img alt="https://i1.next.westlaw.com/StaticContent_49.5.2003/images/v1/flag_red_small.png?ignoreDeliveryNewLine" class="CToWUd" data-image-whitelisted="" height="16" id="m_-2493622698984026638Picture_x0020_3" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ui=2&ik=47e7b8e8b4&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-f:1676550455003141328&th=17444dc18e7b54d0&view=fimg&sz=s0-l75-ft&attbid=ANGjdJ91cwmT6Vcvw10iDlCvROMH3stSQXFNe7oObg3e3EX8uEd7OiE73Sht2q5KUSa4LiJcZxLfadRki5LISsQp2ASnf74yxQaQsvAZbTCyWPq0vyw-Tk42wnG8c_Q&disp=emb" style="height: 0.1666in; width: 0.1666in;" width="16"></span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-conyers-11?ref=Atmwbv!1rwBa_" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Conyers,</span></i> 65 A.D.2d 437, 411 N.Y.S.2d 303</a>, <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">affd. on</span></i> <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">other grounds</span></i> <span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;"><img alt="https://i1.next.westlaw.com/StaticContent_49.5.2003/images/v1/flag_red_small.png?ignoreDeliveryNewLine" class="CToWUd" data-image-whitelisted="" height="16" id="m_-2493622698984026638Picture_x0020_4" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ui=2&ik=47e7b8e8b4&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-f:1676550455003141328&th=17444dc18e7b54d0&view=fimg&sz=s0-l75-ft&attbid=ANGjdJ9hXE2fG92miA5e5JPuucnM7i2K3_B3Otq9O7C2lR289INnGPluLK8UUQQX4rW6dqHUA53jCPqDoNNyMnaBq9ivLGDghSEJk2w1Yl2yLUcj_WGkSNUkctWBCg8&disp=emb" style="height: 0.1666in; width: 0.1666in;" width="16"></span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-conyers-18?ref=Atmwbv!1OW4JZ" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">49 N.Y.2d 174, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 400 N.E.2d 342</a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-hendrix-37?ref=Atmwbv!KlwEkB" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Hendrix,</span></i> 56 A.D.2d 580, 391 N.Y.S.2d 186</a>, <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">affd. on other grounds</span></i> 44 N.Y.2d 658, 405 N.Y.S.2d 31, 376 N.E.2d 192; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-hassin-2?ref=Atmwbv!mANusn" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. Hassin,</span></i> 48 A.D.2d 705, 368 N.Y.S.2d 253</a>; <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">see also,</span></i> Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 110.00, at 412–413).<u></u><u></u></a></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="color: black;">Similar reasoning was employed in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mcdavis-1?ref=Atmwbv!onDNL2" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">People v. McDavis,</span></i> 97 A.D.2d 302, 303–304, 469 N.Y.S.2d 508</a>. Like the assault second statute involved here which requires no proof of intention to cause injury, the manslaughter first statute (Penal Law § 125.20[1] ) in <i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">McDavis</span></i> does not require intent to cause death. The manslaughter first statute does, however—again, like the assault second statute here—require proof of intent on a different element: in subdivision (1), intent to produce serious physical injury. Because the statute requires no proof of intent to cause death, the proscribed result, it was held that there can be no attempt to commit that crime (<i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; padding: 0in;">see, People v. McDavis, supra,</span></i> at 303–304, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mcdavis-1?ref=Atmwbv!onDNL2" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">469 N.Y.S.2d 508</a>).<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in;"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><i><span style="border: 1pt none windowtext; color: black; padding: 0in;">People v. Campbell</span></i><span style="color: black;"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-campbell-440?ref=Atmwbv!nC5zKw" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 605–06, 532 N.E.2d 86, 87–88 (1988)</a><u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;">There is a distinction made between whether elements are just aggravating factors or not in determining whether a charge is impossible. See <i>People v. Saunders</i>, 85 NY2d 341. For some discussion see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-prescott-3?ref=Atmwbv!e1RYf1" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Prescott</i>, 95 NY2d 655</a> which addressed whether attempts to commit DWI and AUO1 were cognizable charges.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in;">Generally, where a penal statute imposes strict liability for creating an unintended result, an attempt to commit that crime is not a legally cognizable offense (see, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-campbell-440?ref=Atmwbv!nC5zKw" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Campbell</i>, 72 N.Y.2d, at 605–606, 535 N.Y.S.2d 580, 532 N.E.2d 86</a>, supra). One cannot attempt to create an unintended result. By contrast, where a penal statute imposes strict liability for committing certain conduct, an attempt is legally cognizable, since one can attempt to engage in conduct (see, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-saunders-178?ref=Atmwbv!x8vBt1" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Saunders</i>, 85 N.Y.2d, at 341, 624 N.Y.S.2d 568, 648 N.E.2d 1331</a>, supra). Likewise, an attempt is legally cognizable where a statute penalizes certain core conduct, but includes as an aggravating factor that the defendant caused an unintended result (see, <i>People v. Fullan</i>, 92 N.Y.2d, at 693–694, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-fullan?ref=Atmwbv!jzN2Ve" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">685 N.Y.S.2d 901, 708 N.E.2d 974</a>, supra; <i>People v. Miller</i>, 87 N.Y.2d, at 217–218, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-miller-576?ref=Atmwbv!pFO0JN" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">638 N.Y.S.2d 577, 661 N.E.2d 1358</a>, supra).<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.5in;">4 Driving while intoxicated appears to fit within the confines of <i>Saunder</i>s, since it is aimed principally at conduct: operating a motor vehicle while “intoxicated.” However, as the Saunders Court acknowledged, other factors, including statutory and policy considerations, can help inform the “attempt” analysis (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-saunders-178?ref=Atmwbv!x8vBt1" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Saunders</i>, 85 N.Y.2d, at 342–343, 624 N.Y.S.2d 568, 648 N.E.2d 1331</a>, supra). Here, we conclude that the Legislature did not contemplate criminal liability for attempted drunk driving. We reach that conclusion based on the comprehensive nature of article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its discrete penalty scheme.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-prescott-3?ref=Atmwbv!e1RYf1" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Prescott</i>, 95 N.Y.2d 655, 659, 745 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (2001)</a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; margin: 0px;">To assess whether an attempt of a crime is a cognizable charge, you may have to actually do a Westlaw search in relation to that charge since the analysis is not always intuitive or easily understood.<u></u><u></u></p><div><br></div>Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-75623789051316909962020-08-05T11:26:00.001-04:002020-08-05T11:26:07.660-04:00An interesting article about the pervasive problem of cops lying under oath and what can be done about it. Read the article <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/08/police-testilying.html">here</a>. Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-49856939132513243672020-08-05T09:45:00.002-04:002020-08-05T10:31:49.434-04:00This is the best decision you'll read this week. <div><br /></div><div>Says United States District Court Judge Carlton W. Reeves, our new hero: "Clarence Jamison was a Black man driving a Mercedes
convertible.
As he made his way home to South Carolina from a vacation
in Arizona, Jamison was pulled over and subjected to one
hundred and ten minutes of an armed police officer badgering him, pressuring him, lying to him, and then searching his
car top-to-bottom for drugs.
Nothing was found. Jamison isn’t a drug courier. He’s a
welder."</div><div><br /></div><div>Read on <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7013933/Jamison-v-McClendon.pdf">here</a>. It's long, but every word is worth your time. </div><div><br /></div><div>And just in case you forgot this stunning speech, at the sentencing of 3 white defendants for the execution of an elderly black man, by the same judge, you can reread it <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/12/385777366/a-black-mississippi-judges-breathtaking-speech-to-three-white-murderers">here</a>. H/T James Grable</div><div><br /></div>Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-78854327930836980532020-06-14T11:05:00.000-04:002020-06-14T12:40:35.545-04:00Prosecutors and Judges Who Pretend To Credit Police Perjury are Complicit in the Police Misconduct<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">In 1982, in his book “The Best Defense,” Alan Dershowitz listed what he called the Rules of the Justice Game. Among these were the following:</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule III: It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating the Constitution than by complying with it, and in some cases it is impossible to convict guilty defendants without violating the Constitution. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule V: All prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule VI: Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule VII: All judges are aware of Rule VI. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">Rule VIII: Most trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are lying. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">That prosecutors encourage and judges credit police perjury to allow unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted is not merely a theory. </span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The New York Times has </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank">reported</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> that the prevalence of police perjury to justify stops and seizures is so great that the police themselves for it – testilying. Indeed, in a three part series, the New York Times found that there is a “ </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/nyregion/new-york-police-perjury-promotions.html" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank">culture of dishonesty” and that officers who lie to justify illegal police conduct are more likely to be promoted than punished</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">. (Parts </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank">one</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">, </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/nyregion/new-york-police-perjury-promotions.html" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank">two</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">, and </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/nyregion/police-lying-new-york.html" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank">three</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> of the reporting on police perjury).</span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">This encouragement and acceptance of police lies regarding illegal police behavior explains why police believe that they can get away with writing false reports about their actions. The videos of the past month have demonstrated that the police version of events, such as the murder of George Floyd, are often lies to justify their illegal behavior. Only because of the videos, we know that the police lied when they c<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/video-george-floyd-contradict-resist-trnd/index.html" target="_blank">laimed that Floyd resisted</a></span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;"><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/video-george-floyd-contradict-resist-trnd/index.html" target="_blank">arrest</a> or that, in Buffalo, <a href="https://www.syracuse.com/state/2020/06/buffalo-police-shove-elderly-man-to-ground-injuring-him-claim-he-tripped-graphic-video.html" target="_blank">Martin Gugino, tripped</a>. Otherwise the police lies would have been accepted.</span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">We won’t have justice until prosecutors and judges stop pretending to believe lying police officers. If after seeing proof of police lies, prosecutors and judges still pretend to credit them, they are complicit in the misconduct.</span></span></div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-32828209000420749692020-02-04T15:41:00.002-05:002020-02-04T15:45:11.507-05:00<div style="text-align: justify;">
New York’s bail reform statute, while only in existence for just over a month, has generated numerous news stories, opinion pieces, and critical articles. Already, there have been calls for the law’s repeal (In the words of one state senator’s call for repeal: “This is only a partial list of offenses that allow criminals to leave prison without bail. These ‘reforms’ are now giving a free pass to many individuals who commit serious crimes that place our communities at risk” [https://www.nysenate.gov/petitions/james-l-seward/repeal-bail- reform]). These criticisms often equate having been charged with a crime with committing it. They stoke fear that a person charged with a crime will commit other crimes while released, reinforcing this bias by reporting arrests of people during their release on other charges. Seldom do these criticisms mention that an accused person is presumed innocent. </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The tenor of popular discourse on this issue evidences a dark reality that looms in the depths of our criminal justice system. That is, most jurors probably don’t presume the innocence of the accused. Yet, that presumption lies at the foundation of our criminal justice system, requiring trial courts to instruct juries about the presumption without minimizing its importance (see CPL § 300.10[2]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-hall-58?ref=Atmwbv!vtKomF" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Hall, 155 AD2d 344, 346-347</a> [1st Dept 1989]). </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
The problem is that potential jurors often hide their true feelings on the presumption of innocence. They’ll tell the court they can presume innocence, while wondering what crime the defendant committed. And who can blame a juror for hiding this opinion? In a courtroom full of strangers, who would want to be seen as unfair, biased, or unjust? </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
To unmask a potential jurors true feelings on the presumption of innocence, we should ask them to share their opinion on bail reform. In the answer, a potential juror might equate criminal charges with commission of a crime, just like many of the critics. And because these criticisms are veiled in terms of justice and/or fairness, a potential juror may be more willing to share an opinion. An answer could even spark a helpful debate amongst the panel. There is no downside in asking.</div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We should expect this line of questioning to be met with resistance from the trial court, which has broad discretion in limiting questioning during jury selection (see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-boulware-11?ref=Atmwbv!c-k5tR" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Boulware, 29 NY2d 135</a>[1971]; People v Corbett, 68 AD2d 7762 [4th Dept 1979]). We should respond that these questions address the ability of a potential juror to be fair and impartial, an area of inquiry in which a trial court is more apt to commit error (see CPL § 270.20[1][b]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-arnold-79?ref=Atmwbv!GpT56o" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358</a> [2001]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-johnson-2419?ref=Atmwbv!Ipi0pB" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600</a> [2000]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lewis-781?ref=Atmwbv!LYlQZH" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Lewis, 71 AD3d 1582</a> [4th Dept 2010]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/state-of-ny-v-habte?ref=Atmwbv!rn7W2l" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Habte, 35 AD3d 1199</a> [4th Dept 2006]). </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Thus, for example, if a potential juror favors pretrial incarceration, we should be able to determine if the juror favors such incarceration because he assumes someone has committed a crime when charged with a crime. It should also be determined if a juror favors pretrial incarceration to prevent a defendant from committing more crimes. If that’s the case, it’s unlikely the juror would follow a Sandoval or Molineux instruction. </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We should move to strike these jurors for cause. Before rejecting such a challenge, the trial court must have some basis in finding that the juror will render a verdict based on evidence and free of these biases. Unfortunately, these biases are reinforced in the daily news cycle. </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
