Sunday, February 28, 2016

Statutory presumptions, Part 2: Factual predicates are required to justify the use of presumptions

Recall that we noted in the last post that presumptions may not be invoked where the underlying facts needed to support them are not present (see People v Zekaj, 191 AD2d 663 [2nd Dept 1993]; People v Wilt, 105 AD2d 1089 [4th Dept 1984]).  When are the underlying facts insufficient to warrant invoking a presumption?  As you might expect, there’s no black on white rule, so we’ll lay out the considerations below.  

Consider a common fact pattern: police find a loaded handgun under the front seat of a car occupied by the defendant and two others. All three are charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree.  As is typically the case, there is no direct proof bearing on defendant’s alleged intent to unlawfully use the weapon found in the vehicle, nor is there any proof regarding defendant’s actual possession or knowledge of the presence of the weapon in the vehicle.  So, the prosecution’s case relies on two presumptions: first, that everyone in the vehicle is presumed to possess the weapon (Penal Law § 265.15[3]) and second, that one who possesses a loaded weapon is presumed to do so with the intent to use it unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.15[4]). 

We’ll talk about problems with presumption stacking next time (sort of like multiplying fractions - you wind up with a smaller, not a greater number or burden of proof).  Leave that aside for now while we consider the use of each presumption independently.  What does case law say about the requisite factual basis?  With apologies for citation format, then:

“Presumptions must be carefully scrutinized before they will be allowed to operate against an accused since there is a real and substantial possibility that they will conflict with the overriding, more fundamental presumption of innocence accorded to every defendant” (Leary v United States, 395 US 6).  Absent a “a reasonably high degree of probability that the presumed fact follows from those proved directly” (People v Leyva, 38 NY2d 160, 166), “the danger . . . is that of logical gaps – that is, subjective inferential links based on probabilities of low grade or insufficient degree – which undetected, elevate coincidence and, therefore, suspicion into permissible inference” (People v Cleague, 22 NY2d 363).  In such a cases, reliance on a presumption may lead to a mistaken or demonstrably incorrect result. 

For example, police officers possess deadly weapons, however that possession, without more, is no evidence of any intention to use those weapons unlawfully.  In fact, just the opposite presumption would be more likely: that the officers possess their weapons for the purpose of enforcing, rather than violating, the law.  The legislature recognized specific instances where the facts affirmatively defeat the presumption by enacting exemptions in Penal Law § 265.20; section 265.20(a)(1)(b) relates to police officers.

Penal Law § 10.00(8) defines “possession” as “to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.”  Thus, in order for the presumption of possession to be constitutionally applied, the proof at trial must support a rational inference that each occupant of the vehicle was aware of the presence of the gun and possessed both the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over it (County Court of Ulster County v Allen, supra, 442 US 140, 152). 

In Ulster County, three men and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling together from Detroit to New York City.  When the car was stopped for a traffic violation, a trooper noticed a gun sticking out of the girl’s open handbag, which held two guns.  The Supreme Court reasoned that because “the guns were lying on the car’s floor or seat in plain view” it was “rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the guns’ presence and had both the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over them.”  The Court found a rational basis permitting invocation of the presumption of possession where codefendants were not casual passengers but well-known to each other, and the weapons were not “out of defendants’ sight” (442 US at 152).

The Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the presumption in cases where a gun was hidden in a car or inaccessible to a defendant.  Rather, the Court refused to find Penal Law § 265.14(3) unconstitutional on its face simply because it could “sweep[] within its compass many occupants who may not know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their sight), and many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but not permitted to access it,” in the grounds that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the application of the presumption in these hypothetical situations.

In its Ulster County decision, however, the Second Circuit held that in a case involving casual passengers and a gun concealed from defendant’s sight, invocation of the automobile–  possession presumption would unconstitutionally diminish the People’s burden of proof  (Ulster County v Allen, 568 F2d 998). 

Such concerns might be triggered (ha, ha) where there is no independent evidence that the defendant knew that the gun was in the vehicle, or lacked any relationship with the others in the vehicle other than that of “casual passengers,” which could support a finding that they shared a common purpose. Absent any independent supporting evidence, there could be no rational basis to infer that the defendant was aware of the presence of the gun and possessed both the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over the gun.  Furthermore, there would be no substantial assurance that the presumed fact of possession is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact upon which it is made to depend – the defendant’s presence in a car where a concealed gun was found.  