In situations like the above, a trial court will ask if the potential juror can still be “fair and impartial” despite prior statements suggesting otherwise. Most jurors respond that they can be fair and impartial. </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
But it is not enough for a trial court simply to hear a potential juror agree that he could be fair and impartial; when a doubt remains about a potential juror’s ability to be fair, the juror should be discharged for cause (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bludson?ref=Atmwbv!GWCZV2" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Bludson, 97 NY2d 644</a> [2001]). This means that even after a potential juror assured that he can be fair and impartial, we should ask if the juror has changed his opinion about bail reform.</div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
We could also direct their attention to the trial court’s earlier instruction that the charges in the indictment and the indictment itself are not evidence of guilt. </div>
<br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
If a juror maintains his criticism of bail reform after this questioning, the juror likely will maintain his or her assumptions underlying the criticism. In this case, no instruction will rid the juror of this assumption, and a doubt remains of the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. When a doubt like this exists, a juror must be discharged for cause. A trial court that fails to do so risks reversal.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
By Paul Meabon</div>
<div>
<br></div>
Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-26284000920516347662019-12-04T22:52:00.000-05:002019-12-04T22:52:22.637-05:00Fighting Local Ordinances Which Purport to Outlaw Conduct Deemed Abusive by Police<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<br /><div id=":60d">
<div class="qQVYZb">
</div>
<div class="utdU2e">
</div>
<div class="btm">
</div>
</div>
<div class="">
<div class="aHl" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, RobotoDraft, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; margin-left: -38px;">
</div>
<div id=":3lg" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, RobotoDraft, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;" tabindex="-1">
</div>
<div class="ii gt" id=":60e" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; direction: ltr; font-family: Roboto, RobotoDraft, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 0.875rem; margin: 8px 0px 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;">
<div class="a3s aXjCH " id=":4zq" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: 1.5; overflow: hidden;">
<div dir="ltr">
In October of this year, two Monroe County legislators introduced a law purporting to protect police and first responders. The law was tabled, but then passed along party lines by the Republican majority in the county legislature. The bill was signed into law by the County Executive on December 2, 2019, despite protests from the community and concerns about its constitutionality as expressed by local attorneys, including those from this firm.<br /><div>
<br /></div>
<div>
On December 4th, the Rochester Police Chief issued a memo indicating that Rochester Police Department members would not be arresting citizens pursuant to this law. Subsequently, the Monroe County Sheriff and other law enforcement agencies in Monroe County stated that they too would not arrest people pursuant to this law.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
We have heard that these laws are being introduced around the state, and perhaps the country. We are including links to the letter sent by the attorneys, as well as a letter sent by the National Press Photographers Association, addressing the legal issues presented by the law that was passed here.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwQQGOn05Nq0OUZEYUhGaTFzSXp0SVpmVmliU3V1S25hTl9F/view?fbclid%3DIwAR3SR6eQkcc0CXXOBta_VFfc36uxsNXbyq8BUTRAe9BUJZeqWuwd4N2zs3M&source=gmail&ust=1575575105248000&usg=AFQjCNGOTb4jsgwxWkuA3ClHeQm91Z5lWA" href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwQQGOn05Nq0OUZEYUhGaTFzSXp0SVpmVmliU3V1S25hTl9F/view?fbclid=IwAR3SR6eQkcc0CXXOBta_VFfc36uxsNXbyq8BUTRAe9BUJZeqWuwd4N2zs3M" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">https://drive.google.com/file/<wbr></wbr>d/<wbr></wbr>0BwQQGOn05Nq0OUZEYUhGaTFzSXp0S<wbr></wbr>VpmVmliU3V1S25hTl9F/view?<wbr></wbr>fbclid=IwAR3SR6eQkcc0CXXOBta_<wbr></wbr>VFfc36uxsNXbyq8BUTRAe9BUJZeqWu<wbr></wbr>wd4N2zs3M</a> </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RDCscTc05Xub8waQnztSqpDUqO3Vb1d0/view?fbclid%3DIwAR1QucbNIVtNYW8s_B6PGGLNde6_ya4I8bAEoTBnoCWXwl1hBq5f_TpO0xo&source=gmail&ust=1575575105248000&usg=AFQjCNHp8AiycDUOkAha_6FvpeZPXu6aNQ" href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RDCscTc05Xub8waQnztSqpDUqO3Vb1d0/view?fbclid=IwAR1QucbNIVtNYW8s_B6PGGLNde6_ya4I8bAEoTBnoCWXwl1hBq5f_TpO0xo" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">https://drive.google.com/<wbr></wbr>file/d/<wbr></wbr>1RDCscTc05Xub8waQnztSqpDUqO3Vb<wbr></wbr>1d0/view?fbclid=<wbr></wbr>IwAR1QucbNIVtNYW8s_B6PGGLNde6_<wbr></wbr>ya4I8bAEoTBnoCWXwl1hBq5f_<wbr></wbr>TpO0xo</a><div class="yj6qo">
</div>
<div class="adL">
<br /></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="adL">
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="hq gt" id=":61e" style="background-color: white; clear: both; color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, RobotoDraft, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 0.875rem; margin: 15px 0px;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-66560153103304049442019-06-07T17:00:00.001-04:002019-06-07T23:08:35.747-04:00Lesser Included Offenses<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">by Jill Paperno</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span><span style="color: black; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: small;"></span><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: medium;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;">"</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Lesser included offenses may come into play at various stages of a case, such as a court's inspection of grand jury minutes and possible reduction of charges, pleas, TODs, the defense theory of the case, and as addressed below, the jury charge at the end of a case.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">There are times that you may wish to request that the jury be charged on a lesser included offense. This means that if the jury concludes the defendant is not guilty of the top count, they may consider a lesser count. Although it seems like you'd want to stop with the acquittal on the top count and not get a lesser charge (and sometimes that is a strategic decision to make) we also often recognize a jury may be reluctant to completely acquit, and since they hear the instructions on the lesser before they deliberate they know there's an option other than a complete acquittal in a case where they might not want to see the client walk.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">In CPL 1.20 (the definitions section - a good place to start with many issues) the term "lesser included offense" is defined. The definition, in subdivision 37, states, "'Lesser included offense.' When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a 'lesser included offense.' In any case in which it is legally possible to attempt to commit a crime, an attempt to commit such crime constitutes a lesser included offense with respect thereto." </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">(In some cases attempts are not possible - those tend to be strict liability crimes - another discussion for another day. Not all strict liability crimes fall within this category and you must do case research.)</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">CPL 300.50 relates to submission of lesser included offenses to the jury when the case is charged by indictment. CPL 360.50(2) relates to the submission when the case is charged by information. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Pursuant to CPL 300.50(1), the court may in its discretion submit the lesser if "there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater." If the court is authorized to submit a lesser (it meets the reasonable view test) and either party requests the lesser, it must submit it. "This reasonable view" test was addressed in a blog piece by one of our former colleagues in appeals, Jim Eckert. I've attached the blog piece below. There are several other subdivisions in this statute worth a read, including subdivision 6 relating to Rape 3 being a possible lesser given to the jury in Rape 1 cases. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">The Court of Appeals has articulated the lesser test as follows:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #2f2f2f; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">A party who seeks to have a lesser included crime charged to the jury must satisfy a two-pronged inquiry. First, the crime must be a lesser included offense within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20 (37). Here, defendant asked the trial judge to charge second-degree manslaughter, which is a lesser included crime of second-degree intentional murder (<i>see</i> <a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-tai-2?ref=Atmwbv!KPGGp2" target="_blank"><i>People v Tai</i>, 39 NY2d 894, 352 NE2d 582, 386 NYS2d 395</a> [1976] [reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of intentional murder]). Second, the party making the request for a charge-down "must then show that there is a reasonable view of the evidence in the [**450] [***452] <wbr></wbr>particular case that would support a finding that [the defendant] committed the lesser included offense but not the greater" (<a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-glover-62?ref=Atmwbv!7uete0" target="_blank"><i>People v Glover</i>, 57 NY2d 61, 63, 439 NE2d 376, 453 NYS2d 660</a> [1982]; CPL 300.50 [1]). In assessing whether there is a "reasonable view of the evidence," the proof must be looked at "in the light most favorable to [the] defendant" (<a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-martin-158?ref=Atmwbv!zHzeq3" target="_blank"><i>People v Martin</i>, 59 NY2d 704, 705, 450 NE2d 225, 463 NYS2d 419</a> [1983]), which requires awareness of "the jury's right to accept some part of the evidence presented [****15] by either side and reject other parts of that proof" (<a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-green-518?ref=Atmwbv!aBTQzl" target="_blank"><i>People v Green</i>, 56 NY2d 427, 434, 437 NE2d 1146, 452 NYS2d 389</a> [1982]). </span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid%3D1000516%26crid%3D2c4f3b36-5ef4-44d7-a4dc-640177b4eafe%26pddocfullpath%3D%252Fshared%252Fdocument%252Fcases%252Furn%253AcontentItem%253A5BXS-FFX1-JCNG-G010-00000-00%26pddocid%3Durn%253AcontentItem%253A5BXS-FFX1-JCNG-G010-00000-00%26pdcontentcomponentid%3D9096%26pdshepid%3Durn%253AcontentItem%253A5BV7-K4G1-J9X6-H3XD-00000-00%26pdteaserkey%3Dsr2%26pditab%3Dallpods%26ecomp%3DbyrLk%26earg%3Dsr2%26prid%3D4c383c93-3e6c-4597-90c6-a3155ea505f9%23&source=gmail&ust=1560022670673000&usg=AFQjCNGMfdrs8nWEncihun1zw5pCzwFoZA" href="https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2c4f3b36-5ef4-44d7-a4dc-640177b4eafe&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5BXS-FFX1-JCNG-G010-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5BXS-FFX1-JCNG-G010-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=9096&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5BV7-K4G1-J9X6-H3XD-00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr2&pditab=allpods&ecomp=byrLk&earg=sr2&prid=4c383c93-3e6c-4597-90c6-a3155ea505f9#" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #2f2f2f; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">We have never, however, "countenance[d] selective dissection of the integrated testimony of a single witness as to whom credibility, or incredibility, could only be a constant factor" (<a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-scarborough-7?ref=Atmwbv!n6pcHW" target="_blank"><i>People v Scarborough</i>, 49 NY2d 364, 373, 402 NE2d 1127, 426 NYS2d 224</a> [1980]; <i>see also</i> <a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-negron-72?ref=Atmwbv!P5Fyhj" target="_blank"><i>People v Negron</i>, 91 NY2d 788, 792, 699 NE2d 32, 676 NYS2d 520</a> [1998]).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #004080; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><br /></span><a class="ct-citation" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5BXS-FFX1-JCNG-G010-00000-00?page%3D120%26reporter%3D3322%26cite%3D23%2520N.Y.3d%2520112%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1560022670673000&usg=AFQjCNGt3cefl1aPQNkOfHN8StkdQB8lXg" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-rivera-2715?ref=Atmwbv!lOra0B" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank"><span style="color: #004080; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">People v Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 112, 120-121</span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Although it seems like it should be easy to figure out if a lesser meets the test set forth in CPL 1.20 (legally impossible to commit the top count without committing the lesser) and the reasonable view of the evidence test, there are many cases interpreting whether lessers are actually lessers based on the elements of the charge and the specific facts of the case under review. So when you are prepping for trial, either take a look at the NYSDA lesser included chart, linked below, or do some research, or both. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nysda.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Files/NY_Lesser_Included_Offenses_.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1560022670673000&usg=AFQjCNGGX0yCf_UF_yuEO9k6N0d78KNPsg" href="https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nysda.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/Files/NY_Lesser_Included_Offenses_.pdf" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-size: 12pt;"><u>https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/<wbr></wbr>nysda.site-ym.com/resource/<wbr></wbr>resmgr/Files/NY_Lesser_<wbr></wbr>Included_Offenses_.pdf</u></span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"> Make sure you consider the <i>mens rea</i> of the greater and potential lesser. In sex offenses this is a bit more complicated. For some sex offenses, the definition of the offense includes the phrase "sexual contact," while others contain the phrase "sexual conduct.." While many Penal Law definitions are found in Article 10 of the Penal Law, some are found in the articles addressing the particular offenses. "Sexual contact" and "sexual conduct" are defined in the definitions section of Article 130. Some sex offense crimes contain neither phrase but the definition of the offense sets forth the elements. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">Sexual Abuse in the First Degree involves "sexual contact." Sexual contact requires the contact be for the "purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party." (PL 130.00(3). The definition is more extensive. But rape, sodomy and course of sexual conduct, for example, do not require that purpose. So it is possible to commit the lesser without committing the greater offense. And if that can happen, the charge is not a lesser. For cases addressing this specific issue in sex offenses, see <i>People v. Wheeler </i>67 NY2d 960 and <i> <a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-baker-664?ref=Atmwbv!zBkPGt" target="_blank">People v. Baker </a></i><a class="ct-citation" href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-baker-664?ref=Atmwbv!zBkPGt" target="_blank">123 AD3d 1378 (Third Dept. 20146)</a>.</span></div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-46673798380211095942018-10-04T22:25:00.000-04:002019-04-05T16:55:16.910-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">by Jill Paperno</span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">A judge must respond to a jury's questions in a way that meaningfully answers the question and does not add new principles of law to those they originally received. (Some practice tips at the end.)</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-wood-305?ref=Atmwbv!-COm4G" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Wood</i>, 163 AD3d 1485</a></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #252525; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 11px; white-space: nowrap;"><a href="http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_05422.htm" target="_blank">, </a></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><a href="http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_05422.htm" target="_blank">2018 Slip Op 05422, (4th Dept July 25, 2018)</a>, the Fourth Department considered whether the trial court adequately responded to the jury's questions about intent and knowledge. Defendant was accused of brandishing a weapon in a restaurant. He was arrested shortly after the incident and found in possession of a loaded firearm. (Interestingly, and unfortunately, defendant's testimony and defense seem to have made out all of the elements of one of the charges in the indictment - CPW2 possession of a loaded firearm under Penal Law 265.03[3] But I digress...).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">During deliberations the jury sent the court a note requesting clarification of the terms "intent" and "unlawfully," and asked whether they applied to when the defendant emerged from the vehicle, when he pulled the weapon from his pants, or at any time he was in possession of the gun. They also asked for a readback about the interaction in the restaurant. The prosecutor then asked, for the first time, for an instruction on the presumption (or as Bradley would remind us, permissive inference) that one in unlawful possession of a loaded firearm is presumed to intend to use it unlawfully against another. The defense objected, noting that the prosecutor had never previously requested the instruction, the Court should not be instructing on principles of law for the first time during deliberations, and that counsel did not have an opportunity to respond to the new instruction. The Court overruled the objections and read the additional instruction. Within two minutes the jury had a verdict.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Appellate Division in <i>Wood</i> wrote:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Criminal Procedure Law allows the jury to ask the court to clarify an instruction "[a]t any time during its deliberation" (CPL 310.30). Upon receiving such a request, the court must " perform the delicate operation of fashioning a response which meaningfully answer[s] the jury's inquiry while at the same time working no prejudice to the defendant' " (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-brewer-109?ref=Atmwbv!nhL5ut" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Brewer</i>, 118 AD3d 1409, 1413</a> [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1082 [2014]; see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-miller-349?ref=Atmwbv!DqhvA1" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Miller</i>, 288 AD2d 698, 700</a> [3d Dept 2001]). "[T]he court has significant discretion in determining the proper scope and nature of the response" (<i>People v Taylor</i>, 26 NY3d 217, 224 [2015]). In determining whether the court's response constituted an abuse of discretion, " [t]he factors to be evaluated are the form of the jury's question, which may have to be clarified before it can be answered, the particular issue of which inquiry is made, the [information] actually given and the presence or absence of prejudice to the defendant' " (id., quoting <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-malloy-13?ref=Atmwbv!72pVci" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Malloy</i>, 55 NY2d 296, 302</a> [1982], cert denied 459 US 847 [1982]).</span><span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">We conclude that the court failed in its duty to fashion a response that meaningfully answered the jury's question and to avoid prejudicing defendant. The jury notes demonstrate that the jury had thoughtful questions about intent and was carefully weighing the conflicting testimony of the witnesses to determine whether and when defendant in fact formed the intent to use the gun unlawfully against another. The court, however, instructed the jury that defendant's possession of the gun was presumptive evidence of intent to use it unlawfully, and that the jury may not need or want to consider additional evidence in light of that presumption. That answer was not responsive to either note. Moreover, the court's response prejudiced defendant by introducing new principles of law after summations, when defense counsel no longer had the opportunity to argue that, despite the presumption, the evidence established that defendant lacked the requisite intent (see<i> Brewer</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-brewer-109?ref=Atmwbv!nhL5ut" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">118 AD3d at 1413</a>; see generally <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-samuel-sierra?ref=Atmwbv!ZZuClO" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Sierra</i>, 231 AD2d 907, 908</a> [4th Dept 1996]).</span></blockquote>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span><br>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">So there are several takeaways from this case. First, don't have your client admit to all of the elements of one of the charges in an indictment if the charges are all at the same level of severity and relate to the same incident. It may be a defense to admit to lower level charges, or charges relating to one non-transactional incident, but to admit to a C violent while fighting another subdivision of the charge may lead you to win the battle but lose the war, as happened here.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Second, if the jury asks a question, make sure you have the opportunity to read the note or have the entire note read to you. Ask the Court to mark it and make it part of the record if the Court is not doing that. Consider whether the Court's proposed response adequately addresses the question. If it does not, object. If the question involves readback, make sure the cross is included, and that all of the readback addressing the topic is provided to the jury - I have had many trials where the Court believed some of the testimony was responsive and was not intending to read the rest, or only asked the stenographer to read part. Sometimes judges rely entirely on the stenographer's interpretation of what testimony is responsive. Object if the cross or a part of the readback is left out (unless that part hurts you, in which case perhaps you rely on the Court's recollection and selection). If there are new instructions or legal principles included in the Court's response, and they are harmful to your case, object, citing this case, and noting that the defense did not have an opportunity to respond to or address those instructions during the trial, and this deprives your client of the rights to due process and a fair trial as protected by the New York State and United States constitutions. </span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As an aside - you do not have to assume that the Criminal Jury Instructions must be read verbatim. They are suggestions, and you should consider offering your own instructions when your case warrants it. If you do, and the Court rejects your instruction, have it marked and made part of the record so it can be reviewed on appeal. Or at least make sure your verbal request is on the record.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Jury instructions are an important part of the case, and much as we would like to take that time for a well deserved nap, we have to be vigilant and precise as we listen, object, consider whether proposed responses are accurate and complete, and make additional requests. </span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<br>
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span></div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-27621460070713926792018-10-01T22:40:00.000-04:002019-04-05T16:55:16.079-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Brian Shiffrin<br>
<br>
It is important understand the differences between actual bias and implied bias of prospective jurors. CPL§ 270(1)(b), deals with a prospective juror who has evinced an actual bias, defined as “a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial.” If a juror’s statements during voir dire raise a doubt about his impartiality, such as statements that he has a pre-formed opinion about the case, that juror cannot be permitted to sit unless he states unequivocally that he can be fair and decide the case solely on the evidence adduced at trial (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-johnson-5481?ref=Atmwbv!brXCcd" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Johnson</i>, 17 NY3d 752, 753</a> [2011]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-chambers-23-ny-3-19-2002?ref=Atmwbv!knYOqt" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Chambers</i>, 97 NY2d 417, 419</a> [2002]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-arnold-79?ref=Atmwbv!GpT56o" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Arnold</i>, 96 NY2d 358, 362-363</a> [2001]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-johnson-2419?ref=Atmwbv!Ipi0pB" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Johnson</i>, 94 NY2d 600, 614</a> [2000]). Thus, actual bias can be cured by an expurgatory oath.<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Another subdivision, CPL § 270(1)(c), permits challenges for cause stemming from the implied bias of a prospective juror’s relationship with either party, witness, or counsel.<br>
Specifically, this subdivision, very broadly permits challenges for cause where a prospective juror<br>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>is related within the sixth degree by consanguinity or affinity to the defendant, or to the person allegedly injured by the crime charged, or to a prospective witness at the trial, or to counsel for the people or for the defendant;. . . . that he bears some other relationship to any such person of such nature that it is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict</blockquote>
(CPL§ 270.20[1][c].)<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As quoted above, CPL§ 270.20(1)(c) is not limited to familial relationships. The Court of Appeals has explained that this subdivision was written to provide for wider listing of relationships subject to challenge for cause than the Code of Criminal Procedure had previously allowed which is why it included the catchall last sentence, not in the Code, authorizing for cause challenges to a prospective juror who bears some other relationship to any such person of such nature that it is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-culhane-1?ref=Atmwbv!9X5yX6" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Culhane</i>, 33 NY2d 90, 104-05</a>, n2 [1973]). These relationships have been held to include a wide variety of professional and personal relationships (see, e.g., <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-rentz-3?ref=Atmwbv!_tKkaS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Rentz</i>, 67 NY2d 829, 830–831</a> [1986] [juror with professional relationship with two witnesses and personal one with one witness should have been disqualified]; <i>People v. Branch</i>, 46 N.Y.2d at 650–651 [looked at “direct contact” with the District Attorney and that juror had “worked directly” with trial prosecutor, in addition to having a personal relationship with trial prosecutor]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-littebrant-3?ref=Atmwbv!ne1wNL" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Littebrant</i>, 55 AD3d 1151, 1154</a>, [2008] [juror with professional and long-term personal relationship with key defense witness properly excused for cause]; P<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bedard-8?ref=Atmwbv!0tvXUp" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>eople v Bedard</i>, 132 AD3d 1070</a> [3d Dept 2015] [friendship with District Attorney required granting of a for cause challenge]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-clark-393?ref=Atmwbv!tVD6FS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Clark</i>, 125 A.D.2d 868</a> [friendship with District Attorney required granting of for cause challenge]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-meyer-10?ref=Atmwbv!qWO3i5" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Meyer</i>, 78 AD2d 662, 664</a> [2d Dept 1980] [limited social acquaintance and a business relationship with the prosecution witness created implied bias requiring exclusion]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-wlasiuk-8?ref=Atmwbv!BtrizH" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Wlasiuk</i>, 90 AD3d 1405, 1412</a> [3d Dept 2011] [juror failed to disclosprofessional relationship as coworker to victim]). </div>
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Critically, in contrast to challenges for cause based on actual bias pursuant to CPL § 270(1)(b), the implied bias of a prospective juror’s relationship with either a party, witness, or counsel, cannot be cured with an expurgatory oath (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-furey-8?ref=Atmwbv!Gj5klL" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Furey</i>, 18 NY3d 284, 287-88</a> [2011]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-branch-48?ref=Atmwbv!H6mEqo" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 649-52</a> [1979] [“the risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship ... [is] so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint”]).<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Thus, the Court of Appeals has explained that a challenge for cause for a person who has a relationship covered by CPL § 270(1)(c)<br>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>requires automatic exclusion from jury service regardless of whether the prospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect her ability to be fair and impartial (see e.g. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-branch-48?ref=Atmwbv!H6mEqo" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Branch</i>, 46 NY2d 645, 650</a> [1979]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-rentz-3?ref=Atmwbv!_tKkaS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Rentz</i>, 67 NY2d 829, 831</a> [1986]). And such bias . . .creates the perception that the accused might not receive a fair trial before an impartial finder of fact. For this reason, we have advised trial courts to exercise caution in these situations by leaning toward “disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality” (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-furey-8?ref=Atmwbv!Gj5klL" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Branch</i>, 46 NY2d 645, 651.)</a></blockquote><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-branch-48?ref=Atmwbv!H6mEqo" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
(<i>People v Furey</i>, 18 NY3d 284, 287-88 [2011].)</blockquote></a>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>This past week, citing and applying <i>Furey</i>, the Fourth Department, in <i style="text-align: justify;">P<a href="http://nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_06380.htm" target="_blank">eople v Farley</a></i><span style="text-align: justify;"><a href="http://nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_06380.htm" target="_blank"> (2018 NY Slip Op 06380 [4th Dept])</a>,</span> reversed a conviction where the <span style="text-align: justify;">the juror acknowledged that the medical witness was the surgeon who save her life, despite the juror's insistence that she could be fair. Remember, reversal only occurs if the defendant exercised a peremptory challenged and and exhausted his peremptory challenges (<i>see</i> CPL 270.20 [2]).</span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="text-align: justify;"><br></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="text-align: justify;"><br></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="text-align: justify;"><br></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="text-align: justify;"><br></span></div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-69125551269544677642018-09-20T19:16:00.000-04:002019-04-05T17:00:01.199-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Jill Paperno,<br>
<br>