Under these circumstances, for a conviction to stand, it must be “clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt” (Ulster County v Allen, 442 US at 165).  Where the prosecution’s entire case for possession is based solely upon the fact that the defendant was present in a car where a concealed handgun was found and the record is devoid of any independent factual basis that could suggest that the defendant knew that a gun was present or had the ability to exercise dominion or control over it, resort to the presumptions of possession or the intention to use unlawfully would be improper.

Statutory presumptions, Part 2: Factual predicates are required to justify the use of presumptions

Recall that we noted in the last post that presumptions may not be invoked where the underlying facts needed to support them are not present (see People v Zekaj, 191 AD2d 663 [2nd Dept 1993]; People v Wilt, 105 AD2d 1089 [4th Dept 1984]).  When are the underlying facts insufficient to warrant invoking a presumption?  As you might expect, there’s no black on white rule, so we’ll lay out the considerations below.  

Consider a common fact pattern: police find a loaded handgun under the front seat of a car occupied by the defendant and two others. All three are charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree.  As is typically the case, there is no direct proof bearing on defendant’s alleged intent to unlawfully use the weapon found in the vehicle, nor is there any proof regarding defendant’s actual possession or knowledge of the presence of the weapon in the vehicle.  So, the prosecution’s case relies on two presumptions: first, that everyone in the vehicle is presumed to possess the weapon (Penal Law § 265.15[3]) and second, that one who possesses a loaded weapon is presumed to do so with the intent to use it unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.15[4]). 

We’ll talk about problems with presumption stacking next time (sort of like multiplying fractions - you wind up with a smaller, not a greater number or burden of proof).  Leave that aside for now while we consider the use of each presumption independently.  What does case law say about the requisite factual basis?  With apologies for citation format, then:

“Presumptions must be carefully scrutinized before they will be allowed to operate against an accused since there is a real and substantial possibility that they will conflict with the overriding, more fundamental presumption of innocence accorded to every defendant” (Leary v United States, 395 US 6).  Absent a “a reasonably high degree of probability that the presumed fact follows from those proved directly” (People v Leyva, 38 NY2d 160, 166), “the danger . . . is that of logical gaps – that is, subjective inferential links based on probabilities of low grade or insufficient degree – which undetected, elevate coincidence and, therefore, suspicion into permissible inference” (People v Cleague, 22 NY2d 363).  In such a cases, reliance on a presumption may lead to a mistaken or demonstrably incorrect result. 

For example, police officers possess deadly weapons, however that possession, without more, is no evidence of any intention to use those weapons unlawfully.  In fact, just the opposite presumption would be more likely: that the officers possess their weapons for the purpose of enforcing, rather than violating, the law.  The legislature recognized specific instances where the facts affirmatively defeat the presumption by enacting exemptions in Penal Law § 265.20; section 265.20(a)(1)(b) relates to police officers.

Penal Law § 10.00(8) defines “possession” as “to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.”  Thus, in order for the presumption of possession to be constitutionally applied, the proof at trial must support a rational inference that each occupant of the vehicle was aware of the presence of the gun and possessed both the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over it (County Court of Ulster County v Allen, supra, 442 US 140, 152). 

In Ulster County, three men and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling together from Detroit to New York City.  When the car was stopped for a traffic violation, a trooper noticed a gun sticking out of the girl’s open handbag, which held two guns.  The Supreme Court reasoned that because “the guns were lying on the car’s floor or seat in plain view” it was “rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the guns’ presence and had both the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over them.”  The Court found a rational basis permitting invocation of the presumption of possession where codefendants were not casual passengers but well-known to each other, and the weapons were not “out of defendants’ sight” (442 US at 152).

The Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the presumption in cases where a gun was hidden in a car or inaccessible to a defendant.  Rather, the Court refused to find Penal Law § 265.14(3) unconstitutional on its face simply because it could “sweep[] within its compass many occupants who may not know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their sight), and many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but not permitted to access it,” in the grounds that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the application of the presumption in these hypothetical situations.

In its Ulster County decision, however, the Second Circuit held that in a case involving casual passengers and a gun concealed from defendant’s sight, invocation of the automobile–  possession presumption would unconstitutionally diminish the People’s burden of proof  (Ulster County v Allen, 568 F2d 998). 

Such concerns might be triggered (ha, ha) where there is no independent evidence that the defendant knew that the gun was in the vehicle, or lacked any relationship with the others in the vehicle other than that of “casual passengers,” which could support a finding that they shared a common purpose. Absent any independent supporting evidence, there could be no rational basis to infer that the defendant was aware of the presence of the gun and possessed both the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over the gun.  Furthermore, there would be no substantial assurance that the presumed fact of possession is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact upon which it is made to depend – the defendant’s presence in a car where a concealed gun was found.  