<div style="font-family: "times new roman"; margin: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;"></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;"><br></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;">There is a body of law that bars discriminatory use of challenges to jurors based on a Supreme Court decision, <i>Batson v. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/batson-v-kentucky?ref=Atmwbv!WFsSXA" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">Kentucky</a></i> 476 U.S. 79. When you are challenging a prosecutor's discriminatory use of jury challenges, it is called "making a<i> Batson</i> challenge." </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;">In <i>People v. Herrod</i>, the Fourth Department reminds us of the process and standards to be applied in<i> Batson</i> challenges. One way prosecutors often oppose our <i>Batson</i>challenges is by claiming that there has been no "pattern" of discrimination established during our challenge. <b>But that is not the standard, and it's really important that we not allow the prosecutor or court to rely on that erroneous belief in denying our challenges. </b> In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-herrod-1?ref=Atmwbv!Dx6tPO" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. Herrod ,</i> 2018 NY Slip Op 05110 [163 AD3d 1462 [4th Dept July 6, 2018]</a>, </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;">the Fourth Department stated, </span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"></span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;">Defendant contends that County Court misstated his burden under the first step of the three-step <i>Batson</i> test. We agree. In order for the moving party to satisfy its burden at step one, it must " show[ ] that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the other party excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason'" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-baxter-54?ref=Atmwbv!P3HdKP" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Baxter</i>, 108 AD3d 1158, 1159, 969 N.Y.S.2d 678</a> [4th Dept 2013], quoting <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-smocum-4?ref=Atmwbv!xCjOTu" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Smocum</i>, 99 NY2d 418, 421, 786 N.E.2d 1275, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239</a> [2003]). "<b>A defendant need not show [either] a pattern of discrimination'" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-anthony-212?ref=Atmwbv!MDgZ2x" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Anthony</i>, 152 AD3d 1048, 1050, 61 N.Y.S.3d 151</a> [3d Dept 2017]) or, as the court stated here, "a systematic approach by the prosecution</b>." (Emphasis added.) Rather, a defendant may satisfy his or her burden under the first step by demonstrating that "members of the cognizable group were excluded while others with the same relevant characteristics were not" or that the People excluded members of the cognizable group "who, because of their background and experience, might otherwise be expected to be favorably disposed to the prosecution" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-childress?ref=Atmwbv!XHizYK" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Childress</i>, 81 NY2d 263, 267, 614 N.E.2d 709, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146</a> [1993]).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"></span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;"><br></span>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: large;">We conclude that defendant met his burden under step one by establishing that there is a basis in the record to infer that the People exercised the peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner. Here, defense counsel explained to the court that the relevant prospective juror was the first African-American male "that's been available without a [for]-cause" challenge and that the prospective juror provided answers during voir dire that were favorable to the prosecution, i.e., that the prospective juror had a number of family members in law enforcement, had a college degree and had at one time been robbed. Defense counsel thus implied that he could not ascertain from the prospective juror's answers a reason for the peremptory challenge other than racial bias. The court did not provide defense counsel with any further opportunity to develop that argument and, instead, interrupted defense counsel and concluded that a pattern of discrimination had not been established.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-1063892246889577966_" style="color: #1155cc;"></a><span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: xx-small;">Inasmuch as there is a basis in the record to infer that the People exercised the peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner, we conclude that "the burden shifted to the People to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for striking the juror, and the court then should have determined whether the proffered reason was pretextual" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-davis-3711?ref=Atmwbv!UNuFCl" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Davis</i>, 153 AD3d 1631, 1632, 62 N.Y.S.3d 641</a> [4th Dept 2017]; <i>see generally People v James</i>, 99 NY2d 264, 270-271, 784 N.E.2d 1152, 755 N.Y.S.2d 43 [2002]). We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for that purpose (<i>see Davis</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-davis-3711?ref=Atmwbv!UNuFCl" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">153 AD3d at 1632</a>).</span><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: xx-small;"><u><br></u></span></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: large;"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-herrod-1?ref=Atmwbv!Dx6tPO" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Herrod, 163 A.D.3d 1462, 1462-1463</a>.</span><br>
<span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span></div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-11911219069007148712018-08-27T20:15:00.001-04:002019-04-05T16:55:17.978-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Jill Paperno,<br>
<br>
<div style="font-family: "times new roman"; margin: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span><br>
<div>
<br></div>
</div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">When a jury has a substantive note in the case (not simply asking for a bathroom or cigarette break, for example), it is not enough for a judge to summarize its contents.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> This is one of the few areas in which appellate courts scrutinize adherence to the letter of the law, in this case CPL 310.30 (Jury deliberation; request for information), and the cases interpreting it (specifically, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-orama-3?ref=Atmwbv!ecK877" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v. O'Rama</i> 78 NY2d 270</a>). Failure to provide this information to defense counsel constitutes a "mode of proceedings error," and can lead to reversal. In <i>People v. Parker</i> and <i>People v. Morrison</i>, both decided on June 28, 2018, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position on the need to strictly adhere to jury note procedures.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">In <i>People v. Parker</i>, </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: small;">2018 NY Slip Op 04776, </span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W8-00000-00?page%3D1%26reporter%3D5314%26cite%3D2018%2520NY%2520Slip%2520Op%252004776%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1535479454854000&usg=AFQjCNH0cu0zL8QXSLUZ-HRadrbLTKevbw" href="https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W8-00000-00?page=1&reporter=5314&cite=2018%20NY%20Slip%20Op%2004776&context=1000516" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">the Court reiterated what is required by the trial court in providing meaningful notice of the contents of the note, and a meaningful response to the jury. The Court further acknowledged the purpose of notice to the counsel is to provide counsel with the opportunity to "participate in the formation of a response" to the jury's question. Justice Rivera, writing for the Court, noted that the record did not establish that all three jury notes were shared with counsel, and stated: </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">CPL 310.30 requires that, in response to a jury request for additional information or instruction "with respect to any matter pertinent to the jury's consideration of the case," the trial court "must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant[,] must give such requested information or instruction as the court deems proper." In <i>People v Mack</i>, we reaffirmed that CPL 310.30 "imposes two responsibilities on trial courts upon receipt of a substantive note from a deliberating jury: the court must provide counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the note, and the court must provide a meaningful response to the jury" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mack-536?ref=Atmwbv!RuOOJ7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">27 NY3d 534, 536</a> [2016], citing <i>O'Rama</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-orama-3?ref=Atmwbv!ecK877" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">78 NY2d at 276-277</a>). "[M]eaningful notice means notice of the actual specific content of the jurors' request'" (<i>id.</i> at 538, quoting <i>O'Rama</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-orama-3?ref=Atmwbv!ecK877" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">78 NY2d at 277</a>). The purpose of this requirement is to give counsel an opportunity to participate in the formation of a response to the jury's substantive inquiry (<i>see O'Rama</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-orama-3?ref=Atmwbv!ecK877" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">78 NY2d at 276-277</a>). </span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#m_872897058033611773_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As we have repeatedly instructed, such "departures from the <i>O'Rama</i> procedures are not subject to preservation rules" (<i>People v Walston</i>, 23 NY3d 986, 989, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377 [2014] [citations omitted]). Rather, "when the trial court fails to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a substantive jury note, a mode of proceedings error has occurred and reversal is required" (<i>Mack</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mack-536?ref=Atmwbv!RuOOJ7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">27 NY3d at 538</a>).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u><br></u></span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http:///api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W8-00000-00?page%3D13%26reporter%3D7320%26cite%3D2018%2520N.Y.%2520LEXIS%25201592%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1535479454854000&usg=AFQjCNFWqiNJMD881yghHegEq_8JZ7bVnQ" href="http://api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W8-00000-00?page=13&reporter=7320&cite=2018%20N.Y.%20LEXIS%201592&context=1000516" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Parker, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 1592, *13-14</u></span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> </span><br>
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> In <i>People v. Morrison</i>, 2018 NY Slip Op 04777, decided 6/28/18, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction because the entire content of the note was not shared with counsel, stating, </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The trial court's failure to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a substantive jury note is a mode of proceedings error that requires reversal (<i>see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mack-536?ref=Atmwbv!RuOOJ7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Mack</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mack-536?ref=Atmwbv!RuOOJ7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 27 NY3d 534, 538</a> [2016], <i>rearg denied</i> 28 N.Y.3d 944 [2016]; <i>People v Nealon</i>, 26 NY3d 152, 156-157 [2015]). "[M]eaningful notice means notice of the actual specific content of the jurors' request'" (<i>Mack</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mack-536?ref=Atmwbv!RuOOJ7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">27 NY3d at 538</a>, quoting <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-orama-3?ref=Atmwbv!ecK877" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v O'Rama</i>, 78 NY2d 270</a>, 277 [1991]). Although the record demonstrates that "defense counsel was made aware of the existence of the note, there is no indication that the entire contents of the note were shared with counsel" (<i>People v Walston</i>, 23 NY3d 986, 990 [2014]). We therefore reject the People's argument that defense counsel's awareness of the existence and the "gist" of the note satisfied the court's meaningful notice obligation, or that preservation was required. "Where the record fails to show that defense counsel was apprised of the specific, substantive contents of the note—as it is in this case—preservation is not required" (<i>id.</i>).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"></span><br>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">
<a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#m_872897058033611773_" style="color: #1155cc;"></a><span style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Moreover, "[w]here a trial transcript does not show compliance with <i>O'Rama</i>'s procedure as required by law, we cannot assume that the omission was remedied at an off-the-record conference that the transcript does not refer to" (<i>id.</i>). In other words, "[i]n the absence of record proof that the trial court complied with its [meaningful notice obligation] under CPL 310.30, a mode of proceedings error occurred requiring reversal" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-tabb-213-ssm-47-ny-11-24-2009?ref=Atmwbv!SiD9_2" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Tabb</i>, 13 NY3d 852, 853</a> [2009]). We again decline "to disavow our holding in <i>Walston</i> . . . that imposes an affirmative obligation on a trial court to create a record of compliance under CPL 310.30 and <i>O'Rama</i>" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-silva-172?ref=Atmwbv!mjjJC5" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Silva</i>, 24 NY3d 294, 300</a> [2014], <i>rearg denied</i> 24 N.Y.3d 1216 [2015]; <i>see People v Parker</i>, — NY3d — [decided today]). </span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W7-00000-00?page%3D1%26reporter%3D7320%26cite%3D2018%2520N.Y.%2520LEXIS%25201594%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1535479454854000&usg=AFQjCNH-SnLkTOShocLdOqnf5uXeqDa8Pg" href="https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SNK-N7J1-JJ6S-60W7-00000-00?page=1&reporter=7320&cite=2018%20N.Y.%20LEXIS%201594&context=1000516" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Morrison, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 1594, *1-2</u></span></a> </div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-65862800581369456322018-08-16T09:25:00.000-04:002019-04-05T17:05:00.859-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by<br>
<br>
<a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-townsend-91?ref=Atmwbv!f-sKWS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">Lawrence L. Kasperek<br>
<br>
<br>
In <i>USA v. Townsend</i>, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. July 23, 2018)</a>, the Second Circuit held that <a href="https://casetext.com/statute/consolidated-laws-of-new-york/pen-penal/part-3-specific-offenses/title-m-offenses-against-public-health-and-morals/article-220-22000-22078-controlled-substances-offenses/22031-criminal-sale-of-a-controlled-substance-in-the-fifth-degree?ref=Atmwbv!oIWxsH" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">NYS Penal Law Section § 220.31</a> (fifth-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance) is not a "controlled substance offense" under USSG 4B1.2(b). See U<i>nited <a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-townsend-91?ref=Atmwbv!f-sKWS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">States v. Townsend</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-townsend-91?ref=Atmwbv!f-sKWS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018)</a> (Cabranes, Carney, Vilardo (W.D.N.Y.)) (appeal from Irizarry, C.J., E.D.N.Y.). Yes that's right -- Judge Vilardo sitting by designation from the WDNY in Buffalo, NY.<br>
<br>
The consequences of this decision is that any New York State statute that just uses the term “controlled substance” is not a controlled substances offense for the purposes of the Career Offender Guideline analysis.<br>
<br>
How to apply Townsend:<br>
<br>
- Any NY state statute that just uses the term “controlled substance” (as opposed to, say "narcotic drug") IS NOT a controlled substance offense. The most common New York State statutes to look for are: 220.31 (criminal sale 5th); 220.06(1) (criminal possession 5th); 220.34(7) and (8) (criminal sale 4th); 220.48 (criminal sale to child); 220.65 (criminal sale by practitioner); 220.77(1) (operating as major trafficker).<br>
<br>
- Statutes from other states with overbroad drug schedules also may not qualify, depending on whether or not the statute is divisible, and whether the government has Shepard documents showing the particular substance sold. States that are known to have overbroad schedules include California, Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. However, there may be others. Often, the good law on divisibility and overbreadth appears in immigration cases involving the “controlled substance offense”" ground of removability. If your client has an out-of-state drug prior, you will want to take a close look at overbreadth.<br>
<br>
- For now, the higher-degree New York offenses, especially 220.39(1) (criminal sale 3rd, narcotic drug) still count.<br>
<br>
Importantly, <i>Townsend</i>'s logic may also apply to 2K2,.1 referencing "controlled substance offenses" or any other Guideline application.<br>
<br>
Credit for the above belongs to Daniel Habib, a Federal Public Defender in the Eastern and Southern Districts of NY for bring the challenge and Amy Baron-Evans, National Sentencing Resource Counsel for analysis.</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-58280514851590221532018-08-12T19:34:00.000-04:002019-04-05T17:10:01.213-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Jill Paperno,<br>
<br>
<div style="font-family: "times new roman"; margin: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><br></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">As you know, there are different ways a client may be charged with unlawful possession of drugs or a weapon or other contraband. They may be charged with actual possession, when the item is found on their person. Or they may be charged with constructive possession, when it is alleged they have dominion and control over the location in which the item was found. Under some circumstances (and please check the statutes for the specific circumstances in each case) they may be accused of possession based on a statutory presumption. </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"> </span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">All too often, our clients are accused of possessing items in locations where they are spending a short time or passing through. When a client is accused of possession under those circumstances, we should challenge the claim by moving against the accusatory instrument, requesting greater specification of the dominion and control in the request for bill of particulars, seeking suppression through hearings, and focusing on that at trial. (If a defendant is accused based solely on a presumption, the defendant has automatic standing to challenge an unlawful search of a location. If they are accused based on the presumption and constructive possession, you must ask in your request for bill of particulars what the factual basis is for a conclusion that the defendant exercised dominion and control. Argue that the prosecution is merely making a constructive claim to avoid the automatic standing. (Often they are.) </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">When a defendant is charged with constructive possession, they must have greater involvement with the location than merely being present. In </span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?cite%3D2018%2520N.Y.%2520App.%2520Div.%2520LEXIS%25204221%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1534201739802000&usg=AFQjCNGWoIqEiKxXbQBzZnSONqwTRN2t4Q" href="https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?cite=2018%20N.Y.%20App.%20Div.%20LEXIS%204221&context=1000516" style="color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Williams, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4221</u></span></a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> decided <span class="aBn" data-term="goog_1772039586" style="border-bottom: 1px dashed rgb(204, 204, 204); position: relative; top: -2px; z-index: 0;" tabindex="0"><span class="aQJ" style="position: relative; top: 2px; z-index: -1;">June 8th</span></span>, the Fourth Department reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the defendant's connection with the apartment where she was arrested, and where it was claimed she had dominion and control, was too limited. The Court stated, </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Where, as here, there is no evidence that the defendant actually possessed the controlled substance, the People are required to establish that the defendant "exercised dominion or control' over the property by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the contraband is found or over the person from whom the contraband is seized" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-manini-2?ref=Atmwbv!_sAl_E" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Manini</i>, 79 NY2d 561, 573</a> [1992]; <i>see</i> Penal Law § 10.00 [8]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-russaw-1?ref=Atmwbv!GdFYjb" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Russaw</i>, 114 AD3d 1261, 1261-1262</a> [4th Dept 2014], <i>lv denied</i> 22 NY3d 1202 [2014]). The People may establish constructive possession by circumstantial evidence (<i>see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-torres-899?ref=Atmwbv!xHPTDx" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Torres</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-torres-899?ref=Atmwbv!xHPTDx" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 68 NY2d 677, 678-679</a> [1986]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-boyd-544?ref=Atmwbv!wlxwaj" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Boyd</i>, 145 AD3d 1481, 1481-1482</a>, [4th Dept 2016], <i>lv denied</i> 29 NY3d 947, [2017]). It is well established, however, that a defendant's mere presence in the area where drugs are discovered is insufficient to establish constructive possession (<i>see Boyd</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-boyd-544?ref=Atmwbv!wlxwaj" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">145 AD3d at 1482</a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-knightner?ref=Atmwbv!C8K1uC" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Knightner</i>, 11 AD3d 1002, 1004, 782 N.Y.S.2d 333</a> [4th Dept 2004], <i>lv denied</i> 4 NY3d 745, 824 N.E.2d 59, 790 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2004]).</span><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u><br></u></span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http:///api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?page%3D2%26reporter%3D7321%26cite%3D2018%2520N.Y.%2520App.%2520Div.%2520LEXIS%25204221%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1534201739802000&usg=AFQjCNHq9wyKyeQmHZyeFv_Ryf6lwI_N5g" href="http://api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?page=2&reporter=7321&cite=2018%20N.Y.%20App.%20Div.%20LEXIS%204221&context=1000516" style="color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Williams, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4221, </u></span></a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br>In this case, the defendant was present in the apartment when the search warrant was executed, but there was no evidence she was a frequent occupant or resident of the premises. The investigator also testified records established the defendant lived there (huh?) but there was no evidence as to how the information was made part of those records, and that through the investigator's surveillance over hundreds of occasions, the defendant was only seen there twice. He testified "typical women's clothing" was found in the apartment but provided no details, and photos did not appear to show such clothing except three pairs of shoes that could be the defendant's, in contrast to the detailed description he gave of men's clothing also found there.</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"> </span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The Court concluded:</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"> </span><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><br style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Inasmuch as there was no evidence, other than her presence, that specifically connected defendant to the apartment where the contraband was found, "the People failed to prove that [she] exercised dominion and control over the contraband, and therefore failed to prove the possession element of the counts as charged" (<i>People v Brown</i>, 133 AD3d 772, 773 [2d Dept 2015], <i>lv denied</i> 26 NY3d 1143 [2016]; <i>see generally <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-gautreaux-perez?ref=Atmwbv!FWX7v7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Gautreaux-Perez</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-gautreaux-perez?ref=Atmwbv!FWX7v7" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 31 AD3d 1209, 1210</a> [4th Dept 2006]).</span><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u><br></u></span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http:///api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?page%3D3%26reporter%3D7321%26cite%3D2018%2520N.Y.%2520App.%2520Div.%2520LEXIS%25204221%26context%3D1000516&source=gmail&ust=1534201739802000&usg=AFQjCNGchssrWZMXB8mrUwcmZOA6IGUEEw" href="http://api/document/collection/cases/id/5SHC-2HR1-FJM6-60B0-00000-00?page=3&reporter=7321&cite=2018%20N.Y.%20App.%20Div.%20LEXIS%204221&context=1000516" style="color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Williams, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4221, *3-4</u></span></a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"> </span></span></div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-26392680247328610762018-08-02T13:44:00.002-04:002019-04-05T16:55:18.807-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Jill Paperno,<br>
<br>
<div style="font-family: "times new roman"; margin: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">In <i>People v. Searight</i>, 2018 NY Slip Op 04466, the Fourth Department considered the admissibility of drug evidence found after defendant's stop. Apparently, the Syracuse police department relies on the same charge for stopping some drivers as RPD - the failure to signal sufficiently in advance of a turn in violation of VTL 1163. (There are ways of challenging the stop when the failure to signal in advance is the basis, such as using internet tools to measure and map the location and the distance from where the driver signaled to the intersection - officers do get this wrong.)<br><br>In <i>Searight</i>, decided 6/15/18, the defendant had moved for suppression, specifically challenging the hearsay allegations relied upon by arresting officers. This was noted in the decision and is critical to your motions - when challenging search or seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds (and the New York State Constitutional equivalent, Article I, Section 12, you must challenge the hearsay relied upon by officers in your written motion. A commonly used paragraph is "Defendant challenges the sufficiency and reliability of any hearsay allegations relied upon by arresting officers, including any information relayed from a police database." (I just added the "police database" piece which was in the defense motion in <i>Searight.</i>. If it works for them...)</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br><br>At the suppression hearing, two Syracuse police officers testified that they "obtained information through the New York State Police Information Network (NYSPIN) that a warrant had been issued for defendant in the City of Cortland for felony drug charges. One of the officers communicated with the 911 Center to obtain further [*3] information concerning the warrant. The 911 Center reported to him that the Cortland Police Department had confirmed that there was an active warrant and had requested that defendant be held until an officer of that department could take him into custody. The officers placed defendant under arrest based upon the warrant and transported him to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). At CID one of the arresting officers asked defendant if he had anything illegal on his person and defendant produced two baggies containing cocaine, resulting in the present charges."</span><span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u></u></span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fadvance.lexis.com%252fapi%252fdocument%252fcollection%252fcases%252fid%252f5SJV-P6R1-JP4G-62YG-00000-00%253fpage%253d2%2526reporter%253d7321%2526cite%253d2018%252520N.Y.%252520App.%252520Div.%252520LEXIS%2525204411%2526context%253d1000516%26c%3DE,1,dPT-XnXyGxTBcrHFFYJKFW7ZQmvRZS3yGjnngOslT1cB0rQDX1B-Qj4UNLQ_UWmOpVmjB5ZoBFwZR8R7_FBJnTtvRN9vWqziPJNAtF3QbPlFeJ0,%26typo%3D1&source=gmail&ust=1533316521722000&usg=AFQjCNEoyf1gzxZk37mBfXtLRe7pECbjrg" href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fadvance.lexis.com%2fapi%2fdocument%2fcollection%2fcases%2fid%2f5SJV-P6R1-JP4G-62YG-00000-00%3fpage%3d2%26reporter%3d7321%26cite%3d2018%2520N.Y.%2520App.%2520Div.%2520LEXIS%25204411%26context%3d1000516&c=E,1,dPT-XnXyGxTBcrHFFYJKFW7ZQmvRZS3yGjnngOslT1cB0rQDX1B-Qj4UNLQ_UWmOpVmjB5ZoBFwZR8R7_FBJnTtvRN9vWqziPJNAtF3QbPlFeJ0,&typo=1" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Searight, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4411, *2-3</u></span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br><br>The Court stated:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">We agree with defendant that the court erred in refusing to suppress defendant's statements and tangible property, including the cocaine, seized as the result of his arrest, inasmuch as the People failed to meet their burden of showing the legality of the police conduct in arresting defendant in the first instance (<i> see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lopez-212?ref=Atmwbv!hVKokR" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Lopez</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lopez-212?ref=Atmwbv!hVKokR" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 206 AD2d 894, 894</a> [4th Dept 1994], <i>lv denied</i> 84 N.Y.2d 937, [1994]). "Under the fellow officer' rule, [a] police officer is entitled to act on the strength of a radio bulletin or a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department and to assume its reliability'" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-rosario-97?ref=Atmwbv!RO7Anj" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Rosario</i>, 78 NY2d 583, 588</a>, [1991], <i>cert denied</i> 502 U.S. 1109, 112 S. Ct. 1210, 117 L. Ed. 2d 448 [1992], quoting <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lypka?ref=Atmwbv!uFuIZZ" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Lypka</i>, 36 NY2d 210</a>, [1975]). Under those circumstances, the agency or officer transmitting the information presumptively possesses the requisite probable cause to arrest (<i>see id.</i>). </span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-702677534195723039_m_650962528183067505_m_4329416912845024502_m_-4417629374204073174_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">However, where, as here, defendant challenges the reliability of the information transmitted to the arresting officers, "the presumption of probable cause disappears and it becomes incumbent upon the People to establish that the officer or agency imparting the information in fact possessed the probable cause to act" (<i>id.</i>; <i>see Lypka</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lypka?ref=Atmwbv!uFuIZZ" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">36 NY2d at 214</a>).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"><u><br></u></span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-702677534195723039_m_650962528183067505_m_4329416912845024502_m_-4417629374204073174_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">The People failed to meet that burden. Despite defendant's explicit challenge to the reliability of the information justifying his arrest (<i>see Rosario</i>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-rosario-97?ref=Atmwbv!RO7Anj" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">78 NY2d at 588</a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-ynoa-rodriguez?ref=Atmwbv!LBW1Ip" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Ynoa</i>, 223 AD2d 975, 977</a>, [3d Dept 1996], <i>lv denied</i> 87 N.Y.2d 1027, [1996]; <i>cf. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-fenner-2?ref=Atmwbv!MBVnrb" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Fenner</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-fenner-2?ref=Atmwbv!MBVnrb" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 61 NY2d 971, 973</a>, [1984]), the People did not produce the arrest warrant itself prior to the conclusion of the hearing (<i>see Lopez</i>, 206 AD2d at 894; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mcloyd-13?ref=Atmwbv!0wM2My" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v McLoyd</i>, 35 Misc 3d 822, 828, 946 N.Y.S.2d 829</a> [Sup Ct, NY County 2012]). Instead, the People relied upon the officer's testimony concerning his communications with an unidentified person or persons at the 911 Center and his assumptions about how the 911 Center confirmed the existence of an active and valid warrant.</span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-702677534195723039_m_650962528183067505_m_4329416912845024502_m_-4417629374204073174_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">That testimony, however, rested "on a pyramid of hearsay, the information having been passed from" the arresting officer to unidentified persons at the 911 Center and the Cortland Police Department and back to the officer (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-havelka?ref=Atmwbv!dqqbOJ" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Havelka</i>, 45 NY2d 636, 641</a>, [1978]). </span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-702677534195723039_m_650962528183067505_m_4329416912845024502_m_-4417629374204073174_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"> "In making an arrest, a police officer may rely upon information communicated to him by another police officer that an individual is the subject named in a warrant and should be taken into custody in the execution of the warrant . . .<b> However, if the warrant turns out to be invalid or vacated . . . [,] or nonexistent . . . , any evidence seized as a result of the arrest will be suppressed notwithstanding the reasonableness of the arresting officer's reliance upon the communication"</b> (emphasis added) (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lee-202?ref=Atmwbv!1u--wS" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Lee</i>, 126 AD2d 568, 569</a>, [2d Dept 1987]; <i>see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-jennings-77?ref=Atmwbv!W88DDW" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Jennings</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-jennings-77?ref=Atmwbv!W88DDW" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 54 NY2d 518</a>,[1981]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lent-1?ref=Atmwbv!Tl_MFT" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i>People v Lent</i>, 92 AD2d 941, 941</a>, [2d Dept 1983]). </span><a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#m_-702677534195723039_m_650962528183067505_m_4329416912845024502_m_-4417629374204073174_" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Here, without producing the arrest warrant itself or reliable evidence that the warrant was active and valid, the People did not meet their burden of establishing that defendant's arrest was based on probable cause (<i>see Lopez</i>, 206 AD2d at 894).</span><span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"><u><br></u></span><a data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fadvance.lexis.com%252fapi%252fdocument%252fcollection%252fcases%252fid%252f5SJV-P6R1-JP4G-62YG-00000-00%253fpage%253d3%2526reporter%253d7321%2526cite%253d2018%252520N.Y.%252520App.%252520Div.%252520LEXIS%2525204411%2526context%253d1000516%26c%3DE,1,3yFM2hln66fYMZvxUGTM6LD22sX0lDBGEocvk0aqyO5F8WRdy9GFL_baOx90qqjudwkbI9oPSwgKXJaaqhTg6Tr4R2lA49CByFLqJIlQKNcPpA,,%26typo%3D1&source=gmail&ust=1533316521722000&usg=AFQjCNFJkSTkX39XssIEBcWUGddD6kzt8w" href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fadvance.lexis.com%2fapi%2fdocument%2fcollection%2fcases%2fid%2f5SJV-P6R1-JP4G-62YG-00000-00%3fpage%3d3%26reporter%3d7321%26cite%3d2018%2520N.Y.%2520App.%2520Div.%2520LEXIS%25204411%26context%3d1000516&c=E,1,3yFM2hln66fYMZvxUGTM6LD22sX0lDBGEocvk0aqyO5F8WRdy9GFL_baOx90qqjudwkbI9oPSwgKXJaaqhTg6Tr4R2lA49CByFLqJIlQKNcPpA,,&typo=1" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><u>People v Searight, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4411, *3-5</u></span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;"></span><br>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">What's interesting to me is that the defendant apparently did violate the V&T with the turn, and he did not have a license. But the Fourth Department still suppressed the evidence, stating that the defendant was arrested based on the warrant, and finding the existence of a valid warrant was necessary to support the arrest. So to the extent you can, if you have a V & T stop, and the police claim a warrant existed that you can challenge, try to get the officers to acknowledge that the arrest was based on the warrant.</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br><br>Side note:</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br><br>This is a different situation than that in the Supreme Court case<i> Utah v. Strieff</i>, 136 Supreme Court 2056 (2016) in which the defendant was initially unlawfully detained, and the police located a valid warrant for a minor traffic violation. The Supreme Court, with a vigorous dissent by Justice Sotomayor, found such an arrest and the seizure of evidence to be lawful.</span></div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-87030180038282970912018-07-24T22:00:00.001-04:002018-07-24T22:00:25.529-04:00An examination of the causes of wrongful convictionsInteresting examination of the causes of wrongful convictions <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3200001">here</a>. H/T Don Rehkopf.Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-70451859350121067182018-07-24T09:35:00.002-04:002018-07-24T09:35:36.670-04:00Many innocent defendants plead guilty in part due to fear of what they call 'the trial penalty' -- that the punishment will be greater after trial.A new article <a href="https://abovethelaw.com/2018/07/innocent-people-who-plead-guilty/">here</a> from Above the Law on how the trial penalty coerces guilty pleas from the innocent.Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-32900647560607381982018-07-23T09:09:00.000-04:002018-07-23T09:09:52.037-04:00Prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases exposed by one of their own<a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/07/18/prosecutors-misconduct-death-penalty/">Here</a> is a new, remarkable article in The Intercept on capital prosecutors behaving badly, including hiding or destroying evidence in capital cases, then lying about it in death penalty cases, as revealed by a former capital prosecutor who claims to have first hand knowledge of this misconduct.Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-28040234117286635312018-07-08T21:45:00.000-04:002018-07-08T21:57:27.948-04:00The Exoneration of Persons Convicted of Misdemeanors That Were Never Committed<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
There are a number of ways a person convicted of a crime can be exonerated. It can be proved that the person was not the perpetrator, for example by DNA testing of biological evidence left by the perpetrator of the crime excluding the defendant. There can be proof of an iron clad alibi – such as proof that the defendant <a href="http://theultimatealibi.com/about/" target="_blank">was incarcerated</a> or i<a href="http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=clb" target="_blank">n another country when the crime was committed</a>. It can be be proved that someone else committed the crime, for example by video evidence of the commission of the crime.<br />
<br />
One way a person can be exonerated is by proof that the crime was never committed. <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/06/22/mf.convicted.murders.victims.alive/" target="_blank">For example, persons have been convicted of murder only for the supposed decedent to subsequently be proved to still be alive</a>. And, unless one believes in witchcraft, one can safely assume that t<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salem_witch_trials" target="_blank">he 20 persons executed for witchcraft in Salem were convicted and killed by the state for crimes that were never committed</a>.<br />
<br />
Most attention to exonerations in the current innocent movement has been focused on persons proved innocent of serious felonies -- homicides, sex crimes, and assaults – by DNA evidence. But, as described in an important and provocative law review article, <a href="http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2018/06/ROBERTS.pdf" target="_blank">THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT AND MISDEMEANORS, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 779 (June 2018)</a> by Jenny Roberts , the Co-Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic and Associate Dean for
Scholarship, American University Washington College of Law, lab tests and video evidence have demonstrated that large numbers of persons have been convicted of misdemeanors, such as drug possession, often by guilty plea, for crimes which were never committed.<br />
<br />
For example, lab tests have demonstrated that there were no illicit drugs. Videos have established that the charged crimes were not committed (such as by showing police planting evidence). As the article discusses, given the huge number of person who are arrested and convicted of misdemeanors, and the impact of such convictions, it might be helpful to direct far more resources to both identifying such cases and dealing with the the police and prosecutorial practices which have enabled them.<br />
<br />
I taught a wrongful conviction cause for a decade and, apart from a discussion of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rampart_scandal" target="_blank">Ramparts scandal at Los Angeles Police Department </a>, did not even discuss the issue of exoneration of people convicted of misdemeanors. I strongly believe that this is article is worth reading as it raises numerous important questions regarding the meaning and significance of such exonerations and how we should respond to them to prevent future convictions of innocent persons.</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-41354530118579384152018-07-07T11:02:00.001-04:002018-07-07T11:02:31.098-04:00Pro se litigant obtains a reversal on appealIn the "even a blind squirrel finds a nut" category, in the July 6th packet of Appellate Division, Fourth Department decisions, perennial litigant and pretty good jailhouse lawyer Isiah Williams won a reversal of his conviction, pro se. Mr. Williams was previously acquitted of the possession of two forged checks and convicted of possession of another. After the Fourth Department reversed that conviction, at the retrial the Ontario County Court allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of defendant's possession of the checks he had been acquitted of possessing. Unsurprisingly, the Fourth Department found that this was wrong, and reversed defendant's conviction. Good lawyerin' Mr. Williams. Read the decision <a href="http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/Decisions/2018/07-06-18/PDF/0593.pdf">here</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-74060085127779445412018-07-06T21:03:00.001-04:002018-07-06T21:03:42.461-04:00Monroe County Public Defender's Office 50 year anniversary celebration<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: red;">Greetings to all alumni/dinosaurs of the Monroe County Public Defender's Office.</span></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;"> On September 14, 2018 from 5:30 p.m. - ??? </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">there will be a celebration of 50 years of service for the Monroe County Public Defender's Office at Tournedos at the Inn on Broadway </span><a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=26+Broadway,+Rochester,+NY+14607&entry=gmail&source=g" style="background-color: white; color: #1155cc;">26 Broadway, Rochester, NY 14607</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222;">. There will be a cash bar, grazing tables, music, "Get out of Jail" t-shirts and stuff, and lots of present and past PDs. As we firm things up we will pass along more information here as it becomes available; be sure to check back. Please help us reach out to out-of-towners. Don't assume we have reached everyone locally or otherwise. Finally, we will likely ask for deposits as soon as we have a price point to help with expenses (again check back for info on how much and whom). This should be a terrific celebration of you, the office, the mission of the office, its future and the present staff. Please come help us celebrate, have fun, tell war stories and share a few.</span></span></div>
Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-37909647756864439122018-07-02T22:56:00.000-04:002019-04-05T16:55:19.758-04:00<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
In a recent DWI prosecution, ETKS associate Paul Meabon moved to preclude the introduction of the results of a sample taken by a registered nurse at the direction of a Rochester Police officer pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(a)(1)(I), which provides, in relevant part that “[a]t a police officer’s request … a physician, a registered professional nurse, a registered physician assistant, a certified nurse practitioner, or an advanced emergency medical technician as certified by the department of health” may withdraw blood to determine the blood’s alcoholic or drug content.</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
Mr. Meabon argued that because the discovery provided revealed that the sample had not been properly collected or stored, any test results relating to that sample would unreliable and therefore irrelevant.</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
In New York, a blood draw must be “safe, reliable” and “impose no more physical discomfort than is reasonably necessary” (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/matter-of-abe-a-2?ref=Atmwbv!WpKkos" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288, 297-98</a> [1982]). Reliable methods fall within “accepted medical standards” including, for example, the application of an “aqueous solution of a nonvolatile antiseptic” on the area of skin where blood is drawn (see id., referencing <a href="https://casetext.com/case/schmerber-v-state-of-california?ref=Atmwbv!87MJck" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 771-772</a> [1966]; <a href="https://casetext.com/regulation/new-york-codes-rules-and-regulations/title-10-department-of-health/chapter-ii-administrative-rules-and-regulations/subchapter-d-laboratories/part-59-chemical-analyses-of-blood-urine-breath-or-saliva-for-alcoholic-content/s-592-techniques-and-methods-for-determining-blood-and-urine-alcohol?ref=Atmwbv!JgX6vR" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">10 NYCRR 59.2</a>[d]). A blood sample collected outside statutory guidelines must be suppressed (see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-olmstead-2?ref=Atmwbv!B23q4J" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Olmstead, 233 AD2d 837</a> [4th Dept 1996]; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-ebner-1?ref=Atmwbv!54pAxA" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Ebner, 195 AD2d 1006, 1007</a> [4th Dept 1993]).</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
Along with the method of its collection, a blood sample’s reliability depends on the sample’s storage. In Mr. Meabon’s case, the nurse stored each blood sample in a NIK Public Safety, Inc. vacutainer tube containing chemicals to safeguard the sample’s integrity.</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
One chemical contained in the tube, 20 milligrams of potassium oxalate, is a powdered anticoagulant that hinders blood’s production of thrombin, an enzyme that stimulates clotting (Peter Gerstenzang & Eric H. Sills, Handling the DWI Case in New York § 38:10 [2015-2016 ed.]; see <a href="https://casetext.com/regulation/new-york-codes-rules-and-regulations/title-10-department-of-health/chapter-ii-administrative-rules-and-regulations/subchapter-d-laboratories/part-59-chemical-analyses-of-blood-urine-breath-or-saliva-for-alcoholic-content/s-592-techniques-and-methods-for-determining-blood-and-urine-alcohol?ref=Atmwbv!JgX6vR" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">10 NYCRR § 59.2</a>[c][4][ii] [“blood shall be deposited in a clean container containing a solid anticoagulant”]). Clotting in a blood sample concentrates alcohol in the sample’s liquid, the portion tested to determine blood alcohol content, causing an erroneously high result (see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-boyst?ref=Atmwbv!q9SRC0" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v Boyst, 177 AD2d 962</a> [4th Dept 1991] [blood sample without anticoagulant admissible given laboratory’s use of clotting conversion factor]).</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