Under these circumstances, for a conviction to stand, it must be “clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt” (Ulster County v Allen, 442 US at 165).  Where the prosecution’s entire case for possession is based solely upon the fact that the defendant was present in a car where a concealed handgun was found and the record is devoid of any independent factual basis that could suggest that the defendant knew that a gun was present or had the ability to exercise dominion or control over it, resort to the presumptions of possession or the intention to use unlawfully would be improper.

Sunday, February 7, 2016

Mr. Guilty, I presume? The use of statutory presumptions in criminal prosecutions.

This is the first in a series of several blog posts on statutory presumptions in criminal prosecutions, many of which deal with guns and drugs (presumption that all occupants possess a firearm found in a vehicle [Penal Law § 265.15(3)]; presumption that all occupants of a vehicle knowingly possess controlled substance not concealed on a occupant’s person [Penal Law § 265.25(1)]; presumption of knowing possession by all occupants of controlled substances or marijuana in open view in a room used as a drug factory [Penal Law § 220.25(2)]).  As noted in Handling a Criminal Case in New York (Muldoon, Thomson Reuters, § 1:33 [2015-2016]) “these function as ‘shortcuts’ to allow the prosecution to establish an element of a crime by establishing other facts. 

In future installments I intend to examine presumption stacking, a defendant’s burden to rebut a presumption once invoked, and may also take a separate excursion into common law presumptions: innocence, sanity, competence, regularity, and finality.  But for today, the more basic underlying question: Why do we need or allow these shortcuts?  

We know that to be constitutional, presumptions must be permissive, not mandatory (Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510 [1979]).  So why do we have them at all?  In the absence of a presumption, the prosecution can argue that the jury should reach the same conclusion concerning possession or intent as is suggested by the presumption, and the jury could elect to do so.  Consider, for example, the knowing (or not) possession of gun in room or car –  intent and knowledge are virtually always issues in any criminal prosecution and rarely known or knowable with any certainty, and the fiction of our judicial system that they are knowable with consistently repetitive certainty is as true in cases involving presumptions as in any other.  The use of a presumption therefore, gives the prosecution a legislatively-conferred leg up, where none is needed, and the net effect is the watering down of the constitutionally-required burden of proof. 

In Leary v United States, 395 US 6, 33 [1969], the Supreme Court held that “a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”  Presumptions, then, are justified by the claim that the ultimate fact flows from and is likely true where the underlying inferential facts are proven to exist.  But such claims are not based on any empirical evidence, but rather, hunches, guesses, and “experience” (whatever that means) that is little better than resort to old wives tales and war stories.  

In truth, presumptions represent an unnecessary legislative concession in the absence of any direct evidence that tilts the jury in the direction of a finding that the missing facts are true, basing a verdict on that finding, which a jury could make on its own, without the help of a presumption.  I suggest that real reason for presumptions is fear: the fear of not guilty verdicts where the prosecution has not proven the ultimate fact, resulting in too many probably guilty (but not proven to be so beyond a reasonable doubt) defendants going free, a socially unacceptable result.

Importantly, a presumption can act as the necessary lynch pin of the jury’s verdict.  An example is provided by People v Whitfield, 158 AD2d 922 [4th Dept 1990], where the prosecution failed to request that the jury could presume defendant’s knowing possession of stolen property from his recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime.  Because there was no other evidence of knowing possession, the proof was held to be legally insufficient to support defendant’s conviction.  In other words, had the prosecution requested and the court instructed the jury on the presumption, that permissible inference could have formed the only basis establishing the element of knowing possession.

Importantly, presumptions may not be invoked where the underlying facts needed to support them are not present.  Be careful not to fall into the trap of assuming that because presumptions are present in the statute, they are available upon request in every case.  They are not (see People v Zekaj, 191 AD2d 663 [2nd Dept 1993]; People v Wilt, 105 AD2d 1089 [4th Dept 1984]).

Wilt (which is still good law), offers an important lesson.  In that case, the Fourth Department found the statutory presumption that all occupants of a vehicle are presumed to possess a weapon in the vehicle unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, who presented evidence that he was only in the vehicle for 5-6 minutes before it was stopped, never looked in the trunk (where the gun was found), and did not know there was a gun in the trunk.  The Court, reasoning that there was no “rational connection” between the discovery of the gun in the trunk and Wilt’s presumed possession, reversed his conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Along these lines recall that, going all the way back to the landmark presumptions case of Ulster County v Allen, 442 US 140 [1979], the Supreme Court held that resort to a presumption is improper where there is no rational way under the facts of the case for the fact-finder to presume the ultimate fact from the other facts in the case.  