A second chemical, sodium fluoride, is a preservative staving off fermentation as a sample decays (Handling the DWI Case in New York, supra at § 38.11). A blood sample without a preservative ferments during storage (even while refrigerated) and, in some cases, raises a sample’s alcohol content 0.25% or higher (id.).</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
Some careful attention to a critical variance between the instructions for the blood draw kit and the procedures followed presented an issue.</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
Because clotting and fermentation undermine a blood sample’s test results, the blood draw kit used instructs the nurse to “slowly invert the tubes at least five times immediately after blood collection” (see id. at § 38:8). Likewise, the kit instructs the officer supervising the blood draw, to “INVERT [the tube] slowly and completely at least 20 times” to “ensure proper mixing with the anticoagulant powder” (see id.)</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
In Mr. Meabon’s case, however, neither the nurse nor officer inverted the tubes as directed before sealing the tubes in the kit’s mailer box. As a consequence, the anticoagulant and blood were not properly mixed and the blood could have clotted before testing. From the test results provided, it was unclear whether the testing laboratory factored clotting into the test results (see Boyst, supra). Furthermore, the test results provided failed to indicate how the laboratory stored the tubes, whether the tubes contained sodium fluoride, or whether any preservative worked to stave off fermentation during the blood sample’s pre-testing decay.</div>
<div style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 20px; margin-bottom: 15px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
Some issues to consider in your next blood draw DWI case.</div>
Donald Thompsonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12536036026587314189noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-21823604449100502132017-12-20T16:32:00.001-05:002017-12-20T16:32:33.593-05:00Mandatory Jury Instruction in Cross-Racial Identification Cases<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by Jill Paperno,<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNoSpacing" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;">
</div>
<br />
<div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; margin: 0px; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span></div>
<br />
Last week the Court of Appeals issued a decision requiring that if requested, a jury charge must be given on the potential lack of reliability of identification evidence in cross-racial identification cases. People v. Boone, 2017 N.Y. Lexis 1722. Notably, the Court did not require expert testimony on cross-racial identification, or even cross-exam of the witness, for the charge to be given. The Court stated:<br />
<br />
In light of our discussion of the cross-race effect, which has been accepted by a near consensus in the relevant scientific community of cognitive and social psychologists, and recognizing the very significant part that inaccurate identifications play in wrongful convictions, we reach the following holding: in a case in which a witness's identification of the defendant is at issue, and the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races, a trial court is required to give, upon request, during final instructions, a jury charge on the cross-race effect, instructing (1) that the jury should consider whether there is a difference in race between the defendant and the witness who identified the defendant, and (2) that, if so, the jury should consider (a) that some people have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of [*18] a [**8] different race than in accurately identifying members of their own race and (b) whether the difference in race affected the accuracy of the witness's identification. The instruction would not be required when there is no dispute about the identity of the perpetrator nor would it be obligatory when no party asks for the charge.<br />
<br />
People v Boone, 2017 N.Y. LEXIS 3722, *17-18, 2017 NY Slip Op 08713, 7-8<br />
<br />
Jury charges usually used by judges can be found on the Office of Court Administration website here http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/index.shtml. Charges are divided into charges of general applicability and penal law charges. Browse them sometime; you might be surprised at what is in there - especially the charges of general applicability. You can download them in pdf or wordperfect. If you have a mobile device and a file sorting app like Goodreader you can download them in pdf and sort them and have them easily available for trial. You should always be reviewing the jury charges in any case you are litigating well in advance of trial.<br />
<br />
The jury charges on the OCA website do not contain mandatory language, but instead suggested language. That means a charge may be flawed in general, or as it applies to your particular case. You can always submit your own jury charges too, if there are particular legal or factual issues that warrant a unique charge. Remember, if you don't get a charge you want, or the judge reads a charge you believe is improper, you must object after the charge when the judge asks if there are any "exceptions to the charge" or if the judge asks if you have any requests following the charge. That is usually done by approaching the bench. Make sure your requests are on the record. Also, if you've submitted written charges, make sure they are marked as court or defense exhibits so they are made part of the record. (Documents not marked as exhibits and made part of the record do not exist for purposes of appeal. So mark them and note what they are verbally on the record.)<br />
<br />
If you have a one witness ID case and there is no confession or other evidence, you may be entitled to what is referred to as the "Expanded Identification Charge." It's a good one. Here it is: http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Identification-One_Witness.pdf I'd suggest given the growing body of information about eyewitness identification, you may want to request the expanded charge even if it's a two witness ID case with no other evidence.<br />
<br />
The Court of Appeals in Boone included the cross-racial language from the one-witness jury charge in its decision:<br />
<br />
"You may consider whether there is a difference in race between the defendant and the witness who identified the defendant, and if so, whether that difference affected the accuracy of the witness's identification. Ordinary human experience indicates that some people have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race than they do in identifying members of their own race. With respect to this issue, you may consider the nature and extent of the witness's contacts with members of the defendant's race and whether such contacts, or lack thereof, affected the accuracy of the witness's identification. [*17] . . ." (CJI 2d [NY] Identification [One Witness]; CJI 2d [NY] Identification [Witness Plus]).<br />
<br />
People v Boone, 2017 N.Y. LEXIS 3722, *16-17, 2017 NY Slip Op 08713, 7<br />
<br />
<br />
That means that even if it's not a one witness case, you can still request this language (or stronger if you craft your own) be used in your request to charge on cross-racial identification. My understanding is that there are efforts underway to create a cross-racial identification charge even as we speak (or write).</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-253740687045404312.post-46448302925606289372017-10-27T20:01:00.001-04:002019-04-05T16:55:21.682-04:00<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: sans-serif;">by Jill Paperno,</span></div>
<div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">Author of "</span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Representing-Accused-Practical-Criminal-Defense/dp/0314285296" style="background-color: white; color: #336699; font-family: verdana, arial, sans-serif;" target="_blank">Representing the Accused: A Practical Guide to Criminal Defense</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "verdana" , "arial" , sans-serif;">"</span><br>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]-->
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
As you may know, there are several new statutes that were
passed or amended this year which will have a major impact on criminal
practice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They include statutes which
raise the age for criminal responsibility and change courts in which cases of
youths to whom the statutes apply are handled, statutes which require recording
of interrogation in some cases, and changes in the law relating to
identification evidence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The newly written statutes are dense and awkward, and it
takes a few reads (and perhaps some additional interpretation and a drink or
two) to understand what they are saying.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The following comments about the changes in statutes relating to
identification evidence are an effort to make this muddy mess a bit
clearer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The statutes amended and/or created include CPL 60.25,
CPL 60.30, CPL 710.20, CPL<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>710.30,
Executive Law 837 and the Family Court Act statutes relating to identification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In addition, a model policy was created (as
discussed below).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The thrust of most of
these statutes is to make photo identifications admissible at trial IF they
were done in a way that is deemed to be less suggestive – methods described as
either “blind” or “blinded.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
statutes also ensure that even if a photo or video identification was not
“blind” or “blinded”, there may be an in-court identification so long as the
procedure complied with constitutional requirements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We usually take that to mean that the
procedure was not unduly suggestive, which would implicate due process issues,
but I’d like to suggest that we broaden our view of what due process requires
and start thinking about whether a procedure affected reliability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And I’d encourage you to read a recent Fourth
Department decision, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-kev-in-re-reeves-3?ref=Atmwbv!j26rbb" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Reeves</i>,
152 AD3d 1173 (Fourth Dept. July 2017)</a>. </div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Please note – I have not yet practiced under these
statutes, so I cannot foresee the problems within the statutes</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">1.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Vocabulary</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The statutes repeatedly refer to “Pictorial, photographic,
electronic, filmed or video recorded reproduction.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This phrase is used to include photos and
videos that may be used during identification proceedings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I believe it is intended to be as broad as
possible so that we will not argue that certain kinds of pictorial
representations are not within the statute, and therefore not admissible at
trial.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Blind </b>– According
to the Division of Criminal Justice Services Model Policy (more on this below)
a blind procedure is “An identification procedure where the administrator does
not know the identity of the suspect.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
“blind” procedure is one in which the person administering it (usually a member
of law enforcement) does not know who the suspect is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other words, the administering officer
does not know which of the photos is the suspect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A blind procedure theoretically requires two
officers – one to select the suspect’s photo and then place fillers in the
array, and another who DOES NOT KNOW who the suspect is to display the array to
the witness.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Blinded</b> – According
to the DCJS Model Policy, a blinded procedure is “an identification procedure
where the administrator may know who the suspect is, but by virtue of the
procedure’s administration, the administrator does not know where the suspect
is in the array.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This can be done by
creating a few folders with arrays, with the suspect in different places in
each folder, and then having the witness select one photo for use during the
procedure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The goal of these procedures is to prevent the
administering officer, either intentionally or unintentionally, through words
or actions, from suggesting to the witness which person should be selected
during an identification procedure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Neither
blind nor blinded are best practices.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“Double blind”, in which the administrator does not even know if the
suspect is in the array, is a better practice.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">2.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>History </b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Through the course of the evolution of New York law on
identifications, it has been traditionally held that absent some unusual
circumstances, identifications based on photographs would be inadmissible at
trial, both due to the possibility that a photo could be altered or distorted,
and that the photo in possession of the police would imply that the defendant
had a criminal record and the photo was a mug shot.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(See <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-perkins-111-ny-6-29-2010?ref=Atmwbv!YujmdL" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People
v. Perkins</i>, 15 NY3d 200 (2010)</a>.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
In recent years, the Court of Appeals also concluded that
because photos were not admissible at trial, CPL 710.30 did not require notice
of photo arrays.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">3.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>CPL 60.25 – A witness who cannot identify at
trial</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
CPL 60.25 existed before the new identification law came
into effect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That law permitted a
witness who is unable to identify the defendant at trial to testify to the
witness’s viewing of the defendant during the incident or at some time related
to the incident, and then at a later identification proceeding.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Another witness, usually a police officer,
would then link that identification to the defendant – </div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
“And who was the person the witness selected in position
number six at the lineup?”</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
“The person the witness selected in that lineup
proceeding was John Doe.”</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Do you see John
Doe here in court today?”</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Yes, I do.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“Where is he?”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>“He’s sitting at the table over there
(pointing to the defendant).”</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Historically, prior photo arrays could not be used to
establish identification by a witness who is unable to presently identify.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under the amended statute, if the prior
identification was “blind” or “blinded,” the prior procedure is now admissible
even if it involved photos.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
CPL 60.25(c) states that the failure of a public servant
to use blind or blinded procedures will result in preclusion of the testimony
of the identification procedure as evidence in chief, but shall not lead to
suppression under CPL 710.20(6) which bars identification evidence obtained as
a result of an “improperly made previous identification of the defendant.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Our usual <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wade</i> reasons – suggestiveness, due process violations,
unreliability of the identification.)<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>What this seems to mean is that the prior ID procedure may not be admissible
AS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF if it has not been blind or blinded, but if, as a result
of a Wade hearing, the Court concludes there were no constitutional violations,
the witness may make an in-court identification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The weird thing here is that this statute
addresses when a witness cannot make an in-court identification based on
inability to presently identify, so I’m not sure about what the goal of this
piece of legislation is.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although it may
be to make the procedure admissible if not used as evidence in chief.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Perhaps if the door is opened?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
One other important note about CPL 60.25 generally is
that it only applies to circumstances in which the witness cannot identify due
to present inability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Other reasons –
death, fear, etc. – are not sufficient to permit a prior ID procedure without
present ID to come in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-bayron-5?ref=Atmwbv!0nS7Tk" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Bayron</i>, 66 NY2d 77 (1985)</a>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-cwikla-6?ref=Atmwbv!4FEL-a" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">People v. Cwikla</a></i><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-cwikla-6?ref=Atmwbv!4FEL-a" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">, 46 NY2d 434 (1979)</a>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-quevas-2?ref=Atmwbv!DWUXjY" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Quevas</i>, 81 NY2d 41</a>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Patterson</i>, 93 NY2d <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-patterson-230?ref=Atmwbv!sc8-Lt" style="mso-comment-date: 20171031T0941; mso-comment-reference: TD_1;" target="_blank" class="ct-citation">80</a><span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt;"><a class="msocomanchor" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=253740687045404312#_msocom_1" id="_anchor_1" name="_msoanchor_1">[TD1]</a><span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span></span></span>.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If the basis for the witness’s inability to identify is
uncertain, you may wish to request a hearing or voir dire of the witness during
trial outside the presence of the jury.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
In our practice, it is less common for us to have
witnesses who cannot identify the defendant in court, so this statute will be
less frequently applied than…</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">4.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>CPL 60.30 – A witness who can identify at
trial</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The amendments to CPL 60.30 are likely to have a much
greater impact on our work.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the past,
CPL 60.30 permitted a witness to testify both about a previous identification
procedure in which the defendant was viewed “in the flesh,” such as a lineup or
showup, and which procedure was not deemed to have violated constitutional
prohibitions, and to identify the defendant at trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, testimony about prior identification
procedures that used photographs were not generally admissible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(For a discussion about identifications of
defendants on video during the incident, see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-gee-162-ny-12-12-2002?ref=Atmwbv!VP6MIW" target="_blank" class="ct-citation"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Gee</i> 99 NY2d 158 (2002)</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The amendment to this statute now permits a prior
identification using photographs or other media made by a witness WHO IS ABLE
TO IDENTIFY AT TRIAL to be admitted at trial as long as the procedure was blind
or blinded and comports with constitutional requirements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The language is a bit strange, since in order
to say the procedure has to be blind or blinded to be admissible, the statute
incorporates by reference the blind or blinded requirement of CPL 60.25, which
refers to blind or blinded.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Although the statute permits this evidence to be
admissible, we may still wish to raise arguments about bolstering.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As these statutes are new, we may also want
to think about whether there are any constitutional challenges to raise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(And if so, don’t forget to put the A.G. on
notice when raising a constitutional objection to the validity of a statute.)</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
5<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>CPL 710.60 </b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
CPL 710.60 was amended to incorporate the photo and other
pictorial or video identification procedures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In addition to specifying that a court may suppress evidence of a prior
identification procedure involving photos, videos, etc., based on an improper prior
identification, the statute notes that a claim that the prior identification
using photos, videos, etc. was not blind or blinded shall not be a basis to
suppress evidence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
So what does this mean?</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Here’s my take:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Under CPL 60.25</b>,
if a witness cannot identify at trial, and this is established on the record,
if the procedure was blind or blinded and did not violate constitutional rights
(suggestiveness, due process violations) the prior procedure comes in.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If the witness cannot identify at trial, and the
procedure was not blind or blinded, it does not come in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Since they can’t identify at trial, I don’t
see how the 710.60 concerns come into play.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If they can’t identify at trial, it was blind or blinded,
but it violated <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wade</i>/due process
rights, the prior procedure does not come in.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Under CPL 60.30</b>
(witness is able to identify at trial)</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If the procedure was blind or blinded and did not violate
constitutional rights, prior ID and in-court ID permitted.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If not blind or blinded, but did not violate
constitutional rights, prior does not come in but in-court ID can be made.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
If blind or blinded, but violated constitutional rights,
neither comes in.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">6.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>CPL 710.30(1)</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
This statute now clarifies the notice requirements of
710.30, muddied by <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Grajales,
supra.</i></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Under the amended version of CPL 710.30(1), the
prosecution must provide a 710.30 notice if a witness has engaged in a photo or
video identification proceeding previously.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">7.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Executive Law 827(21)</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The Executive Law was amended to require the DCJS to
promulgate “a standardized and detailed written protocol that is grounded in
evidence-based principles for the administration of photographic arrays and
live lineup identification procedures for police agencies and standardized
forms for use by such agencies in the reporting and recording of such
identification procedures.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The statute
describes some of the areas to be covered.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>While recommended, the policies are model policies and not mandatory,
which is a huge disappointment to many who were hoping for law requiring
evidence based procedures (and not just gently suggesting them).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Which brings us to:</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">8.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Model Policy:</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
In June of this year DCJS released its model policies,
based on the requirements of the Executive Law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>While they are not mandatory (and not even necessarily best practices),
they are better than what we have seen, and should be used to argue at the
hearing and trial about how the police failed to apply better and model
policies to their work, and that failure increased the likelihood that the
defendant was misidentified.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
The Model Policy can be found here: <a href="http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Eyewitness-Identification-Model-Photo-Array-and-Lineup-ID-Procedures.pdf">http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Eyewitness-Identification-Model-Photo-Array-and-Lineup-ID-Procedures.pdf</a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And I
urge you to scrutinize it, especially as you prepare for hearings and trials
involving these issues.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
One of the features of the Model Policy is that it
requires confidence statements from a witness, though it discourages numerical
assessments (like “I’m 80% sure).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If our
departments start using them, it should be interesting to see what witnesses
claim about their certainty of the identification.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">9.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A few thoughts on practice</b></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
First, in every case we get, we may wish to include a
motion that “If any witness was involved in an identification procedure
required by CPL 60.25 or CPL 60.30 to be blind or blinded, and such procedure
was not blind or blinded, defendant moves for an order precluding the use of
any such identification by the witness at trial.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note – this does not substitute for your <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wade</i> motion following receipt of an
adequate 710.30 notice, or your motion to preclude identification in the
absence of sufficient notice.</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Additionally, we really have to think about how to expand
the scope of our cross-examinations at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wade</i>
hearings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, looking at the
model protocol, you may wish to question on whether the police have taken the
online course, whether they followed procedures for selection of fillers, etc.
You will want to address the specifics of how fillers were selected, and
whether the description given by the witness was incorporated into selection of
the suspect and filler photos. (If the police have ignored the description and
gone after “the usual suspects,” isn’t that suggestive?)</div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
<br></div>
<div class="MsoNoSpacing">
Dig into the Model policies and consider all the ways you
might use them to expand your cross.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And
take a look at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v. Reeves</i>,
supra, in considering how to craft your arguments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For additional discussion of these issues,
see Barry Kamins analysis in the New York Law Journal http://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202794793850/?slreturn=20170925153256.</div>
<div style="mso-element: comment-list;">
<hr align="left" class="msocomoff" size="1" width="33%">
<div style="mso-element: comment;">
<div class="msocomtxt" id="_com_1">
<span style="mso-comment-author: "Timothy Donaher";"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_msocom_1"></a></span>
<div class="MsoCommentText">
<span class="MsoCommentReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt;"><span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> <a class="msocomoff" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=253740687045404312#_msoanchor_1">[TD1]</a></span></span></span>How
does one establish this? Voir dire witness outside presence of jury?</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="false"
DefSemiHidden="false" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="371">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footer"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of figures"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope return"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="line number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="page number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of authorities"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="macro"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="toa heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Closing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Message Header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Salutation"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Date"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Block Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Hyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="FollowedHyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Document Map"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Plain Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="E-mail Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Top of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Bottom of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal (Web)"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Acronym"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Cite"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Code"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Definition"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Keyboard"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Preformatted"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Sample"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Typewriter"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Variable"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Table"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation subject"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="No List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Contemporary"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Elegant"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Professional"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Balloon Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Theme"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" QFormat="true"
Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="41" Name="Plain Table 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="42" Name="Plain Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="43" Name="Plain Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="44" Name="Plain Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="45" Name="Plain Table 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="40" Name="Grid Table Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="Grid Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="List Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="List Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="List Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if !supportAnnotations]--><!--[endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;
mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}
</style>
<![endif]--></div>
</div>
Brian Shiffrinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10237352678322961062noreply@blogger.com0