Next time: problems presented by presumption stacking.

Mr. Guilty, I presume? The use of statutory presumptions in criminal prosecutions.

This is the first in a series of several blog posts on statutory presumptions in criminal prosecutions, many of which deal with guns and drugs (presumption that all occupants possess a firearm found in a vehicle [Penal Law § 265.15(3)]; presumption that all occupants of a vehicle knowingly possess controlled substance not concealed on a occupant’s person [Penal Law § 265.25(1)]; presumption of knowing possession by all occupants of controlled substances or marijuana in open view in a room used as a drug factory [Penal Law § 220.25(2)]).  As noted in Handling a Criminal Case in New York (Muldoon, Thomson Reuters, § 1:33 [2015-2016]) “these function as ‘shortcuts’ to allow the prosecution to establish an element of a crime by establishing other facts. 

In future installments I intend to examine presumption stacking, a defendant’s burden to rebut a presumption once invoked, and may also take a separate excursion into common law presumptions: innocence, sanity, competence, regularity, and finality.  But for today, the more basic underlying question: Why do we need or allow these shortcuts?  

We know that to be constitutional, presumptions must be permissive, not mandatory (Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510 [1979]).  So why do we have them at all?  In the absence of a presumption, the prosecution can argue that the jury should reach the same conclusion concerning possession or intent as is suggested by the presumption, and the jury could elect to do so.  Consider, for example, the knowing (or not) possession of gun in room or car –  intent and knowledge are virtually always issues in any criminal prosecution and rarely known or knowable with any certainty, and the fiction of our judicial system that they are knowable with consistently repetitive certainty is as true in cases involving presumptions as in any other.  The use of a presumption therefore, gives the prosecution a legislatively-conferred leg up, where none is needed, and the net effect is the watering down of the constitutionally-required burden of proof. 

In Leary v United States, 395 US 6, 33 [1969], the Supreme Court held that “a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”  Presumptions, then, are justified by the claim that the ultimate fact flows from and is likely true where the underlying inferential facts are proven to exist.  But such claims are not based on any empirical evidence, but rather, hunches, guesses, and “experience” (whatever that means) that is little better than resort to old wives tales and war stories.  

In truth, presumptions represent an unnecessary legislative concession in the absence of any direct evidence that tilts the jury in the direction of a finding that the missing facts are true, basing a verdict on that finding, which a jury could make on its own, without the help of a presumption.  I suggest that real reason for presumptions is fear: the fear of not guilty verdicts where the prosecution has not proven the ultimate fact, resulting in too many probably guilty (but not proven to be so beyond a reasonable doubt) defendants going free, a socially unacceptable result.

Importantly, a presumption can act as the necessary lynch pin of the jury’s verdict.  An example is provided by People v Whitfield, 158 AD2d 922 [4th Dept 1990], where the prosecution failed to request that the jury could presume defendant’s knowing possession of stolen property from his recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime.  Because there was no other evidence of knowing possession, the proof was held to be legally insufficient to support defendant’s conviction.  In other words, had the prosecution requested and the court instructed the jury on the presumption, that permissible inference could have formed the only basis establishing the element of knowing possession.

Importantly, presumptions may not be invoked where the underlying facts needed to support them are not present.  Be careful not to fall into the trap of assuming that because presumptions are present in the statute, they are available upon request in every case.  They are not (see People v Zekaj, 191 AD2d 663 [2nd Dept 1993]; People v Wilt, 105 AD2d 1089 [4th Dept 1984]).

Wilt (which is still good law), offers an important lesson.  In that case, the Fourth Department found the statutory presumption that all occupants of a vehicle are presumed to possess a weapon in the vehicle unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, who presented evidence that he was only in the vehicle for 5-6 minutes before it was stopped, never looked in the trunk (where the gun was found), and did not know there was a gun in the trunk.  The Court, reasoning that there was no “rational connection” between the discovery of the gun in the trunk and Wilt’s presumed possession, reversed his conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Along these lines recall that, going all the way back to the landmark presumptions case of Ulster County v Allen, 442 US 140 [1979], the Supreme Court held that resort to a presumption is improper where there is no rational way under the facts of the case for the fact-finder to presume the ultimate fact from the other facts in the case.  

Next time: problems presented by presumption stacking.